1. Introduction

In contrast to what happened in telecommunications, the domestic broadcasting sector has been quite independent from external political pressures. As we have shown in Chapter III, the EU was faced with great difficulties in entering this domain because national politicians were not prepared to let this highly sensitive area escape their control. So far, it has merely developed a generalist framework which member states can interpret in very distinctive ways. The EU legislation for broadcasting has had little impact on the Portuguese broadcasting sector and broadcasting companies do not see the EU as a particularly relevant actor.

In fact, it has been at national level that the most crucial political decisions have been taken, though 'cross border' arguments have played a significant part. The government was satisfied with the Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa's (RTP) monopoly as the control over content was easier to carry through, but  - as we have demonstrated before (see Chapter V) - it was no longer sustainable. Ideological and technological changes made it increasingly difficult for governments to justify a state monopoly over broadcasting. However, in the Portuguese case, the prime minister, Cavaco Silva, delayed the allocation of television frequencies as much as he could. Only after his second majority government was elected, in 1991, was the RTP's monopoly broken up. The private operators allowed to run their own TV channels were Sociedade Independente de Comunicação (SIC), chaired by Pinto Balsemão, an historic member of the Social Democrat Party, and Televisão Independente (TVI), chaired by Roberto Carneiro, a senior member of the second Cavaco Silva's government.
The break-up of RTP's monopoly was the most meaningful change in the television broadcasting sector since RTP was set up in 1956. Since the early days of television in Portugal, no structural changes have occurred in the relationship between the medium and the political power. Direct censorship was abolished after the 1974 revolution but RTP remained under the control of successive governments. A structural change took place in 1992 because, although new national channels were attributed to the safest possible actors,  the government of the day lost, for the first time, the power to exercise direct influence over all television political output. The new commercial channels have their own agendas and the government is no longer able to suppress all sensitive information.

The national broadcasting sector was liberalised without real opposition. With the exception of the Communist Party, all parties favoured the attribution of two TV channels to private operators. Public opinion, in general, was favourable to this move mainly because RTP was perceived as being constantly under direct and/or indirect governmental control. At that time, any alternative was understood as being better than the RTP monopoly. In addition to RTP's lack of credibility, other factors played a role in terms of facilitating the break up of the monopoly. Advertisers and expected winners of the bidding process argued for the opening up, trying to convince politicians and the public that Portugal was once again backwards, losing the liberalisation/modernisation bandwagon. Elements of the political and economic elite, who already had access to satellite television, were also convinced that more national channels would mean more independence from political power and wider choice. The opening up to private initiative was perceived as the 'natural' thing to do because most European countries had already done it. Cross border ideas were taken as almost 'universal truths', pre-empting any serious debate on the contents and the economic viability of four national channels. Indeed, no serious discussion took place about what kind of commercial exploitation should be associated with private channels.

Although the financing of public and private television was a crucial issue, it has never been realistically and efficiently dealt with. The RTP's license fee was abolished by the government before the allocation of the new TV channels with no rationale being given for that political decision. In what was perceived as a populist move, the social democrat government thought to gain political points if voters would not have to pay this 'tax'. From then on, all TV channels would have to depend almost totally on advertising revenues in a very modest advertising market. In 1994, the television advertising market reached no more than £160m and in 1995 it is expected to stay at around £180m. In these circumstances, broadcasting companies are bound to face financial hardship. The recent introduction of Cable TV in Portugal will necessarily fragment audiences even further, reinforcing already existing tendencies.

 In this chapter, we are going to put the Portuguese broadcasting in the context of EU policies in order to assess their relevance. We will then move to the national level and we will examine the recent intensification of domestic political intervention in both terrestrial and cable TV. As cable TV is still in its initial stages, we will pay particular attention to the existing public and commercial terrestrial channels.
 

2. Regional Policies

Despite the EU's attempts to develop a more comprehensive policy for the broadcasting sector, its difficulties have been notorious. In the 1980's, the Commission started arguing that broadcasting was a tele-service and, as such, essential to the development of an integrated economic market. Therefore, the EU actions in the broadcasting sector had to be undertaken either as strictly economic measures which are permitted under the EEC Treaty or by using the Commission's spending powers in programmes such as MEDIA 92 and MEDIA 95. As in the telecommunications sector, the EU rationale to intervene in yet another policy area was related to competitiveness (if nothing is done, the argument goes, Europe will be dominated by US programming imports) but the political and ideological resistance from member states was far more ferocious.

Since the early 1980's, the EU had taken some initiatives concerning the broadcasting sector but the real milestone in the EU's intervention in the sector was the 1984 Green Paper directed to the establishment of a single broadcasting market in the Community (COM (84) 300). This document, known as Television without frontiers, defended the free flow of TV programmes as, indeed, any other service or good. The subsequent directive, adopted five years later, established a free flow of programmes, removing national regulatory obstacles to the free market. Although various issues were covered by this directive, namely advertising, sponsorship and moral welfare of children, a minimalist approach was taken and member states have ample room to develop their own detailed legislation. The most controversial issues such as quotas for European-made programmes were, at the time, effectively neutralised. Countries should comply with EU orientations 'where it is practicable'. To sum up, the most relevant outcome from this directive is that EU governments cannot impede external broadcasts or prevent the free circulation of broadcasting products. This final directive represents a victory for the EU's most liberal forces.

However modest, the dirigistes (mainly DGX) also had a victory with the MEDIA programme. Contrary to most Commission's broadcasting initiatives (for more details, see Chapter III), this programme concentrated on content and aimed at counterbalancing the impact of an open market for broadcasting production. MEDIA's numerous sub-programmes (e.g. Scale, Babel, Script, Cartoon) are supposed to foster cultural pluralism, though their inadequacy to help the audio-visual industries in small European countries is widely recognised.

The broadcasting traditions in the member states were quite different so the EU hardly had the strength to pull together a more comprehensive broadcasting framework. The Television without frontiers directive is so generalist that it does not play any role in the definition of Portuguese broadcasting policy. All crucial issues relating to broadcasting structure such as the number of TV channels, ownership of these channels and means of financing were decided exclusively by the Portuguese authorities, taking into account domestic lobbies and domestic political considerations. Similarly, in terms of broadcasting content, all ground rules (though crudely developed) were set up by national politicians. The opening up of the broadcasting market  - the most significant outcome of EU broadcasting policy - is also quite irrelevant for Portugal. The broadcasting companies do not produce fiction, drama or documentaries. If Portugal has nothing to export, an open market is bound to have no relevance. Furthermore, with the exception of the UK, national broadcasting companies do little business in Europe. They have preferred to buy US and Brazilian fiction instead. As quotas have not yet been put in place (though the issue is high on the political agenda), the EU plays no significant role here as well.

The EU countries most likely to benefit from the EU broadcasting policy are those with the strongest broadcasting industries. Their products can circulate with even more ease and they are the best candidates to get some money out of EU programmes. In any case, programmes such as MEDIA which were designed to stimulate production and increase cultural diversity are having almost no significance for both big and small countries. In almost all MEDIA sub-programmes, Portugal is one of the EU countries with few projects submitted and approved (see Media Desk, 1993; 1993a; 1994; 1995). Between 1989 and 1993, for example, the Script fund has supported two Portuguese movies (Media Desk, 1993:5). Between 1991 and 1992, the Documentary sub-programme has financed one national documentary (Media Desk, 1993:9). In 1993, the Scale sub-programme, which is specifically designed to stimulate production in small European countries has supported four productions (Media Desk, 1993:21). Although the financial allocations have not been fully disclosed and it is not clear what they represent in the overall budget, it is believed that they are very limited indeed. Because the financial rewards are not relevant and difficult to obtain (mainly for bureaucratic reasons), national broadcasters have not shown any particular interest in applying to these projects.

Following the 1994 Audiovisual Green Paper (COM (94) 96), a new MEDIA programme was developed and is due to operate from 1996 until 2000 with a proposed budget of ECU 400m. MEDIA II  (designed to support training and project development where there is an European dimension in the market strategy and encourage the distribution of the European films) is so far the only concrete outcome of the 1994 Green Paper. In this consultation document, the Commission analysis identifies four fundamental requirements for the future of the European Programme Industry: i) it must be competitive in an open, world-wide market; ii) it must be forward-looking and involved in the development of the information society; iii) it must illustrate the creative genius and the personality of the people of Europe and iv) it must be capable of transforming its growth into new jobs in Europe (COM (94) 96).

The 1994 Green Paper reflects distinct (possibly contradictory) goals. On the one hand, it wants to promote economic growth and job creation. On the other hand, it implies that European culture (whatever it entails) should be defended from cheap American imports. Although European culture and identity is often invoked as a rationale for public policy, the EU provides no explanation as to what it means. 'The notion of 'unity in difference' has been convenient for policy makers. It has enabled them to glide over difficult questions' (Collins, 1994:47). Cultural interventionists (mainly within DGX) have, in fact, been emphasising that European culture and/or European identity cannot be disassociated from national culture and identity, and that it must be protected. Still, these preoccupations have had no impact on the development of broadcasting policy in Portugal. Issues of national culture and identity were never addressed by domestic politicians (at least since the 1974 revolution) or by other actors in the broadcasting arena.

At this stage, the EU is not bringing any benefits to the Portuguese broadcasting sector and it might even have perverse effects on the development of a national broadcasting/communications policy. National politicians are aware that EU binding legislation takes precedent over national legislation and they do not want to be challenged by regional decisions. Within the Commission itself there are contradictory  interests and a great deal of ambiguity as to who is responsible for what. The Competition directorate (DGIV) has no direct responsibility over broadcasting but has been successfully exerting influence in this arena. The telecommunications directorate (DGXIII) has been very active in terms of satellite and HDTV policies. DGX has direct responsibility over broadcasting but is perceived as a weak DG, if compared to DGIV and DGXIII. Due to the Commission's internal struggles, contradictory signals are often sent to the member states and unprepared politicians - unclear about their own views - might think that it is safer to do nothing than to act and be challenged later on.
 

