Chapter VIII

General Conclusion



This study has attempted to examine communications policy in Portugal and its links with the EU. We have analysed how telecommunications and broadcasting policies have developed both at regional and national level, particularly since the mid-1980's. In general terms, we tried to demonstrate that:

i) although the EU is playing an increasingly important role in the communications arena, Portugal is still the crucial actor in terms of defining public communication policies;

ii) national communications policy cannot be disassociated from the overall political process and, in fact, the general characteristics of the Portuguese policy-making process are observable in the communications arena;

iii) despite the technological convergence between telecommunications and broadcasting, these sectors are still seen in Portugal as distinctive policy areas.

To expand on these ideas, we started by examining the EU communications policy in order to establish its relevance to Portugal as a member state and as an LFR. Though we considered other international actors involved in communications, we took the view that the EU was, in comparative terms, the most relevant. The EU has been steadily increasing the level of activity in telecommunications and broadcasting and, differently from a number of international organisations, a substantial part of its legislative/regulatory output is binding upon its member states. Then, we moved to the national level of analysis and investigated the aspects of recent political history which were most likely to have an impact on communications policy.
With the basic tools to understand the overall policy process, we went on to cover the historical evolution of both telecommunications and broadcasting. We believe that without assessing the national policy traditions and the domestic actors already involved in communications policy-making, it would have been difficult to critically assess the current situation. In the last two empirical chapters, we concentrated specifically on the examination of national telecommunications and broadcasting since the accession of Portugal into the EEC which coincided with a dramatic intensification of political intervention in the communications arena. Though most crucial policy decisions are still being taken by domestic politicians, often under pressure from national actors, in these two chapters we analysed the inter-action between international developments, regional and national policies. Basically, in this general conclusion we will sum up the most relevant aspects of the empirical chapters whilst relating them back to the theoretical framework.

Although there had been early attempts to intervene in communications, it was only in the 1970's that the EU started voicing with increasing frequency ideas concerning the development of an European telecommunications policy. This was, however, a highly sensitive area: the Treaty of Rome did not specifically provide the Community with competencies in this particular field; the telecommunications networks were considered natural monopolies and manufacturers, PTTs and national governments were satisfied with the status quo. Despite the political hostility, a consensus was achieved around the need to intervene, at least, in the computer and microelectronics sectors because the technological gap between Europe and the US and Japan was more evident. In order to put telecommunications in the political agenda, the Community had no alternative but to link it up to information technology products.

Despite these early efforts, it was not until the early 1980's that significant political activity evolved in that particular area. With the liberalisation and deregulation processes in the US and Japan, companies started turning to the international markets. Faced with the American and Japanese apparent success, the Commission attributed their growth to the enormity of their domestic markets and argued that EU countries were too small to achieve economies of scale in telecommunications products. Manufacturers also argued that national markets were not big enough to support competition. Furthermore, big business pushed for liberalisation because there was a belief that without better communications, European companies would be at a disadvantage. From then on, there was a convincing economic rationale to intervene.

In general terms, it can be said that since the early 1980's the EU telecommunications policy has been developed around two main fronts: firstly, it is part of an industrial policy in the information technology domain to help European companies to regain some of the lost ground, and secondly, it follows the liberalisation and pro-competition bandwagon which started in the US. These two dimensions, although inter-related, reflect different and often contradictory views within the community, between interventionists pushing for a strong industrial policy, and free market believers, such as the Competition Directorate (DGIV), who saw the dirigiste approach as anti-competitive under the Treaty of Rome provisions.
But, if the Commission had difficulties entering the telecommunications domain, it was even more complicated to put broadcasting on the EU agenda. The Commission held the view that broadcasting was a tele-carried service and as such played a seminal role in the development of an integrated market. Nevertheless, most member states were not prepared to accept the argument and sustained that the Commission should not extend its authority into what they saw as essentially a cultural issue. So, the EU's actions in the broadcasting sector had to be undertaken either as strictly economic measures or by using the Commission's limited discretionary spending powers. Just as in the telecommunications sector, and despite fierce resistance, the main rationale to intervene was (and still is) related to the European competitiveness in the world market.

