Chapter V

The Evolution of CommunicationsPolicy in Portugal

1. Introduction

In spite of the technological convergence between telecommunications and broadcasting, these sectors have been perceived up to now as very distinct policy areas. At governmental level, different departments deal with them and, not surprisingly, different pressure groups try to influence the political output for each sector. This fragmentation will be difficult to sustain as it becomes increasingly evident that more co-ordination is needed if issues such as cable TV (see Chapter VII) are to be properly addressed. In any case, in Portugal, there is no tradition of inter-governmental departments to deal with communications aspects and, if it were not for the new digital technologies and optic fibres, there would hardly be any relevant inter-connection between both sectors. Historically, broadcasting and telecommunications have used different technologies, have had distinctive social significance, and - what is most relevant for our study - have been used by politicians for very particular purposes.

In this chapter, we will analyse the development of communications policies and we will try to assess the similarities and differences in the political approaches towards broadcasting and telecommunications. In terms of telecommunications, we will start from the 19th century up until the late-1980's, when liberalisation was introduced in value-added services. We will see how the sector developed throughout the Salazar rule and in the aftermath of the 1974 revolution. Basically, we will argue that- despite some political/ideological objectives (e.g. during the dictatorship, the international operator was used to unite the so-called 'Portuguese World') - telecommunications in Portugal have been perceived as an instrument of modernisation and as being relevant for the economic performance of the country. Still, the country has performed poorly throughout this century(see Chapter IV) and the evolution of telecommunications reflects this reality.

Broadcasting policy will be linked, in this section, to media policy because, up until recently, media policy has revolved almost exclusively around the control of content, and Radiotelevisão Portuguesa (RTP) - the sole television company up until 1992 - was the cornerstone of this covert policy. Under Salazar and Marcello, repressive measures applied to all media and, although the actors and laws have changed after the revolution, the mechanisms of control continued to work efficiently. When it was no longer politically acceptable to maintain RTP's monopoly, the second Cavaco Silva's majority government gave way to two new national TV channels. Even if the prime minister himself carefully selected the less politically damaging applicants, the monopoly of control was over.

Summing up, this chapter examines the evolution of policies in both sectors up until the time when the traditional position of communications' operators was challenged by a range of new market entrants, that is, when liberalisation and re-regulation of the sectors became a pressing political issue. So, when we refer to the liberalisation of the broadcasting sector in Portugal, we mean the stage when RTP's monopoly was broken up and two national TV channels were allowed to operate: Sociedade Independente de Comunicação (SIC) in October 1992 andTelevisão Independente (TVI) in February 1993. By liberalisationof the telecommunications sector, we mean the stage when the three traditional operators - Correios e Telecomunicações de Portugal(CTT)/Telecom Portugal (TP), Telefones de Lisboa e Porto(TLP) and Marconi - were faced with a range of new service providers mainly from the late 1980's onwards.

2. Telecommunications Policy

2.1. From the 19th Century until1974

In 1877, one year after Bell patented his new invention, the first telephone experiences took place in Portugal. The first successful voice transmission with the Bell telephone occurred on the 24th of November between Carcavelos and the Cabo Station (TPL,1992:5). The telephone was highly acclaimed at the time, and King Luís himself was interested in this technological development. So, in 1881, the government decided to open up a bidding process for telephone operators in the two business areas of Lisbon and Oporto. Four proposals were considered but the government was not satisfied with any of them and soon after granted the exclusive right of telephone services in the two main cities to the British Edison Gower Bell Telephone Company of Europe. The contract was signed by the director of Post and Telegraph, Guilhermino de Barros (CTT,1974:2). The telephone network for public usage started being set up in December 1881(TLP, 1992:6).

The contract with the Edison Gower Bell Company was transferred on the 14th of September 1887, by governmental decree, to the Anglo-Portuguese Telephone (APT) Company (TLP,1989:13) which would maintain the monopoly of telephone infrastructure and services. The first governmental concessionto APT expired in 1901 but it was then renewed for another 36 years (CTT,1974:6)conditional on the company's installation of double circuit lines, more adequate switches and to the introduction of cables to substitute aboveground telephone lines in central Lisbon and Oporto (TLP,1989:13).