3. Public Service, Commercial TV and Economic Issues

Although the EU has not had a direct impact on the definition of the national broadcasting scenario, the development of new terrestrial, cable and satellite commercial channels throughout Europe in the 1980's was very relevant. Traditional public service companies were confronted with new private competitors and, as these changes were noticed in the country, consensus was gained around the need to move in the same direction. In this sub-section, before analysing in detail the Portuguese broadcasting system, we will establish some differences between public service and commercial TV, and we will examine the economic logic which underlines the broadcasting scene.

Public service broadcasting (PSB) is not a precise term, but Kuhn argues (1985a:4-5) that any working definition would comprise at least four elements:

1.  A commitment to balanced scheduling across the different programme genres, with no undue emphasis on any one; hence public service broadcasting institutions have usually been statutory required to educate and inform as well as entertain the audience. One institution has frequently had the task of satisfying all the audience's needs;

2. A broadcast institution is a public body, with normally a high degree of financial independence from both government and commercial sources;

3. The service is provided to all (for example, outlying rural as well as densely populated urban areas) in return for a basic, initial payment, usually in the form of an annual license fee;

4. Political output is obliged to be balanced and impartial.

In addition to these characteristics, PSB can and is often seen as a mission. Blumler (1993:404-7; emphasis in the original) argues that it may be conceived in terms of four communication tasks with four underlying value commitments. The first of these tasks is communication for citizenship, bearing a sense of responsibility for the health of the political process and for the quality of public discussion. A second task is concerned with programming for children, serving as a trustee for the maturing development and educative needs of growing youngsters. A third task mainly for public television is cultural patronage in the best and most accessible sense. This means tapping the society's cultural riches, both classical and current, in literature, drama, art, science, history, music and other forms of performance, and making them available to the mass audience in engaging and entertaining forms. A fourth task for public television, given the openness of private channels to a host of foreign products, is the expression of national and regional cultural identity. This is a matter of treating all forms of programming as able not only to divert but also to give food for thought on those moral dilemmas and social problems that arise in national and sub-national terms.

Since the very beginning, and in spite of all limitations, the BBC became the classic embodiment of the notion of public service broadcasting. The social direction was first reflected in the Royal Charter of 1927 when the company was re-named British Broadcasting Corporation. Two years before, Parliament appointed a committee to consider the future of broadcasting in the United Kingdom. Its role was to consider whether the company formed in 1922 by the Post Office and radio manufacturers should continue to furnish the radio broadcasting service. 'The committee rejected the options of both governmental and private ownership, recommending instead a public corporation that, although ultimately subject to parliamentary control, would nevertheless be invested with the maximum freedom the Parliament is prepared to concede' (Head, 1985:70-71). Parliament accepted the committee's recommendation and authorised the setting up of the new corporation by means of a Royal Charter. This charter establishes the corporation, defines its goals and outlines its constitution.

The second crucial legal instrument of the BBC is the License and Agreement which presents in more detail the relation between the company and Parliament. This document spells out the technical regulations and the extent to which the government may control the BBC finances and programmes and it also defines technical regulations. These legal documents transformed the BBC into a public broadcasting service and its charismatic first Director-General, John Reith, came to be considered as an 'unyielding champion' of the public service. 'As much as possible, he kept the BBC free from direct government control (Head, 1985:74). Indeed, political and economic independence as well as being at the service of the public interest 1 were, and still are, key ideas of what should be expected from public service broadcasting.

The BBC public service model was clearly the most widely imitated and it is still the most important reference for public service broadcasting (PSB). Gradually, after the Second World War, most European countries set up their own PSB which reigned without serious competition up until the 1980's. Although public services varied a great deal, there has been a clear difference between more politically independent services in Central and Northern Europe and substantially controlled public services in Southern Europe. Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece have traditionally had a very close relationship between broadcasting and the political system.

But, particularly since the 1980's, public service television in Western Europe has had to confront competition not only from new commercial terrestrial channels but also from cable and satellite channels. Indeed, the application of new telecommunications technologies to the broadcasting arena has accelerated the pace of private channels' expansion (Peacock, 1986; Locksley, 1989). Technological changes such as the use of higher and until now un-used frequencies, optic fibre cable and ultimately the use of digital transmission modes have made the idea of spectrum scarcity obsolete. This shift in paradigm, away from the former cultural considerations and the re-orientation of the analysis of broadcasting into economic terms, has been accelerated by technological developments which have favoured the expansion of commercial TV channels. Still Garnham emphasises that the public service was not primarily based upon scarcity of frequencies. 'The available frequencies could have been engineered to provide thirteen channels in the major population areas and, within the public service tradition, even with the priority given to equal coverage for all, the fourth channel [in Britain] has been available for allocation since Pilkington reported in 1962. Channels have been limited, whether rightly or wrongly, for social and economic, not technical reasons' (1990:120).

The push towards liberalisation and the break-up of public service monopolies came from the most industrialised OECD countries. Contrary to the United States and Japan which have largely invested in Information Technology (IT) since the 1960's, it was only in the 1980's that Europe, due to a serious economic crisis, made major investments in IT. Mostly in Britain, but also across Europe, old key industries such as shipbuilding and textiles started declining in the early 1970's and still play an important role in the unemployment figures. European countries were also losing competitiveness in medium technology industries like automobiles. European economies are still struggling to catch up the pace of the high technology industries. Sectors like aerospace, nuclear power and computers are in serious difficulties in maintaining world market share.

The decline of the traditional industries was so complex that countries like France, UK and Germany felt they had to find new solutions that lay outside the realms of normal economic management. 'They are looking to new technology as the panacea. The developments in electronics are recognised as providing new markets of enormous potential. Cable TV, satellites, telecommunications equipment and computers are the major growth areas' (Locksley in Marsh, 1983:129). IT has been perceived as crucial because it is a growing market. This market compromises three industries: computers, telecommunications and micro-electronics. 'With technological advance in electronic components, the three traditional markets have coalesced, so that computers and such office products as interactive word processors both use microchips within themselves and communicate with each other via telecommunications links which are computer controlled' (Hills, 1984:8). During the 1980's, the output of these three traditional industries was very significant. According to Hills,  the market was predicted to grow between 13 and 15 per cent  per annum in the world wide demand for information technology products (1984:8).  IT has not only been identified as the major growth area but also as a 'locomotive' for the rest of the industry.

It was in this context that policies were taken to achieve comparative advantage in the international market. Hence, the broadcasting sector, which has traditionally been part of the cultural sphere, has been shifting to the economic domain and has become part of a more comprehensive industrial policy 2. The development of new technologies depended on peoples' willingness to 'consume' them, and European public service monopolies were just one example of what would not be suitable for the expansion of new technologies such as cable and satellite. Not surprisingly, broadcasting liberalisation and deregulation became international buzz-words.

The knock down of European public service monopolies was also related to the increasing strength of liberal ideology throughout the 1980's. There was a belief that, once technology gives the means, the market would be superior to a regulated public service as a mode of cultural production and distribution. Governments and the public were convinced that more TV channels would mean more choice and better programming quality. The main reasons why it would not be the case lie in the economic characteristics of the broadcasting commodity.

The particular features of the broadcasting commodity such as immateriality, novelty, etc. (see Collins,1987) have significant implications in terms of production costs. 'If each programme is in fact a new product then each programme is a prototype' (Locksley, 1988:139). Unlike manufacturing industries,  in programming production almost all costs are protopype costs. The problem with the constant production of prototypes is that there is no direct relationship between investment and success/ revenues. 'The $44 million spent on making 'Heaven's Gate' did not make it a good movie. Released in 1980 it had only earned $1.5 million in rentals on the North American market by January 1985. But 'Raiders of the Lost Ark' made for £22 million and released in 1981 had earned $115.6 million in the same period' (Locksley, 1988:140).

In spite of the high costs, there are large numbers of prototypes reaching the market. Most of them do not have any success but producers know they have to improve the probabilities of having a big hit. The hits pay the costs of the much larger number of misses. So, in cultural products there is a tremendous difference between the costs of the first and second copy. In fact, in cultural industries and particularly in broadcasting there is no real 'production' after the prototype stage. In television the commodity is reproduced. 'In one sense this means a programme, performance or book can be copied many thousands of times. The only input is the video cassette, tape or paper not the whole range of inputs necessary to make the programme, performance or book. In another sense additional customers are served in television broadcasting instantaneously by the act of transmission. In both senses the initial or first copy costs have no relation to the costs of the second copy' (Locksley, 1988:143). As the reproduction costs are very low, there is an exceptional incentive to expand markets.

In addition to economies of scale, economies of scope can also be extremely attractive in economic terms. Economies of scope can be understood as the re-use of the same product in a different form or segmented to a sub-market. Repackaging the same product and re-selling the same content is a very common way of maximising revenues. A movie that does well at the box office might be a good example of the 'cascade strategy'. 'Typically a film will start on its home market, usually the US, before entering foreign theatre showings. After first showings it will be entered at a time appropriate to the financial opportunities in the order: US pay cable television; network television; foreign television and television syndication' (Locksley, 1988:126). Economies of scope have significant implications in the structure of the industry. To take advantage of economies of scope, companies must have access to all the appropriate distributory sub-markets, and small firms can hardly expect to be successful in this race.