Apart from a few largely unsuccessful initiatives, the EU's intervention in the broadcasting sector started with the Commission's 1984 Green Paper directed to the establishment of a single broadcasting market in the Community, known as Television without frontiers. In this document, the Commission defended the free flow of TV programmes as any other service or good. In the Community, the free movement of goods extends to video cassettes and discs as economic assets in the same way as it does to sound cassettes and records. As a rule, therefore, films, television recordings and the like may circulate without restriction in the Community. The main objective of the Green Paper, and of the subsequent directive adopted by the Council five years later, was to establish a free flow of programmes, removing national regulatory obstacles to free market.

Regardless of its difficulties, the EU has dramatically increased its political intervention in the communications field. In parallel with the overall EU integration process, developments in communications give some credence to neo-functionalist perspectives. Neo-functionalists believe that different European actors cannot achieve their aims without a progressive transference of power to the centre. One political action would demand another one to make it effective and, from this forward linkage or 'spill over' process, a de facto political union would be achieved. Indeed, neo-functionalists were right to point out that integration would be a step by step process and that no a priori goals should be settled because the process would be adaptive and flexible.

Over the last decades, the Commission managed to move forward from intervention in postal services (which were at the time closely related to telecommunications) to intervention on IT and, from IT to telecommunications and, furthermore, from telecommunications to broadcasting. There has been a spill-over process from one policy area to another, as neo-functionalists had predicted. Where this theoretical perspective appears to fail is in its assumption that both European and national actors would realise that their interests would be better served if more power was conferred to the centre. On many occasions, actors did not recognise any interest in moving forward and the Commission, often divided about its own policies, had to struggle to keep integration going. Both regional and national actors pick and choose - according to their interests - in which policy areas integration is desirable and in which it is not. In fact, interest groups move differently, according to their perception of what suits best their immediate goals. The consociational theory correctly suggests that the integration process seems to provide an opportunity for the political and economic elites to favour their own.

The development of the EU communications policy has certainly served the interests of a number of actors.
Manufacturers, for example, have reasons to be satisfied with the way EU communications policy has developed. The EU has not only provided them with R&D funds but also with wider markets to place their products. However, accepting that communications technologies have an enormous economic potential and that economies of scale are needed, only countries with strong electronic industries such as Germany, France and The Netherlands, were likely to benefit. In fact, the EU telecommunications and broadcasting policy - largely developed before Portugal joined the Community - was not conceived to support LFRs but to support European companies to fight US and Japanese competition and to enable them to compete on a world-wide basis.

In terms of R&D programmes (e.g. ESPRIT and RACE), Portugal was one of the countries which benefited less. Whilst Portugal participated in 23 RACE projects, the UK participated in 148, Germany in 146 and France in 144. The other crucial aspect of EU intervention (market liberalisation) was also bound to be far more relevant for the core countries. Portugal has never had an autonomous electronic industry and - at this stage - its electronic industry has no significance. Without an export driven electronic industry, it is difficult to benefit from the opening up of the markets. Additionally, Portugal has no national programming industry, so it has no economic benefits from the opening up of the broadcasting market. The free movement of broadcasting products can potentially benefit countries with a strong broadcasting industry.
Although Portugal is not benefiting from the most relevant aspects of the EU communications policy, it cannot be inferred that regional policies have no impact at national level. In the telecommunications field, the Commission realised that trade-offs were necessary to convince LFRs to open up their markets. Therefore, programmes such as STAR and Telematique were put in place and, as far as the Portuguese case is concerned, they helped to modernise the basic infrastructure and to launch advanced services. The introduction of mobile phone, paging and videoconferencing, for instance, would certainly have been slower if it were not for the EU's financial assistance. Globally, the financial impact of EU R&D programmes has been small (around 5% of gross expenditure in R&D) but locally very significant  - it can be around 40% of the research budget of participating teams.