These internationalising and often oligopolistic tendencies in programming production have been reinforced by what is known as Baumol's disease. In the 1960's, W. J. Baumol was the first economist to study the impact of production costs in the cultural industry. 'His analysis of US data, not only in the traditional performing arts, but also in the film and network TV industries, leads him to characterise such industries as ones of continual decline to stagnation (see Baumol and Bowen, 1966; Baumol et al., 1984). What Baumol argues is that the basic commodity-production process of the cultural industries is inherently labour intensive because it is concerned with constantly producing prototypes' (Collins, 1987:16). Baumol's theory that performing arts are predestined to be victims of a cost disease is based on the argument that the cost of labour-intensive industries will continuously increase while, due to  technological advances, production costs in manufacturing industries are decreasing. Indeed, in the case of cultural industries, including broadcasting, it is very difficult to increase the productivity of the labour-force (script writers, artists, directors, technicians). Technological advances are particularly important for reproduction and/or transmission of the prototype, not for the production of the 'first copy'.

Naturally, if a country is not prepared to take advantage of economies of scale and scope in this industry, it makes economic sense to buy foreign products rather than make their own investments in high-risk productions. Broadcasting companies are aware that there is no direct relationship between investments and returns. If TV material is to be considered just an economic good, there is no reason to worry about the internationalisation of production and distribution. But if broadcasting products are to be seen as cultural goods, political measures should be taken to cope with the imbalance of trade. As Richard Collins points out, the maintenance of national sovereignty and identity are becoming increasingly difficult as the units of economic and cultural production and consumption become increasingly transnational (1987: 55).
Portugal has no production industry and the four TV channels rely almost exclusively on imported fiction and foreign formats. Once ratings became the main factor determining programming for both RTP and the private channels, the economic difficulties and increasing competition geared television output towards the middle of the market. Programming in general, and in prime-time in particular, moved towards light entertainment and Latin-American soaps (mainly Brazilian but also Mexican and Venezuelan). Programmes which are designed to appeal to marginal groups or which demand more of the viewers have almost disappeared from prime-time. To sum up, national products are practically non-existent and cheap US and Brazilian products are clearly dominant. The so-called 'lowest common denominator theory' (see, for instance, Hellman and Sauri, 1994) clearly explains the Portuguese scenario in terms of television programming.
 

4. The Opening up of the Portuguese Market

In Portugal, there has been considerable debate about private television, in particular, since the 1982 Constitutional changes. The 1976 Constitution states that no TV channel could be privately owned and the 1982 review did not contemplate any changes in this area. Nevertheless, it unleashed some controversy about the issue. The Catholic Church was one of the first actors to openly express its desire to own and run a private TV channel but the political and economic conditions were not favourable. In the early and mid-1980's,  there was political instability and a serious economic crisis. The situation would only change after Portugal's entry into the European Community in 1986.

From 1987 onwards, there was considerable economic growth and the social democrats brought political stability to the country. As the advertising market expanded so others expressed interest. The Balsemão, Sonae and Presslivre groups started to seriously evaluate the possibilities in the new context. This process, however, was delayed until the early 1990's because the government had to concentrate its efforts on the re-organisation of the radio sector whose expansion had been chaotic since the mid-1980's. When local and regional radio frequencies were attributed, political interest moved again to private television.

The constitutional obstacles towards private television were removed on the 1st of June 1989 when the National Assembly approved amendments in the legislative text by a two thirds majority. The new text allowed TV channels to be privately owned. The next highly controversial step was the drafting of a new television act. Conflicting interests were at stake and, once again, the Catholic Church was in the centre of the polemic. The Church wanted to be granted a TV channel without participating in the bidding process. So, when the government's law proposal was known, the Portuguese bishops went publicly against the government saying that 'the law proposal does not correspond to former commitments and to what was expected, it does not safeguard the Church's rights consigned in the Constitution' (Público, 7 February 1992:5). In the 1970's, the Church had been granted an assurance by the former prime minister, Sá Carneiro, that it would be attributed a television channel. Hence, the religious leaders felt they were now being unfairly treated. The Church's Rádio Renascença  network was used to put these arguments forward and clerics throughout the country were given the task of reading and commenting on the bishops' position.

In the middle of these serious rows and hot debates, on the 13th of July 1990, the Parliament approved a new television law which did not contemplate any privileged position for the Catholic Church, but it also did not prevent the Church, in any way, from applying for a channel. The law says that 'the activity of television cannot be exercised and financed by political parties or associations, unions, professional and employers organisations, and by local authorities' (law nº 58/90, Art.3º). Still, significantly, religious organisations were not mentioned in this law. So, the Catholic Church was allowed to enter the competition.

Once the new television law was passed and the bidding regulations approved, on the 2nd of April 1991, three candidates applied for the two available national TV channels: the Sociedade Independente de Comunicação (SIC) led by Pinto Balsemão; TV1 Rede Independente, chaired by Proença de Carvalho with the support of the Carlos Barbosa media group (Presslivre), and Televisão Independente  (TVI), close to the Catholic Church. The other potential candidate, Sonae group, announced in January 1991 that it would give up the competition. Sonae is a successful economic groups and the predictable lack of advertising revenues certainly contributed to its pulling out. Applying for a TV channel would be an expensive exercise and Sonae's chances of winning, whatever the quality of the project, would be very slim indeed. Sonae was - at the time - perceived as being close to the Socialist Party and the group's newspaper, Público, was often critical of government's policies.  Hence, in spite of its economic strength, Sonae's political weight was limited.
The three candidates put forward quite different projects which the government, with the approval of the Alta Autoridade para a Comunicação Social  (AACS), had to choose from.

The Proença de Carvalho candidacy (TV1) promised to broadcast from 8am to mid-night on a daily basis (on week-ends it could go until 2am). The channel would be generalist and popular. Programming would comprise news programmes (four news bulletins were predicted: three short ones and an extended one at night), telenovelas, talk-shows, movies, series and sports. According to the chairperson, the cornerstone of this project would be the emphasis on national production and the exclusivity of national capital. However, it was reported that there were contacts between Proença de Carvalho and Silvio Berlusconi, who would be prepared to make some investments in the Portuguese private television (see e.g. Público, 6 February 1992: 22) This project was not selected, although Proença de Carvalho is a well known public figure, close to the social democrats, and with experience in the television arena. During Balsemão's government, Proença de Carvalho was the head of RTP. His political weight is considerable and, if the Church had not been in competition, Carvalho's project would have been selected. Even if other strong candidates had run, this candidacy would have had a real chance.
Pinto Balsemão was the public face of the Sociedade Independente de Comunicação candidacy. SIC said that it was prepared to broadcast from 5.30pm to after mid-night. During week-ends, it would start at 3.30pm. Although SIC's general buzz-words were 'difference, popularity and intelligence', the main emphasis of this project was on information. Four news bulletins were predicted. SIC programming, which could be changed each time the news justified, would include series, talk-shows, competitions and movies. At this early stage, SIC had 17 shareholders, from which the most important were Soincom, SGPS (25%); Globo Participações (15%); Banco Mello (10%); Espírito Santo Sociedade de Investimentos (6,25%) and Banco Totta & Açores (6,25%). Pinto Balsemão himself has 2,5% of the shares. According to Portuguese law, no national citizen or economic group is allowed to own more than 25% of the company, and no foreign company can invest in more than one TV channel nor is the foreign participation of any channel allowed to exceed 15% (law nº 58/90, Art.9º). This piece of legislation has been accepted with regard to non EU members. But TVI, for instance, has recently increased its foreign (EU) capital to approximately 40%, arguing that 'non-discrimination' EU legislation is in contradiction with national laws. In any case, this argument cannot be used for non EU members and the Brazilian Globo network could only invest the maximum allowed by the Portuguese law.

Given that the negotiations between the Church and the government for a direct attribution of a TV channel failed, the Church went ahead with its candidacy. The main idea behind this project was to set up a channel of 'Christian inspiration' of true 'quality' and 'public utility'. Broadcasting was supposed to start on week days at 5pm and finish transmission around mid-night, whilst on week-ends it would go from 10am to 1am. In terms of programming, three news bulletins a day were predicted and, like the other projects, it would include series, movies, sports, quizzes and talk-shows. Although this would not be a 'religious' channel, TVI considered in its candidacy space for religious content. TVI had also plans to co-operate with television stations from the Portuguese Speaking African Countries (PSACs). The most important shareholders of this project were Rádio Renascença, the União das Misericórdias, Editorial Verbo  and Companhia de Jesus (institutions directly or indirectly related to the Catholic Church). The international shareholders were The Luxembourg Television Company (CLT) and the Spanish private television, Antena 3.

So, it was in this context that the Government and the Alta Autoridade para a Comunicação Social  had to decide. Politicised and without resources and credibility, the AACS  was not prepared to put forward its views on such a sensitive issue. But, as its opinion was required by the Constitution, the High Authority decided for 'technical equality' and no candidacy was excluded. The TV1 project (Proença de Carvalho) was considered 'deliberately ambitious', TVI's (Church) understood as 'modest' and SIC's (Balsemão) as 'balanced'. In this context, it was exclusively up to the government to decide on the issue. At that stage, the process was totally in control of the prime minister. Although in the beginning other senior politicians were involved, when final decisions were to be taken, Cavaco Silva managed the process himself.
On the 6th of February 1992, after a Cabinet meeting, the ministro Marques Mendes, announced publicly the results: SIC was attributed the third national channel and TVI got the fourth channel. According to Marques Mendes' speech, these decisions were taken considering the AACS opinion and four additional criteria: technical quality, economic viability, type and characteristics of the programming and the candidates ability to satisfy diversity and public interest (Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, 6 February 1992). But, for the opposition and for TV1 this result was no more than a 'political decision', taken without transparency. When the decisions were known, the editorial of Público newspaper stated: 'The government took the less politically damaging decision attributing the two private channels to the Church and to Balsemão, the candidates with more 'specific weight' (7 February: 3).

At that time, attention was almost exclusively concentrated on who would gain control over the two new TV channels. This is hardly surprising given that - until then - the state/government which owned RTP had effective editorial control over the company's output. If the same were to happen  with the new TV stations, politicians holding office would have to be extremely careful as to who 'deserved' such a  powerful instrument. All other crucial issues associated with the opening up of the market, such as sources of financing, balanced programming, national production, etc., were neglected. The Television Law (58/90 of 7 September), passed by Parliament, was so badly drafted that it is totally ineffective and allows TV channels to take the easier option: cheap imports and populist programmes.

According to this piece of legislation, the generic objectives of television - both public and private - are i) to contribute to educate and inform the public and to promote cultural values which express the national identity, ii) to contribute to the formation of a critical conscience, stimulating creativity and free expression, iii) to contribute to the entertainment and education of the public and iv) to favour the exchange of ideas between national citizens and foreigners, particularly Portuguese language speakers (article 6). These objectives are obviously a dead letter because no specific legislation was developed and there are no means to implement them. The law does not contemplate any relevant programming requirements. It does say that 40% of the broadcasting time 'should' be in Portuguese, of which 30% 'should' be of national production and 10% of in-house production (article 19). This is of no significance as companies can easily comply with news bulletins, national sports and Brazilian soup operas. Other aspects of programming such as European production and nationally based independent production are to be observed 'whenever possible'. In fact, the Portuguese broadcasting regulatory framework is so vague and generalist that companies can literally do what they want in terms of programming strategies. The creation of a programme regulator such as, for example, the British Independent Television Commission (ITC) was never contemplated.
 

5. Public Service Broadcasting in Portugal

If one takes Kuhn's working definition of Public Service Broadcasting (PSB), as considered above, it must be recognised that in Portugal there is and there has never been a PSB. RTP has never had a balanced and impartial political output, it has been financed mainly (and now almost totally) by advertising revenue; thus, it has never had a high degree of financial and political independence. Finally, its statutory requirement to educate, inform and entertain has not been taken seriously. In general terms, the Portuguese PSB has been controlled by the government and operates like the other commercial channel.

With the increasing competition from private operators, RTP became more populist than ever and less concerned with a PSB mission, as defined by Blumler (1993:404-9). In any case, RTP is - according to the Constitution and law nº58/90 (Art.5) - a public service company. But because the license fee had been abolished and because RTP was due to start operating in a competitive environment, in August 1992, the government ordered a study to evaluate 'the true cost of public service obligations' so that the PSB company could be financially compensated. Following this study, a contract 3 was signed on March 1993 between the State and RTP. This contract stated how and for what services RTP would receive direct subsidies from the government of the day. Some of these services are: provision of RTP's signal for all Portuguese living in continental Portugal, broadcasting to the autonomous regions of Madeira and the Azores, the maintenance of the audio-visual archives, the production of programmes and broadcasting to the Portuguese communities abroad, co-operation with the Portuguese Speaking African Countries, concession of air time to political parties, professional organisations and religious broadcasts, among others (clause 12). In order to be partly or fully compensated for these public service 'tasks', RTP would have to prepare annually a public service activity plan and would have to draw up a budget for these activities to be carried out (clause 15). The execution of the contract would be supervised by the Ministry of Finances and by the government's member with responsibility for Social Communication (clause 18).

The public service contract signed after the two private channels were already operating created (rather than solved) serious difficulties in the new broadcasting environment. Unwittingly, this document reflects the government's view that public service broadcasting consists of the fulfilment of given tasks rather than a structured framework for the company's overall operation. This means that 'public service tasks' apart, RTP is a commercial television station fighting for advertising revenues for its channels as fiercely as the other two private channels. In 1993 and 1994, the government has compensated RTP with around £28m per annum, a sum which is less than that the company has argued for (Público, 8 March 1994:19). RTP's chairperson, Freitas Cruz, has argued that because the majority of the company's activities must be paid by advertising revenues, RTP has no other choice but to be a commercial operator (Ibid.).

This contract has been severely criticised by the new operators which have contested the fact that RTP has had no advertising ceiling and argue that for the money the government is prepared to pay RTP, they too are fully prepared to perform public service tasks (Balsemão, interview 4:10.01.95 and Carneiro, interview 5:11.01.95). The problem for the government now is that it is tied up to a contract which neither solves RTP's financial problems (by the beginning of 1995, RTP's debt was believed to be £72m) nor allows the two private channels to benefit from a bigger share of the television advertising cake. Overall, in the first year of private television, the four channels lost £80m (Diário de Notícias, 10 January 1994: 2 Negócios ).

Indeed, private operators have been very critical of the government's policy for the television broadcasting sector, as they believe the executive is benefiting the station it controls best, the RTP. 'The political power has acted as the owner of a station, not as a referee', argues Pinto Balsemão, adding that RTP does not provide the public with programming that can be identified as 'public service', so it should be financed voluntary by the civil society and not by the tax payers (interview: Op. Cit.).  TVI's chairperson, Roberto Carneiro, also argues that RTP should not have the monopoly of public service tasks: 'I am convinced that for the money the government is paying RTP, I would provide a better public service' (interview: Op. Cit.). In spite of the criticisms, in the near future, the Constitution and/or the television law are not likely to be changed, and according to both, RTP is the sole provider of public service in the country.
 

5.1. Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa

Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa  (RTP) was granted the exclusive concession for television broadcasting in October 1955 and its regular broadcasts started on the 7th of March 1957. The Salazar government, acting on the recommendation of a TV study committee, had issued this exclusive license for twenty years, with a provision for extending it by consecutive periods of ten years, and an option for the government to purchase the corporation after its first ten years in operation. RTP was a corporation whose shares were divided into three parts, held by the government, Portuguese commercial radio stations, and banks and other private companies. Its technical operations were to be regulated by the PTT, and its supervision was the responsibility of a Board of Directors partially appointed by the government. RTP's status remained unchanged until the 1974 Revolution, when a new Constitution led to a redrafting of the 1955 Television Broadcasting Act. A further redrafting in 1979 changed RTP from a mixed ownership company to a public company. The latest shake up of the company was due to the opening up of the television broadcasting sector to private operators (for more details on RTP's history and politics, see Chapter V).

Currently, RTP operates five distinctive channels: Canal 1, TV2, RTPInternacional, RTP-Madeira  and RTP-Açores. Canal 1  is, according to the Public Service contract (clause 4), a generalist channel, with diversified options, destined to serve the generality of the population; TV2 is expected to complement Canal 1 and is designed to serve potentially minority groups. Having an educational vocation, TV2 is supposed to pay particular attention to literature, science, music, theatre, opera, ballet and arts in general. RTPInternacional (RTPi) is the international channel of RTP which broadcasts, via satellite, mainly to the Portuguese communities abroad and to Portuguese speaking countries around the world. RTP-Madeira and RTP-Açores  are regional channels, covering these two autonomous regions.

The average broadcasting time for RTP's channels in 1993 is as follows: 18,5 hours per day for Canal 1; 16,75 hours for TV2; 14 hours for both RTP-Madeira and RTP-Açores, and 7 hours per day for RTPi. RTP has production centres in Lisbon, Oporto, Madeira and the Azores. Within the national territory, RTP has offices in the cities of Vila Real, Bragança, Viseu, Coimbra, Évora and Faro. Foreign delegations and/or foreign correspondents are based in Brussels, Maputo, Moscow, Luanda, Washington, Madrid, Rio de Janeiro, Bone, Paris, Geneva and Cologne (RTP, 1994).

In spite of its deep financial difficulties, RTP has - in its chairperson's words - managed to maintain some production capability. 'The company is still producing theatre plays, concerts, operas, children's programmes and some original fiction' (Cruz, interview 6:10.01.95). However, RTP's production capability has been severely criticised for being in the hands of three production companies owned by three key television personalities: Carlos Cruz Audiovisuais (CCA) owned by Carlos Cruz; Nicolau Breyner Produções (NBP), owned by the actor Nicolau Breyner and MMM owned by the former RTP's Information Director, José Eduardo Moniz. A well known RTP journalist, Barata-Feyo, has argued that if these three companies - for any reason - stopped producing, everything that is considered to be RTP production would be stopped as well (interview to Diário de Notícias, 1 November 1994:15). In practice, these three companies are believed to have the strength to paralyse RTP.

Being a 40-year old company, RTP has well established links with international organisations, foreign broadcasting companies and suppliers. According to RTP's chairperson, Freitas Cruz, English speaking products (mainly from the US, but also from the UK) are still the number one in terms of imports (interview: Op. Cit.). Brazil comes second, Globo 7, Manchete and Serviço Brasileiro de Televisão (SBT) being the main suppliers. From these TV networks and producers, RTP imports a great number of telenovelas. TV producers in other languages, rather than English and Portuguese, have not successfully exported their products to RTP. German, French and Spanish products, for instance, have not been particularly well received.

The Portuguese PSB company is a big consumer of foreign products but, so far, it has not been able to sell its own productions, however few. The company's products have only been well received in the former Portuguese colonies in Africa (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and S. Tomé e Príncipe) where television studios have been set up with RTP's technical know-how and financial assistance. Still, RTP has not financially benefited from the broadcasting of its products in these African countries because, since  the companies cannot afford imports, RTP is giving some of its productions free. RTP's links with the Portuguese Speaking African Countries (PSAC's) have been further reinforced by the signing of the Public Service contract which specifically states that the company is obliged to co-operate with the PSAC's in terms of programme production, training of personnel and technical assistance (clause 8).

From an institutional point of view, RTP - as a public service broadcaster - has a long standing relationship with the European Broadcasting Union (EBU). Contrary to the EBU, the EU institutions appear not to have any practical relevance to RTP. 'One cannot talk about a fruitful relationship between EU institutions and RTP', says Freitas Cruz (interview, Op. Cit.). Indeed, RTP is not participating in EU programmes such as MEDIA, and much of EU legislation, in terms of production and advertising quotas, are not taken seriously because it is widely acknowledged that the EU has no means to implement its policies. In recent years, Portuguese television companies have been concerned with domestic issues such as the government decisions for the sector and competition with other national channels.