In line with the consociationalist perspective, national economic and scientific elites have also benefited from integration in the telecommunications sector. The country has certainly lost a degree of control over its telecommunications policy but a number of operators, research centres and universities, mainly based in Lisbon (72% of the EU resources were allocated to the capital), did indeed benefit from the EU handouts. Because financial rewards were available, these elites recognised an interest in moving towards further integration in the telecommunications arena. The same, however, did not happen in the broadcasting sector. Differently from the telecommunications sector, trade-offs in the broadcasting field were non-existent. The Commission had far more difficulty in entering the broadcasting domain and its position is still rather weak. Programmes such as MEDIA 92 and MEDIA 95 are so financially limited that they simply have no impact on the national broadcasting industry. The main national broadcasting actors did not recognise that they could benefit economically from these programmes and therefore they did not get involved and are not lobbying to foster policy convergence in the broadcasting sector.

National interest groups have been using the EU in pursuit of their own interest in a rather different manner. Because domestic politicians are not at ease with the new communications environment, national actors have been using the EU as a testing ground. When broadcasters do not agree with a given domestic policy decision, they attempt to get their voice heard at European level. The Portuguese private broadcasting company TVI, for example, has formally complained to the Competition directorate against the state subsidisation of the public service company RTP. In practice, because the EU communications policy reflects a high level of political ambiguity and contradictory interests, national actors try to use the Commission and the European Court of Justice to try to circumvent domestic decisions. So, the EU is not providing any leadership in the communications arena whilst diminishing the confidence of national governments which lack experience in the international fora in developing a more coherent national communications policy.

The EU has eroded the ability of Portuguese authorities to autonomously determine a national communications policy. Still, in a neo-realist perspective, this study attempted to illustrate that despite the increasing level of international connections between Portuguese communications and international organisations and markets, the core characteristics of the state have not been lost. In spite of the indisputable intensification of transnational links, the interdependency body of literature went at times too far in the dismissal and devaluation of realist concepts. The evidence put forward in this thesis demonstrates that basic assumptions of realism and interdependency are not exclusive of one another: there is more interdependency and states are still crucial actors both in the international and domestic scene. In the telecommunications sector, the Portuguese government has now to operate within a generalist regional policy framework but there is still ample room for manoeuvre. In the broadcasting sector, the impact of EU policies has been so minimal that all important political measures have been taken at national level. A closer look at national politicians who often operate under pressure from nationally-based actors is therefore crucial to our analysis.

The assessment of the recent national telecommunications and broadcasting policy cannot be disassociated from the recent political history of the country and from the general characteristics of the current political process.  Portugal has a long tradition of authoritarianism and democratic institutions - as understood in the West - were only established in the mid-1970's. The repudiation of the Salazar legacy however was far from fundamental and the state remained largely unreformed in crucial areas such as the administrative system, the police and the military. In fact, the tradition of centralisation and control has not disappeared overnight. The adoption of a set of Western style democratic institutions has eased off the repressive nature of the state but political power remained concentrated in the hands of a small minority.
Elite theory argues that political power is highly concentrated in the hands of a small but cohesive elite and, furthermore, that electoral mechanisms do little to diffuse power. Both in the past and in the present, elitism presents relevant explanatory elements to the analysis of the Portuguese case. During the dictatorship, and despite the so-called corporatist apparatus, the executive was the sole actual locus of political power. Presently, because the Parliament largely neglects its legislative functions, the power remains highly concentrated in the hands of the prime minister and a few senior government members, chosen by the prime minister mainly for reasons of personal confidence. So far, elected governments have been packed with ill-prepared elements who generally distrust the administrative bureaucracy, tend to ignore expert advice and are largely unaccountable.

When a small minority of ill-equipped government officials have ample liberties to decide without public debate and consultation, and without being adequately scrutinised by the media or interest organisations (e.g. parties, trade unions, consumer groups, etc.), it comes as no surprise that Portugal has had poor quality executives. Furthermore, the tradition of secrecy inherited from the authoritarian regime has not faded away: most crucial policy options are still taken behind closed doors. If a wider range of people were involved in the policy-making process and if politicians had to publicly justify (in a satisfactory manner) their choices, the country would have an improved political system. The elitist mode of decision-making appears to be more open to manipulation than an approach involving public debate and alternative policy proposals.