RTP is now 100% owned by the state and there are no plans to introduce private capital into the company. RTP has traditionally owned its distribution network but, just before the opening up of the television sector to private initiatives, the government decided to take the transmitter network from RTP and set up Teledifusora de Portugal (TDP), a new company which could distribute TV channels' signals. TDP was later integrated into the biggest Portuguese telecommunications operator, Portugal Telecom (PT) and both RTP and SIC are paying PT for the service. TVI decided not to use TDP services and set up its own network. RTP is paying PT an annual fee of around £14m for the broadcasting of its two national channels. The government's decision to take the transmitter network from RTP complicated RTP's finances even further and is yet another example of PT winning out versus other actors (see Chapter VI).

RTP is a bureaucratic public company with a staff of around 2,200. Administrations have been appointed on a political basis and consequently the company has a long history of poor management. By the beginning of 1995, RTP's debt amounted to around £80m. So, expenses will most certainly be cut and lay offs are feared among RTP employees.

5.1.1. Canal 1

Canal 1 is a popular and generalist channel. In spite of public service obligations, Canal  1 has  a clearly commercial strategy and has, so far, managed to maintain the highest share of audience (around 45% 8) and the highest share of advertising revenues (around £85m in 1994 9) in the new competitive environment. Although this channel's journalistic output has traditionally been under government control, programming in general has been relatively free from political and economic pressures. Aggressive scheduling and fierce fights for audiences is a recent phenomena, due to the channel's need to maintain a substantial share of advertising revenue. The ferocious competitiveness with the new private channels has been severely criticised and the company's chairperson himself admitted in an interview to Expresso that competition has been excessive and that RTP's reputation was at stake (13 February 1993).

Although significant changes have not taken place, Canal 1 has slightly reduced its aggressive scheduling. Considering one programming day (Monday, 16 January 1995 10),  one can see that Canal 1 starts broadcasting at 8am with Bom Dia (Good Morning), a live programme with news, sports, cartoons, etc. Up until the one o'clock news bulletin programmes vary from telenovelas (two in this period of time) to children's programmes, food programmes and American series. In the afternoon, up until the main news programme at 8pm, schedules show another telenovela, one talk show, one special news programme for children, an American series and a quiz show. After the main news bulletin (domestically produced), at peak time, Portuguese is the language of the three following programmes: at 8.30pm, a Brazilian telenovela, at 9.25pm, a sitcom (Nico D'Obra) with national actors, including Nicolau Breyner, and at 10pm, Zona +, a talk show hosted and produced by Carlos Cruz. After 11.30pm, there are another news bulletin, a sports programme, and two English speaking programmes: a series and a movie.

Looking at Canal 1 peak time scheduling it becomes clear that the channel is geared towards ratings, neglecting its public service mission, as considered by Blumler who argues that the first PSB task is communication for citizenship 11, bearing a sense of responsibility for the health of the political process and for the quality of public discussion (1993:404-7). In fact, an analysis of a programming week (from the 14th of January to the 20th of January 1995 12), nor even one documentary or investigative journalism programme was scheduled. The only programme in which there is public discussion is Prova Oral, a live programme on which public figures (not necessarily politicians or political analysts) are interviewed by José Eduardo Moniz, the former RTP's director of Information. Yet, this programme was scheduled at 10.50pm of a week day. In general, after the main news bulletins, peak time programmes are telenovelas, variety shows, talk shows, quiz games and sports.

5.1.2. TV2

From 1955 to 1968, RTP had only one channel. A second one, at that time called RTP2, started broadcasting to the Lisbon area 13 years after regular broadcasts started in Portugal. Renamed TV2  in 1992, this channel can now be considered the less commercial face of RTP as the channel is making an effort to address the needs of minority groups. Its cultural vocation is legally defined and, in spite of its political and financial ambiguity, TV2  has taken its public service mission more seriously since the beginning of 1995. During the first two years of competition, TV2  reacted as any other commercial channel, ignoring its duties as an alternative public service channel. In terms of audiences, TV2  maintained higher ratings than both private channels up until September 1993, declining steadily since then. By January 1995, its share of the audience was the lowest, with 6,1% (AGB figures).

Considering one programming day (Monday, 16 January 1995), TV2  starts at 4pm with one hour of tele-shopping, followed by a series and a children's programme. In the evening, after 8.45pm, its schedules show a programme about health issues, a programme about contemporary Portuguese music, a news bulletin, a programme about cultural events in Portugal, a US movie and, finally, another programme about classic themes in Portuguese music.

TV2  has clearly a wider variety of television genres and appeals to minority groups. In the programming schedule from the 14th to the 20th of January 1995, one can notice the existence of documentaries like Gente Remota  (Remote People) and Homem e a Cidade (Man and the City), programmes geared to financial consumers (e.g. Dinheiro em Caixa), religious programmes such as the Sunday Mass and 70x7, movies and series. Broadly speaking, in this week TV2  gave considerable space in peak time to high culture programmes such as opera, theatre, music and other forms of art. Given that all other national channels show at least four telenovelas  per day, its absence in TV2  must be recognised.

5.1.3. RTPInternacional

Having started in 1992, RTPInternacional (RTPi) is the most recent RTP channel. It broadcasts to the Portuguese emigrant communities and to the Portuguese speaking people around the world. RTP's chairperson argues that it is the most noble of the public service tasks: 'being the Portuguese a people of diaspora, RTPi is a way of sharing our reality with the Portuguese abroad and foreigners with interest for the Portuguese culture' (interview, Op. Cit.). Although national politicians did not attempt to outline what they meant by national/cultural identity,  RTPi was justified on the grounds that the identity of the Portuguese emigrants should be maintained.

RTPi's programming is a combination of mainly Canal 1 and TV2 programmes (news bulletins, entertainment and fiction) and its own production. In 1994, the international channel was broadcasting eight hours per day, but there are plans to increase the broadcasting time up to 24 hours per day (Público: 11 November 1994:21).  If this is to happen, RTP will be pressured to include SIC and TVI programmes in the RTPi's schedule because it is legally possible and because private channels have been arguing for it. Still, this will not be easy to negotiate: RTP might not be prepared to pay private channels for their input into the international channel and it has its own human and technical resources to expand the number of broadcasting hours. Furthermore, the costs of production and transmission of RTPi are paid directly by the government. So, it does not represent an additional burden on RTP's finances.

The Companhia Portuguesa Rádio Marconi (Marconi), the Portuguese international telecommunications operator (now owned by PT), is responsible for RTPi satellite broadcasts. Although no accurate figures of RTPi's audience exist, this channel can be received in a large number of countries and experiments are being done to make it a truly global channel. According to the channel's director, Afonso Rato (quoted in Público, 11 November 1994:21), there are tests now being done with the new satellite Express 2 which will enable RTPi to be received in Brazil and all South America. Besides, with the launching of the Chinese satellite APStarII, RTPi will be received in Asia and Australia. At this stage, RTPi is being received in Europe, Africa and North America.

5.1.4. RTP-Madeira and RTP-Açores

In addition to the channels referred to above, RTP has two regional channels: one in the autonomous region of Madeira and the other in the autonomous region of The Azores .13 Both regional channels develop their programming schedules based on Canal 1 and TV2 programmes, combined with their own production. The Public Service contract, established between the Portuguese state and RTP, states that it is RTP's obligation to ensure the needed means for the exchange of information and programmes with the autonomous regions and to promote the production and transmission of regional programmes (clause 5). Much of the regional channels' content comes from the two RTP national channels, but RTP-Madeira and RTP-Açores produce regional information and a very few fictional programmes.
 

6. Commercial Television

6.1. Sociedade Independente de Comunicação

Sociedade Independente de Comunicação (SIC) was the first private national TV channel operating in Portugal. Regular broadcasts started on the 6th of October 1992, eight months after the Council of Ministers granted the company a broadcasting license. The project's leading figure, Pinto Balsemão, had started to put pressure for the opening up of television to private initiative in the mid-1980's, but the 1982 Constitution stated that television could not be the object of private ownership (Art.38, nº 7) and - at that time - the political climate was not favourable to constitutional changes. It would be only in 1989, when the Constitution was revised 14, that SIC had the opportunity to develop its strategy in order to successfully apply for a license. SIC's license was granted by the government on the 6th of February 1992.

SIC is a commercial, generalist and populist station. Both its chairperson and its share holders deny political objectives in this venture. Pinto Balsemão describes it as a journalistic project and even refers to objectives such as the defence of press freedom, defence of the functioning of the democratic institutions and contribution to a more egalitarian society (interview:10.01.95). Still, so far, SIC has engaged itself in a fierce competition for audiences regardless of quality criteria and programming diversity. Fight for audiences and publicity has been the rationale of the station, compromising journalistic and fictional content. In an interview in Diário de Notícias (6 October 1993:17), SIC's Programmes Director, Emídio Rangel, argued that a TV channel should not have a formative/educational component, justifying in this way soft-porn shows the station was broadcasting during prime time.

Since the very beginning, SIC's strategists decided to compete directly with RTP's Canal 1. The confrontational strategy did not work and, during the first months of 1993, SIC saw its audience stagnate at around 10% whilst Canal 1 got between 70% and 60% of the total share (AGB figures). SIC's initial strategy consisted of putting forward on peak time the same television genre as its 'adversary': to a news programme in Canal 1 would correspond a news programme in SIC, to a telenovela in Canal 1 would correspond a telenovela in SIC, and so forth. Asked by Público newspaper (24 September 1992: 19) if this was not a risky strategy, Pinto Balsemão argued that it was not because their programming was better. Yet this strategy failed as RTP, in spite of financial difficulties, was a resourceful and experienced company. SIC had no other option but to change its strategy.