Being part of an overall policy process, the definition of the most important policies for broadcasting and telecommunications has been done according to the core elements of the elitist model. In general, communications policy is highly centralised both in political and geographical terms which are naturally inter-related. Most political decisions are taken in Lisbon by a small number of government members and, when crucial issues are at stake, by the prime minister himself. Secrecy is another import aspect of the decision-making process for communications. There is no tradition of disclosure as to how and why a given decision is taken amongst other options. Moreover, mainly because governments lack expertise and are not properly advised, there is no co-ordination between broadcasting and telecommunications policies. So far, there has been a mere set of ad hoc decisions for these sectors, largely as a reaction to internal pressures and technological developments.

In both telecommunications and broadcasting, there are a number of interest groups trying to have a say in the definition of policies. However, and in contradiction to basic assumptions of pluralist thought, power is not highly dispersed among competing interest groups. As far as the Portuguese case is concerned, the pluralist perspective has clear inadequacies. Interest groups, such as trade unions and consumer associations, have traditionally been ignored and only a restricted number of powerful actors (e.g. the Catholic Church and close friends of government members) managed to exercise effective power over political outcomes. Theories of the state help us to understand some general characteristics of Portuguese communications policy but they are less relevant when trying to explain the distinctiveness and particularities of policy areas such as broadcasting and telecommunications.

Like pluralism and corporatism, the literature on policy networks has been used to analyse the interest group intermediation process. But, differently from those theoretical perspectives, the policy network body of literature does not provide an a priori  view as to the way groups behave. This approach emphasises the need to desaggregate policy analysis and stresses that relationships between groups and government vary between policy areas. Policy networks can be understood as a meso-level concept in the sense that it provides a link between the micro-level of analysis, which deals with the role of interests and government in relation to particular policy decisions, and the macro-level of analysis, which is concerned with broader questions concerning the distribution of power in society. The study of Portuguese communications not only requires the understanding of international and regional developments but also the grasp of a number of macro, meso and micro aspects within the national level.

Although - as part of the overall policy process - common characteristics between telecommunications and broadcasting can be identified, these sectors have developed as distinct policy areas. Historically, broadcasting and telecommunications have used different technologies, have had distinct social significance and have been used by politicians for very particular purposes. Apart from the Salazarist period when telecommunications were used for specific political goals, telecommunications have generally been perceived as an instrument of modernisation and as being relevant to the economic performance of the country. Broadcasting has never had any economic significance and broadcasting policy has been, first and foremost, about the control of content. No government has so far restrained itself from intervening in the political output of RTP.

Since the early days, Portuguese telecommunications have been controlled by foreign companies. The country did not have financial resources and expertise to fully develop national and international communications. Contracting out seemed - at the time - the best alternative. In any case, domestic telecommunications developed quite slowly not only because financial resources were lacking but also because there was no political will to improve the situation. During Salazar's authoritarian rule, the development of domestic communications for civilian use was not a priority. International communications however were perceived as relevant to the consolidation of the overseas empire. Particularly since the 1940's and 1950's, Portuguese people were being persuaded to settle in the African colonies. Hence, affordable communications between continental Portugal and the African territories was seen as crucial to unite the scattered parts of the empire. Marconi was important to the development of Salazar's nationalist project.

When the independence wars broke up in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, in the 1960's, Salazar feared for the security of the country and decided not to renew APT's contract and Marconi's shares were bought by the Portuguese state. Telecommunications became then, for the first time, part of the public sector. Salazar's successor, Marcello Caetano, saw telecommunications as a means to help reviving the economy and, in fact, from 1968 to 1974, substantial investments were made in both domestic and international telecommunications. For example, in 1972, Marconi acquired ITT Space Communications satellite stations for Lisbon, Luanda and Lourenço Marques (renamed Maputo).

In clear contrast, television broadcasting has always been in national hands and has always been controlled by the government. Salazar was not particularly keen in having television in the country but Marcello Caetano, his close ally, persuaded him that television was necessary to modernise the regime. Although RTP was set up in the 1950's by a more liberal faction of the regime, the same repressive mechanisms applied to television as to any other medium. Still, while Salazar was the head of government, television was mainly to 'pacify' not to indoctrinate the population. When, in 1968, Salazar withdrew from power, Caetano started using television in a rather different manner. He believed in the power of the media and frequently used television to put his views across. Despite these differences, in terms of ownership and structure of the broadcasting system, nothing has changed under Caetano leadership.

The 1974 revolution did not bring immediate changes to the telecommunications scene and, until the mid-1980's, the political instability was so acute that no important measures could be implemented. Throughout this volatile period, governments were far more concerned with the control of the media rather than with the reform of telecommunications. Pre-censorship was abolished but the most important media still in private hands were nationalised in 1975. This meant that - from then on until the late 1980's - successive governments directly appointed people of their confidence to run those media. With very few exceptions, the most important newspapers and radio stations were state owned and therefore controlled by the government.

The authoritarian nature of the Portuguese state played an important role in the way telecommunications and broadcasting sectors developed. Firstly, because both sectors served the interest of the regime, though in different ways; secondly, because it prevented politicians and the public in general from gaining experience on the workings of a democracy, which has implications in the way politics are conducted up to this day. Maxwell argued, in 1986, that despite the dramatic events of 1974 and 1975, the social composition of the new political class differs little from that of the old regime. 'The  bureaucracy remains in place, merely expanding to accommodate a new political clientele superimposed upon, rather than being modernised by the infusion of new people and ideas' (1986: 135-136). In this historical context, it comes as no surprise that when the first majority government was elected, in 1987, Portuguese communications were so distinct from those in most European countries.

The changes which were introduced in Portuguese communications since the mid-1980's were possible due to a number of international and national developments. Having conservative governments at the time, leading Western governments were arguing for the liberalisation of communications markets and/or privatisation of communications companies. In the same line, the EU had already designed, even if not implemented, legislation concerning the opening up of the European telecommunications and broadcasting markets. In addition, the development of satellite and optic fibre technologies, and the subsequent proliferation of European satellite TV channels, had a significant impact on the national debate concerning the opening up of national television to the private sector. It was argued that once international private TV channels could be received in Portugal, there was no reason why national TV channels should be prohibited.

At national level, a number of circumstances made it possible for communications reforms to be introduced. In 1986, the country joined the EEC which favoured political stability and economic prosperity. One year later, Cavaco Silva got his first majority government which would incidentally be repeated in 1991. The first Cavaco's majority government corresponded to a period of enormous economic growth. A large influx of foreign investment, rising exports and EC grants had a remarkable impact on the country's finances. In these circumstances, the advertising revenue increased dramatically and a variety of periodicals (some quite independent and outspoken) were set up. Telecommunications being essential to the economic reform of the country, this sector was prioritised and, indeed, financial resources were allocated and changes were introduced. Broadcasting was a far more sensitive policy area and only after the 1991 legislative elections was the prime minister prepared to grant TV channels to private capital.

The analysis of the national telecommunications sector since the accession of Portugal into the EEC requires the assessment of both domestic and EU policies and the understanding of the inter-relation between them. When Portugal became a member, the Community had little to offer to LFRs because the most important aspects of the telecommunications initiatives had been conceived to make core countries' industries more competitive. Portugal - with a backlog of isolation and lack of expertise in the international arena - wanted to be seen as a model member state and has not adequately negotiated the introduction of telecommunications reforms at national level. Possibly because political and technical elites did not fully realise what was there to be negotiated, Portugal opened up its domestic market without being properly compensated for it. Though interdependent relationships will always involve costs, since interdependency restricts autonomy, it can be argued that - in this case - Portugal has not fully benefited from what should have been a more equitable interdependency relationship.

In any case, if one takes interdependency as mutual dependency (even if not knowing if the benefits of the relationship will exceed the costs), there is a case for arguing that such a relationship exists between the EU and Portugal in the telecommunications arena. On the one hand, powerful EU actors had very concrete interests in having the market opened up. For manufacturing companies, for example, Portugal was yet another market to place their products or provide their services. For the Commission itself, the opening up of the Portuguese telecommunications market was crucial if economic and political integration was to go ahead in this policy area. On the other hand, and even if Portugal did not properly benefit from the most important aspects of the EU telecoms policy, the country used EU subsidies to expand its basic network and speeded up the introduction of advanced services. Despite the meagre resources of programmes such as STAR and Telematique (particularly if compared with ESPRIT and RACE), a number of PTOs and research centres have benefited from the EU financial support.