The watershed in terms of programming and audience would only materialise in the second semester of 1993 when a series of popular foreign formats were adapted to Portuguese language and aired on peak time, immediately after the Brazilian telenovela. Minas e Armadilhas, Falas Tu ou Falo Eu  and Chuva de Estrelas  were crucial shows in helping the station get a higher share of the audience. From May 1993 to December 1993, it gained 10% of the total audience and progressed steadily up to more than 30% the following year (AGB figures). SIC understood the interest for light entertainment in Portuguese, but at this level it has not offered more than talk shows, quizzes and sports shows. Fictional content in Portuguese (excluding Brazilian telenovelas), such as drama, series and films, is almost non-existent. Since the beginning, SIC has only produced a mini-series with ten episodes (A Viúva do Enforcado). More has not been done because of financial difficulties and because of the risks involved - quality programming is no guarantee of audiences.

Considering one programming day (Monday, 16th of January 1995) 15 , SIC starts broadcasting at 11am with two Brazilian telenovelas followed by a news bulletin at 1pm. The afternoon continues with another Brazilian telenovela followed by an American movie and a Children's programme. A small news programme goes on the air at 5.45pm pursued by Praça Pública, a popular show of 'social' journalism. Another Brazilian telenovela is on the air before the main news programme at 8pm. The fifth Brazilian telenovela of the day is shown at 8.50, after the weather broadcast and a fashion show. From 9.50pm on, the evening is filled with a US movie and a last news bulletin.

Taking the week from the 14th of January 1995 to the 20th of January 1995 16, SIC put on the air five different Brazilian telenovelas daily from Monday to Friday, two on Saturday and one on Sunday. The four news bulletins are also maintained throughout the week. Considerable differences occurred only in the evening schedule, after the fifth telenovela. Quizzes and variety shows in Portuguese language, mostly from imported formats, are clearly dominant: on Tuesday, Ora Bolas Marina and Labirinto, on Wednesday, Perdoa-me (this being a reality show in which people's emotions are openly exploited), on Thursday, Os Trapalhões  and on Friday, Chuva de Estrelas, a show dedicated to talent hunting. Overall, SIC broadcasted, in 1994, 49.64% of programmes in Portuguese language from which 13% were Globo telenovelas, 7% external productions and 29% home productions, including information, sports, promotional features, among others (SIC, 1994, unpublished material).

SIC has an obvious deficit in television genres such as documentaries, programmes of investigative journalism and drama. During the week we are considering, only two programmes were dedicated to in-depth political interviews, Terça à Noite  and Sete à Sexta. and, as we stated before, SIC has only produced one mini-series (costing around $1m). Their own documentaries and investigative journalism programmes on the lines of, for example, BBC's Panorama or Channel Four's Dispatches are totally non-existent. The station's chairperson, Pinto Balsemão, says they would like to have more documentaries, better cinema and to produce their own music shows, but argues that what they broadcast is 'acceptable' (interview, Op Cit.).

In terms of external relations, Globo - Brazil's multi-media empire 17 - is clearly the most significant partner of SIC. Since the very beginning, Globo's managers and personnel have provided SIC with both technical know how and strategic expertise. Pinto Balsemão says that there is an 'intimate' relationship between Globo and SIC: 'They have given us plenty of advice, we tried to follow them and it has been very fruitful' (interview: Op. Cit.). To SIC's chairperson, this privileged relationship is only natural since Globo  is a share holder and it has a member sitting on SIC's administrative board (Ibid.). Indeed, Globo has the maximum of shares allowed by the Portuguese law for a foreign investor (15%).

Additionally, SIC imports from Globo around £5,200m in telenovelas alone. Even if legally Globo cannot acquire a higher percentage of shares, its importance as an 'adviser' and as an exporter of highly popular products makes it one of the most influential share holders of the company. The other share holders of SIC are the so-called Balsemão group, SOINCOM (24%), SMAV (Mello Bank) (15%), Edisport (14.78%). The remaining 20.22% of shares are distributed amongst other banking institutions and small share holders.

If the Brazilian Globo is providing SIC with vital know-how and telenovelas, it is mainly from the US that non-Portuguese fictional content is originated. The company buys annually around £4,4m in movies and series from the US majors (Balsemão, interview, Op. Cit.). European productions are almost non-existent in SIC's scheduling. Yet, SIC is a great consumer of tested 'reality show' formats which are being acquired mainly from the Dutch company Endemol. 'All You need is Love' and 'Perdoa-me' (Forgive me) are examples of SIC's 'lower common denominator' programming. These programmes are cheap to produce and so far have guaranteed audiences.

In institutional terms, SIC is quite isolated in the international arena. It is neither a member of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) nor of the Association of Commercial Televisions (ACT). European Union policies also seem far from having any impact in the way SIC perceives itself or defines its strategy. Pinto Balsemão says they have never benefited from any EC/EU financing scheme and, so far, they have no projects to do so (interview, Op. Cit.). EU broadcasting policies are difficult to implement and financial rewards are slim and hampered by complicated and lengthy bureaucratic processes.

SIC is a small and flexible company with a total staff of 319 and a total turnover in 1994 of around £64m. The company has only one production and broadcasting centre in Carnaxide, Lisbon, and  unlike TVI, it does not possess its own distribution network. The signal is broadcast on UHF (Ultra High Frequency) by Telecom Portugal for an annual fee of approximately £3,200m. SIC's hardware studio equipment is mainly Sony and represented an investment of around £12m.

6.2. Televisão Independente

Televisão Independente  (TVI) is the second private national TV channel operating in Portugal. Regular broadcasts started on the 20th of February 1993, one year after the Council of Ministers granted the company a broadcasting license. TVI is a very unique television station in the national and international context. The idea that the Catholic Church could and even should have a television station had been cultivated for quite a long time. When the opening up of private television was inevitable, few believed that the government would have the willingness to confront the church, refusing to grant it a broadcasting license. Being described as a television of 'Christian inspiration', TVI is neither a commercial television (it was not conceived to make profit) nor a traditional public service broadcaster (it is privately owned).

TVI's Chart of Principles states that the station is a 'private initiative of public service' (2nd ¶) and that it will try to be an 'alternative to conventional models' (1st ¶). TVI is said to stand for the fundamental values of the Human being and for the Humanity's great causes: Freedom, Justice, Peace, Solidarity and Truth (4th ¶). These grand ideas committed the Church to the project, and financial and human resources were made available to go ahead with the initiative. TVI's problem, however, is that no consensus could be found around what a television of 'Christian inspiration' should be, in practice. 'There were no models, there was no clear definition, no idea of what the programming schedule should be. So, TVI had to be designed and shaped as it went along', says the chairperson of the station, Roberto Carneiro (interview:11.01.95).
Indeed, TVI did not turn out to be a religious channel, as many in the Catholic Church were hoping for, but a commercial and generalist station with some obvious religious preoccupations. The objectives of the station are now defined by its chairperson in the following terms: i) as a business, the company must balance its books, ii) as a broadcasting company, it must present itself as an alternative to other stations and iii) its humanistic and Christian values must come across in an intelligent, appealing and popular way (Carneiro, interview: Op. Cit.). The TVI's Chart of Principles and announced objectives do not change the fact that the station operates, like RTP and SIC, in an extremely difficult financial environment. Lacking resources and with only 10% of the television advertising cake, TVI has survived with cheap imports and with no investments in home productions.

If one wants to establish the differences between TVI and both RTP and SIC, programming schedules should be analysed. Taking into consideration one programming day, the 16th of January 1995 18 , as we have done for the other stations, TVI starts broadcasting at 10.57am with a TV shopping programme (TVI Shopping Center), followed by an episode of 'Alice in the Wonderland' and by another of the 'Love Boat'. The afternoon starts with the lunch time news bulletin, followed by a Venezuelan telenovela (dubbed into Brazilian-Portuguese) Another 'TVI Shopping Center' goes on air at 2.15pm followed  by A Escolha é Sua!, a programme in which viewers call in to choose which series or film they want to see. Before the children's programme, there is a five minute reflection on a daily topic (Encontro) that is repeated immediately before the station is closed. After the children's space, two different Venezuelan telenovelas precede the weather and the main news programme of the day, the Telejornal at 7.30pm. A fourth telenovela (the only Brazilian on air in this channel) is presented after the news and before the US series, MacGyver. From 9.30pm on, the evening is fulfilled with light entertainment: a show called 'Truth or False' (guests tell stories and the viewers are supposed to find out which is true and which is false), a sitcom and a quiz. At 11.30, a light news programme is broadcasted, followed by sports and the weather. Before the last programme (Encontro), the religious programme Novos Ventos  goes on air.

Taking the week from the 14th of January 1995 to the 20th of January 1995 19, TVI scheduled five different Latin American telenovelas, four daily and one at the week-end. During the week, at peak-time, the news bulletin was normally followed by a Brazilian telenovela and by a US series. Later in the evening, the programming varied from movies (generally American) to quizzes and reality shows such as Amigos para Sempre (Friends for Ever). During this week, one could not find television genres like documentaries, political debates, investigative journalism programmes, or indeed national series or drama. So far, TVI has only produced one telenovela, Telhados de Vidro,  but it has not been able to put more financial resources into other relatively expensive projects. Roberto Carneiro regrets the fact that the station cannot afford more national production. 'I would like to invest in national fiction to fight the ultra-dependency on Brazilian telenovelas. I believe that the set of values (or indeed lack of values) they entail are not healthy for the country (interview: Op. Cit.).

Although TVI's leading figures have always maintained that the station should be an alternative to other projects, small audiences and consequent lack of advertising revenues have made it a poor relative of the other broadcasting companies. From the very beginning (February 1993), TVI audiences have risen gradually to a peak of 17% in March 1994. From then on, there was a decline to 13% in September/October 1994 (AGB figures) and it seems difficult to regain some of the lost ground. In this context, it is hardly surprising that the company has not managed to get more than 10% of the television advertising revenues (around £20m).