So far, the national telecommunications reforms have largely been in line with the EU policy/regulatory orientations. The market was opened up: terminal equipment and advanced services were liberalised; the separation of the regulatory and operational functions became effective; postal and telecommunications services were split up; the sector was re-organised and the biggest telecommunications operator, PT, was partly privatised. However not all these political measures can be understood as a mere result of EU policies because, so far, the EU has developed a generalist legal framework and member states still have room for manoeuvre as the interpretation of the law can vary. Furthermore, the EU does not have any overt policy regarding the organisation and privatisation of telecoms operators. It must be recognised therefore that, although Portugal is following the US/EU liberalisation/privatisation bandwagon, important recent developments in the telecommunications sector say more about concrete domestic interests than regional developments.

 Indeed, the three traditional telecommunications operators were merged into Portugal Telecom because the CTT/TP lobby was more influential than the Marconi lobby which fiercely fought the merger. Likewise, the partial privatisation of PT has taken place because capital was urgently needed. The public companies pension funds had been used to finance the expansion of the network and the development of advanced services. The partial privatisation was perceived as the easiest way of generating cash to cover those funds. Moreover, the Treasury was also expecting to generate extra-funds. Although the EU policies are relevant to our study, crucial aspects of the recent telecommunications reform were designed and implemented by the national government lobbied by a small number of nationally-based actors.

The way the merger of existing public operators into a single company was conducted represents a good example of the suitability of the elite theory to the analysis of Portuguese policy-making. Notwithstanding the fact that a great number of actors had a direct interest in this matter, the decision was taken behind closed doors by a small number of individuals. The government has nor even attempted to justify the paradox of arguing simultaneously for liberalisation and for concentration. On the one hand, the government has been arguing that liberalisation and competition can only be good for the consumer whilst, on the other hand, it has argued that only a big operator could respond to new challenges. In any case, because the government decision was presented as the only way forward, no other alternatives were evaluated and no consistent case was prepared to justify this policy option. Similarly, the partial privatisation of PT was not preceded by any form of public debate or consultation. The tradition of centralisation and secrecy is clearly patent in the way telecommunications policy has developed at national level. If a wider range of interests and expertise were involved in those decisions, other alternatives would have been considered and, what is most relevant in a democratic society, politicians would have had to publicly justify - in a satisfactory manner - their choices.

In contrast with what is happening in the telecommunications arena, national broadcasting policies have not been significantly affected by the EU legal framework. The EU faced great difficulties in entering this domain because national politicians were not prepared to let this highly sensitive area escape their control, and so far, only a minimalist policy framework had been agreed on. Member states can decide on all relevant aspects of broadcasting policy. In the case of Portugal, even the few EU programmes to develop the broadcasting industry have been quite irrelevant. A small number of Portuguese projects have been submitted and approved, and furthermore, national broadcasting companies do not recognise the EU as a particularly significant actor. In fact, the design and implementation of broadcasting policies have been almost exclusively related to the national level of politics. Even if cross-border arguments have been used by a number of actors, national governments would not allow direct external intervention in the definition of basic rules for the broadcasting system.

Broadcasting is directly linked to electoral politics and no government is keen on introducing changes which might diminish the prospects of winning the next election. When in power, national politicians from all affiliations appeared to be satisfied with the television broadcasting status quo. Having direct and/or indirect control over the political output (fictional content was seen as far less important), there was no obvious reason to push for the re-organisation of the sector. However, pressure for the opening up of the sector to private initiative was mounting: ideological and technological changes made it increasingly difficult for the government to justify RTP's monopoly; advertisers and potential winners of the bidding process argue for the move on the grounds that Portugal was once again behind the EU core countries; for the public in general, RTP was perceived to be controlled by governments to such an extent that there was a belief that any alternative to the monopoly would be better.

The constitutional obstacles towards private television were removed in 1989, one year later the Television Law was approved by Parliament and in 1992 two national TV channels were attributed. The real problem with this process was that the government (and other actors involved), were so concerned about who would gain control over the two new TV channels, that all relevant issues associated with the opening up of the market were neglected. Matters such as sources of financing, quality programming, national productions, etc., did not count amongst the preoccupations of those most closely involved in the setting up of the new broadcasting framework. On the one hand, politicians had no previous experience in the re-organising of the broadcasting sector; on the other hand, they did not make an effort to learn from the failures and successes of other countries.