In the first two years of broadcasting, TVI has clearly had two quite distinctive stages. In the first stage, there was a true conviction that it could afford to be an alternative: it had only two telenovelas per day (one of Venezuelan origin and the other home produced), there were some programmes of debate such as Casos da Vida  and Referendo, and only one quiz was scheduled. The second stage corresponds to a time when there was a realisation that - if it was to survive - the station had to be more competitive and and cut costs. So, at this stage, TVI can hardly say that it represents any serious alternative: it has five telenovelas, reality shows such as Amigos para Sempre, several quizzes, US movies and more aggressive and popular news programmes. In general terms, TVI does not have a diversified programming schedule and the quality of the products is generically low. The recognition that TVI is far from its original ideas, has caused considerable distress among some of the station's original investors who have openly argued for a less commercial orientation.

In the beginning, TVI was financed almost exclusively by the Portuguese Catholic Church through institutions such as Rádio Renascença (12.5%), the Catholic University (6%), the União das Misericórdias, Verbo Publishing House, among many other religious bodies. But, as the station had to reinforce its financial capacity, it has gradually expanded its capital - through the selling of shares on the stock exchange - from £10m to around £71m. The total number of share holders is now reported to be around 16,400 (Visão, 21-28 December 1994:69). These capital increases have caused great controversy because around 44% of TVI's capital is now estimated to be from foreign origin (Expresso, 9 April 1994:N-11), mainly from pension funds, insurance and banking companies, despite the fact that the Portuguese law does not allow broadcasting companies to have more than 15% of foreign capital. Still, so far, nothing has been done to change TVI's situation. The company has argued that it is mainly EU capital and that, according to EU law, European partners cannot be discriminated against.

The stations' chairperson argues that, in spite of these changes, TVI is still very much in the hands of its main national share holders. Roberto Carneiro says that the discontentment voiced since the station took a more competitive stand can be explained by the existence of two distinctive views within the Church of what the channel should be: there is a group who understood that the channel should stand for human values without being apologetic and a second group who defend a more 'evangelic' approach. It is this second group which is said to be disenchanted with the project. 'The first task of this channel is to entertain with dignity without porn-shows and gratuitous violence', emphasises Roberto Carneiro (interview: Op. Cit.).

In terms of external relations, one of TVI's most relevant partners is the Spanish TV channel, Antena 3, which has 2.5% of the capital. In addition to being share holder, Antena 3 has been exporting programmes and formats, and has been providing assistance in terms of technical know-how and training of personnel. TVI has also a commercial relationship with all US majors (Time Warner, Columbia, Disney, etc.) and with British TV companies. From the US, the main products acquired are movies and light entertainment. Within Latin America, TVI buys mainly telenovelas from Brazil (Bandeirantes, Serviço Brasileiro de Televisão, TV Cultura), from Mexico (Televisa) and from Venezuela (Venevision). Europe is clearly not relevant, either in commercial or institutional terms, in the way TVI conducts its company strategy. EU policies and programmes appear not to have much impact on TVI's overall management. The company has only successfully applied for a subsidy of £160,000 to finance Pal Plus experiments.

TVI is a small and flexible company with a total staff of 270. The company's headquarters are in Lisbon and the station has no regional production centres (like SIC, it has only one office in Oporto). TVI decided to set up its own distribution network, RETI (Rede de Teledifusão Independente), which now covers almost all national territory and represents an investment of around £12m. RETI's signal is broadcast on UHF and the network has the capacity to distribute two TV channels and four radio channels (Diário de Notícias, 13 October 1994:N-4). In addition to broadcasting, the Church in general and TVI in particular have shown interest in moving into telecommunications services. Although, when the government allowed TVI to set up its own distribution network, the provision of telecommunications services was not contemplated, TVI has been arguing that it has the technical expertise and potential to provide telecommunication services such as trunking, paging, and other data and voice transmission.
 

7. Satellite and Cable Television

As we have stated before, in Portugal, broadcasting and telecommunications have been perceived as very distinct policy areas, with different government departments dealing with them and with very different actors trying to influence political outcomes. In these circumstances, it was particularly difficult for government to decide on what should be done about the distribution technologies of cable and satellite. Technologically, they belong to the telecommunications domain, but they distribute cultural goods, i.e., broadcasting products. So, until the late 1980's, neither the Parliament nor the government have intervened to alter the status quo. Satellite broadcasts were being received in the country without any regulatory framework and commercial cable TV was non-existent. The first moves took place when it became necessary to legitimise existing actors and/or practices.

Throughout the 1980's, the most well-off were able to buy satellite dishes and to receive dozens of foreign television channels mainly from Eutelsat and Astra satellites. Although there has been a steady increase - particularly since the mid-1980s - in the number of households receiving directly satellite TV, it was not until September 1988 that the government introduced some regulation concerning reception equipment and fiscalization (Decree Law nº 317/88). In the introductory text of this decree, the government justified its intervention stating that 'the private reception of television broadcast by satellite is a growing and entirely established reality'. In this context, the argument goes 'it is therefore essential to regard the determinations of the International Convention on Telecommunications, essential deed of the International Telecommunications Union' (Ibid.). In addition, it also expressed the need to comply with duties resulting from international agreements namely with Intelsat and Eutelsat.

 Official statistics on the number of households receiving satellite TV have been scarce but, in 1993, the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) revealed that 7.5 % of the households were receiving satellite TV (INE, 1993). According to INE statistics, the region of Lisbon and Tagus Valley has the highest percentage of satellite penetration in the country with 16,6 per cent. This region is followed by the Algarve region with 8,4 per cent. The lowest penetration is in Alentejo, with 2,7 per cent (Ibid.). Although this data shows a clear predominance of satellite penetration in the Lisbon area, it tells very little about the country in general. In Portugal, the strongest asymmetries are between the coast and the interior while INE statistics provide data on regions on a top down sequence as following 'North', 'Centre', 'Lisbon and Tagus Valley', 'Alentejo' and 'Algarve'. If one analyses the regional asymmetries on this basis, one would assume that they are less dramatic than in reality. The data on 'North', for instance, would integrate figures from extremely poor rural areas in the interior and wealthy cities such as Oporto, Braga and Guimarães. There is no accurate data on viewing of satellite channels in Portugal but it is assumed that news channels such as CNN and Sky News are quite appealing as well as other movie, music (e.g. MTV) and sports channels (e.g. EuroSport).

Up to the 1990's, satellite television has been for political and economic elites a way of circumventing the RTP's monopoly, providing them with alternative sources of international news and entertainment. Asymmetries between those who had access to these new sources and those who did not have access grew mainly on an economic basis. Those who were prepared to spend the money on reception equipment were allowed to do so with no intervention from public authorities. The introduction of cable technology to television transmission is likely to widen the gap not just between those who can afford it and those who cannot, but also between those who live in the coast and/or urban areas and those who live in the interior. As it is unprofitable for cable systems to provide a nation-wide coverage, no company is so far considering the introduction of cable apart from the coastal line and some cities in the interior.

Cable TV is a very recent development in the Portuguese broadcasting scene 20.  The Television Act (law 58/90) states that specific legislation is needed for the cable TV sub-sector. A law decree was therefore approved on the 13th of August (nº292/91) but only three years later did the government, based on an ICP proposal, issue licences for companies to start operating. The law decree allows operators to distribute third party transmissions, 'simultaneously and entirely' so no nationally-based advertising can be introduced and no other telecommunications services can be provided.

Telecommunications companies are not excluded from entering the broadcasting/entertainment market but operators are excluded from the provision of telecommunications services. There are no limits to the attribution of licences and companies (either public or private) can set up their own infrastructures if they wish to do so. The government prepared this legislation without assessing the potential impact of these services on terrestrial broadcasting operators. Although cable companies cannot get advertising revenues, they are bound to fragment the television audiences even further.

By early 1995, the government had issued licenses to three companies: TV Cabo Portugal, Bragatel and Multicanal (ICP, 1995a:34). TV Cabo Portugal, part of the Portugal Telecom (PT) holding, started providing commercial services in mid-1994. Within the first six years, the company plans to provide services in 85 concelhos 21  mainly along the Atlantic coast (between Braga and Lisbon) and in the Algarve (see the expansion plan of Cable TV in Público, 31 January 1994:E9). TV Cabo Portugal is starting by making the service available to the most affluent cities (e.g. Lisbon, Oporto, Braga and Coimbra) and - within these cities - to the most affluent neighbourhoods. In Continental Portugal, TV Cabo is operating through seven 'regional' affiliates: TV Cabo Douro, TV Cabo Porto, TV Cabo Mondego, TV Cabo Lisboa, TV Cabo Tejo, TV Cabo Sado and TV Cabo Guadiana. TV Cabo Portugal provides around 30 TV channels: the national terrestrial channels and American and European ones such as EuroSport, Teleuno, Discovery, Viva, CNN, Sky News, Rai Uno and Rai Due, BBC World Service, Superchannel, Galavision, among others. The company is leasing PT's infrastructure and combining optic fibres with co-axial cable to deliver its services.

With the full backing of PT, TV Cabo Portugal is the cable company with the most implementation on the ground, having connected 30,000 houses by mid-1995 (Semanário Económico, 23 June 1995:25). Bragatel is owned by TVTEL (linked with Philips), Partex group and TLCI (national capital) and is operating in Braga alone. This cable operator is quite small and its first services were provided in October 1994. By late 1994, it had only 3,000 subscriptions (Pereira: 16 November 1994 22). The type of programming Bragatel is providing does not differ considerably from that which TV Cabo Portugal is offering. In addition to those in common with TV Cabo, Bragatel offers the Franco-German channel Arte, the Adult Channel, the German 3.SAT and the Country Music Television (Público, 27 March 1995:E10). TVTEL has plans to introduce Cable TV in various urban centres and ICP has already had a number of license applications.

 In March 1995, the government/ICP granted Multicanal (a joint venture between the Portuguese Lusomundo and the American UIH - United International Holdings) a license to operate through four subsidiaries: Multicanal Norte, Multicanal Capital, Multicanal Sul and Multicanal Atlântico. Though probably Multicanal will not start providing cable services before early 1996, the company will certainly benefit from the experience of UIH in the international markets 23 and from the fact that Lusomundo group is the distributor of Walt Disney, UIP-MGM, Universal, United Artists and Paramount.

The existing cable companies are using a combination of optic fibres and co-axial cable and they have the technological potential and the will to provide an array of telecommunications services such as voice telephony, data transmission, banking, tele-shopping and pay per view. Furthermore, TV Cabo Portugal has already stated that the company would be interested in getting involved in local/regional TV programming (see Público, 31 January 1994:E7). None of these telecommunications/broadcasting services can be provided under the current national legal framework.  However, the EU legislation might in the near future force national governments to lift a number of restrictions on cable operators which prevents them offering a number of telecommunications services.
 

8. Conclusion

 The impact of EU broadcasting policies in Portugal has been irrelevant. The Commission had serious difficulties in entering the broadcasting arena and, so far, it has only managed to develop a very generalist policy framework. Member states have ample room for manoeuvre in terms of developing their own detailed legislation. Programmes such as MEDIA are also of no relevance to the development of a national programming industry. Portugal has few participants in these programmes and the national broadcasting companies do not recognise the EU as a particularly significant actor. But, if the Union itself is not playing any important role here, changes in the European broadcasting industry throughout the 1980's were certainly consequential. At that time, the national public service broadcasting company was directly and indirectly controlled by successive governments and - despite the rhetoric - there was no real interest in opening up the market. So, the increasing number of European terrestrial, cable and satellite channels started to be used as a weapon for those opposed to the RTP monopoly. If the other European countries were introducing competition in the sector, it became more difficult for the Portuguese authorities to justify the existing situation.

When a consensus between the main parties was achieved (the Constitution had to be altered), the Cavaco Silva's XI and XII governments concentrated on what they perceived as the crucial issue: who should own the future private channels? The break-up of the RTP monopoly would mean that other interests would be represented in the broadcasting media which was, for the government, a highly sensitive matter. Intensive lobbying was exerted but the prime minister himself decided on which groups should control the new channels. Cavaco Silva attributed one channel to the Catholic Church and another one to the social democrat and former prime minister, Pinto Balsemão. Considering their influence in the Portuguese society and the likelihood of the political output, these were perceived as the safest options.

Because political concerns and public debate were concentrated on who should get the channels, all crucial issues associated with the introduction of competition in the broadcasting sector were neglected. The Television Act does not reflect any serious preoccupation with the financing of the channels, and balanced programming and national production were totally ignored. The policy framework is so vague and generalist that - in practice - it allows the broadcasting companies to operate without any control. Without an effective regulatory regime or a programme regulator, the outcome of the opening up of the market could not have been more predictable. The RTP lost its information monopoly but programming is totally dependent on US and Brazilian fiction. The financial hardship that all broadcasting companies are facing has led them to opt for cheap fiction and populist programmes based on foreign formats (e.g. quiz shows and 'reality' shows). However cable TV is still in its early stages, the probability is that it will fragment audiences even further, reinforcing existing tendencies.

What happened in Portugal is not new in the context of the Southern European countries and can be partly explained within the 'cultural industries' perspective. This body of literature has been arguing that cultural products have specific economic characteristics which impacts on the way the markets develop. In cultural industries, and in broadcasting in particular, there is no real 'production' after the prototype stage. A programme can be copied many thousands of times and the only input necessary to do it is a video cassette and, moreover, additional customers can be served instantaneously by the act of broadcasting. In both ways, the initial or first copy costs have no relation to the costs of the second copy. As the reproduction  or retransmission costs are very low, there is an exceptional incentive to expand markets. Frequently, after the companies have already recouped their investments in big domestic markets (e.g. the US and Brazil), their products are sold in the international markets for low prices. This means that for countries with no competitive advantages in the sector like Portugal, it makes economic sense to buy cheap foreign products rather then invest in far more expensive and inevitably high-risk national productions.

It does not alter the fact that national policies could have been developed to compensate for the economic logic of the broadcasting sector. Yet, looking back to the overall pattern of decision-making in Portugal and to the historical evolution of the broadcasting sector, it would be rather surprising if politicians have had the necessary expertise and interest to address the complex issues involved in the opening up of the television market. Broadcasting policy had been exclusively related to the control of political contents and matters of structure and economics were simply not understood. As programming in general has rarely been a top priority, no assessment was made as to the consequences of the opening up of the market in this area. The government's inability to develop a television framework which would provide a qualitative and diversified programming is surely related to the general characteristics of the Portuguese political process. The authoritarian tradition and the elitist method of decision-making have played a part in the way the broadcasting sector was re-organised.

Compared with telecommunications, recent reforms of the broadcasting sector raised more media attention and more actors were involved. This does not mean however that - as the pluralist basic model argues - power was highly dispersed amongst competing groups. In fact, only a limited degree of pluralism existed in the sense that actors such as the Catholic Church and the Pinto Balsemão group managed to portray themselves as the natural winners and therefore it became impossible for the government to deny each of them one national TV channel. Apart from that, crucial measures were taken by a highly restricted number of government members without any consultation or debate. For example, policy decisions which have a direct impact on the economic viability of the broadcasting companies, such as the abolition of the license fee and the number of channels to be attributed, did not evince much thought. In general terms, the television broadcasting sector was reformed by ill-prepared politicians with little consultation and with almost no resistance or criticism.
 

Footnotes:

1. One of the most problematic features of the concept of public interest is that conflicting proposals can be advocated according to someone's version of what is in the public general good (McQuail, 1992:20).

2. By industrial policy, we mean the mechanisms by which a government attempts to preserve or alter industrial structure in the face of international pressures, and the way it seeks to gain advantage for domestic industries in the international market place (Hills, 1984:17).

3. Contracto de Concessão do Serviço Público de Televisão, established between the Portuguese State and Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa, SA, 17 March 1993.

4. Interview at SIC's headquarters in Carnaxide, Lisbon.

5. Interview at TVI's headquarters, Rua 3 da Matinha, Lisbon.

6. Interview at RTP's headquarters, Av. 5 de Outubro, Lisbon.

7. In spite of a long term relationship with TV Globo (RTP has been importing Globo products since the early 1970's), the Portuguese PSB company has taken Globo to the courts because allegedly Globo has not fulfilled a contract established between the two, according to which RTP would have preferential treatment in the choice of Globo's telenovelas, considered crucial in the audience war. Globo has 15% of SIC's shares and has been providing SIC with technical know-how and strategic consultancy.

8. These are AGB-Marktest figures. In Portugal, there are two companies doing audience studies, AGB-Marktest and Ecotel. According to Público newspaper, AGB-Marktest figures have been favourable to SIC whilst Ecotel figures have been favourable to RTP (29 November 1994:24). Because higher audiences mean higher advertising revenues, both AGB-Marktest and Ecotel figures should be considered with caution.

9. These are figures estimated by Expresso newspaper (24 December 1994: Privado 1). According to Marktest, Publitex TV figures - which are believed to be distorted - in 1994 Canal 1 would have got around £112m.

10. This was the first day of the week immediately after RTP's chairperson, Freitas Cruz, was interviewed for this study (10 January 1995).

11. Emphasis by the author cited.

12. This was the first week immediately after RTP's chairperson was interviewed.

13. The autonomous regions have specific political and social and cultural realities and their broadcasting systems reflect these differences. As we have explained before, is not within the scope of our study to analyse the communications scenario  in these regions.

14.  In the 1989 Constitution, the Article 38, nº 7 stating that television could not be the object of private ownership is substituted by the following text: 'The broadcasting stations of radio and television can only operate with a license granted in a public bidding process, according to the law.

15. This was the first day of the week immediately after SIC's chairperson, Pinto Balsemão, was interviewed for this study (10 January 1995).

16. This was the first week immediately after SIC's chairperson was interviewed.

17. Globo is one of the world's largest media monopolies. Its aged and powerful chairperson, Roberto Marinho, runs, besides his 50-station radio network, and 85-station TV network (Rede Globo), six of which he owns, the Globosat/Net cable television system, operating 26 cable TV channels in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, the magazine and book publishing house Globo, and Brazil's second-largest circulation daily O Globo. Roberto Marinho also owns, alone or in association with municipal authorities, 1,500 Earth Reception Stations (ERT) or re transmission units, and has substantial stock in major advertising agencies and printing plants. Roberto Marinho's career was made under the protection of the military regime that took power in 1964 and since then Globo has been instrumental in defeating leftist governments. The defeat in 1989 of the Workers Party leader, Luís Inácio da Silva, is the most well known example (Kucinski, 1994:52-3).

18. This was the first day of the week immediately after TVI's chairperson, Roberto Carneiro, was interviewed for this study (11 January 1995).

19. This was the first week immediately after TVI's chairperson was interviewed.

20. Before the introduction of commercial cable TV, there were a few cable networks transmitting TV signals but for scientific and national heritage preservation purposes.

21. Concelhos  can be compared to councils but they have less administrative powers and their size can vary considerably.

22. Speech delivered by Paulo Pereira, TVTEL, at the 5th APDC congress, 15-18 November 1994, Lisbon.

23. UIH is involved in cable services in 21 countries in Europe, Latin America and Asia (Expresso, 25 March 1995:P1).