Clearly the government was almost exclusively concerned with who would have the two national channels. The Catholic Church and Pinto Balsemão stood out as the 'natural' choices. None opposed the government and both were at the time, and still are, powerful media actors. The attribution of these channels, meant that the government of the day lost, for the first time, the monopoly of power over television political output. From the setting up of television broadcasting in Portugal in 1956 until 1992, no structural change had taken place in the relationship between the medium and the political establishment. But, apart from the political output which is now more diversified, the new legal framework has created nothing more than financial hardship for the companies and poor quality programming.

In fact, and contrary to the telecommunications sector which has been generously financed by recent governments, the broadcasting sector has been financially stretched to the limit. The opening up of two private channels plus the abolition of the license fee for electoral reasons compelled the four national TV channels to compete fiercely for a small advertising cake. Consequently, so-called public service channels and commercial channels have no resources for quality programming and substantial investments on national productions are not being contemplated. Furthermore, the existing legal framework was so crudely developed that, in practice, it allows TV channels to base their programming strategy on cheap imports and populist programmes. Once ratings became the main factor determining programming, the television output is now geared towards the middle of the market. Programmes designed to appeal to marginal groups or demand more of the viewers have been eliminated. Prime-time TV is now dominated by Brazilian soap operas, 'reality' shows and quiz shows (mainly from foreign formats) and US fiction.

Although the national broadcasting system operates quite independently from EU influence, the programming output is, indeed, dependent on US and Brazilian cheap imports. Still, dependency authors have never developed a framework which could explain, for example, how Brazil (a former Portuguese colony and therefore should have been trapped in the periphery) ended up playing a major role in the Portuguese broadcasting sector. The relationship between Portugal and Brazil in this sector is a case of 'reverse' dependency. Indeed, dependency theory does not provide adequate answers as to the root causes of this cultural dependency. The cultural industries approach has been far more useful in demonstrating why a number of countries have competitive advantages in the programming industry and why recipient countries do no fight back the cultural 'invasion'. Essentially, this body of literature argues that each programme is a new high risk product and that the costs of reproduction and distribution are comparatively very low which means that there are exceptionally high returns to economies of scale leading to a constant push towards audience maximisation. Countries that cannot afford a sustainable level of investment and that have no competitive advantages such as a language market or a big domestic markets will hardly recoup their investments. In strictly economic terms, it makes more sense to Portuguese broadcasters to buy cheap products in the international market rather than investing on national productions.

The cultural industries approach partly explains why broadcasting companies do not invest in national productions. However, the lack of investment in national production and the systematic acquisition of cheap poor quality imports is only possible because, at national level, nothing was done to counterbalance the economic logic of television broadcasting. In addition from being asphyxiated by financial constraints, both public service and commercial television have no effective legal restraints and, consequently, programming is unconditionally designed to maximise audiences. Politicians and other actors involved in the setting up of the new framework knew little about programming and were far more concerned with political/ideological power than with the economic consequences of this venture. In any case, and despite the elements of centralisation in the way the re-organisation of the sector was conducted, it can be said that a limited degree of pluralism did exist. Power was not certainly highly dispersed among interest groups - as pluralists would argue - but there was competition between them.

 Summing up the main conclusions of this thesis, one would have to say that international ideological/political and economic changes, and the EU in a particular manner, do have an impact in the way national communications policy have developed so far. Yet, a neo-realist perspective is indispensable to our analysis. Portugal is still the crucial actor in terms of defining public policies for both telecommunications and broadcasting. At national level, communications policies cannot be disassociated from the overall political process. Indeed, general characteristics of the Portuguese decision-making process such as elitism and/or limited pluralism, centralisation, secretism, among others, are observable in the way policies are developed and implemented in the communications arena. Telecommunications and broadcasting have developed quite differently as these sectors have been used by politicians for distinctive policy objectives. Currently, and despite technological convergence, telecommunications continues to be perceived as being related to economic development whilst broadcasting is seen as being related to content.