After this initial stage, the telephone became popularised and demand grew outside the two main cities. The government decided to intervene, developing telecommunications services outside Lisbon and Oporto. 'In September 1904, the Diário do Governo regulated the services which would be provided by the State' (Jornal de Correios e Telecomunicações, June 1989:21). So, in the same year, the governmental Post and Telegraph Department (Direcção-Geral dos Correios e Telégrafos)installed the first telephone line between Lisbon and Oporto and, one year later, Braga and Coimbra were the first cities outside the APT concession area to have access to telephone. At that time, the terminal equipment was provided by either the British Western Electric company or Swedish Ericsson (Jornal de Correios e Telecomunicações, June1989:21). In 1911, the state department responsible for telecommunications services outside Lisbon and Oporto, Correios e Telecomunicaçõesde Portugal (CTT), gained financial and administrative autonomy (TLP,1989:20).

Despite the initial progress in the introduction of telephone in continental Portugal, it soon became clear that the government, or indeed CTT, could not afford public connections with the colonies and foreign countries. Particularly after the overthrow of the Monarchy, in 1910, the country went through an extremely difficult political and economic period and contracting out was perceived as the best alternative to overcome financial and technical shortcomings. At that time, the Portuguese Army and the Navy were already involved in wireless communications but it was foreign companies that argued most for its development in both continental Portugal and in the colonies. For wireless companies, a contract with Portugal was extremely convenient because of the country's vast and scattered colonial empire. The German Telefunken and the British Marconi struggled fiercely for an exclusive contract with the Portuguese authorities.

After intensive lobbying from both parties, a final decision was reached on the 10th of July 1912. The Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Company Limited (MWTCL) was the winner and a contract with the government was published in Diário do Governo on the 2nd of August the same year (Faria, 1994:42). However, due to World War I and the financial difficulties the country was in, the Portuguese government failed to fulfil its part of the contract, namely the erection of structures where Marconi's equipment would be installed. 'The wireless communications were not in the first line of national priorities and [its introduction] was postponed once again' (Faria, 1994:43). Lengthy and strenuous negotiations were re-established after the war, and in 1922 a new contract was signed with the MWTCL.

According to this contract, it was up to MWTCL to establish a Portuguese telegraph and telephone company, the future Companhia Portuguesa Rádio Marconi (CPRM), whose capital and board would partly be Portuguese and partly British. This new company, with headquarters in Lisbon, would have the exclusive right to provide services via radio between continental Portugal and the Portuguese islands of Madeira and the Azores, and the colonies in Africa and in the Far East (see Faria, 1994:43-52). It is relevant to mention at this stage that it was the minister for the colonies, Rodrigues Gaspar, who considered the signature of this contract with MWTCL a matter of urgency as he believed that better communications between the colonies was significant to the consolidation of the Portuguese empire.

By 1922, the general market structure of Portuguese telecommunications was largely defined: two Anglo-Portuguese companies and a state department would have geographical monopolies in both the setting up of infrastructures and in the provision of services. This situation resulted mainly from political and economic circumstances rather than from a carefully designed strategy. When the Edison Gower Company and later APT established themselves in the country, only the cities of Lisbon and Oporto appeared to offer true business opportunities. Similarly, for a wireless company such as Marconi, the dispersed islands and vast coastal areas in the Atlantic and Indian oceans were quite appealing. So, private companies served the potentially most lucrative areas whilst the state took the task of providing telecommunications services to the parts of the country nobody was interested in.

Throughout the 1920's the operators tried to catch up for the lost time during the 1914-1918 conflict. The war not only delayed the introduction of public wireless services between Portugal and the colonies, but it also delayed the modernisation of the telephone network in continental Portugal. 'The APT modernisation plan had to be suspended due to lack of equipment and social upheaval. In 1920, the waiting list was 3,000 which is substantial considering that there were 14,000 telephones installed' (TLP, 1989:20). Progress was made in the national switching system and in terms of telephone penetration but the acute political instability made it difficult for the operators to adequately develop their services. Moreover, British Marconi faced great difficulties in constituting the CPRM because new technological developments demanded further negotiations with the Portuguese authorities whilst the political crisis deepened and public telecommunications were not the first priority. Still, CPRM was legally established on the18th of July 1925 (Faria, 1994:59)

By 1928, it became clear that huge investments had to be made and, if the government was not prepared to sign another contract, APT would not recoup these investments. But the government granted a new concession to APT and it was allowed to operate for another 40 years. 'There was a considerable demand for telephone services whose growth depended on new automatic exchanges. Had the concession to APT terminated in 1936,the company could not have made big investments' (TLP, 1989:22). On the one hand, the company was prepared to build more exchanges to cope with the increasing traffic; on the other hand, APT launched an advertising campaign to promote 'pay per call' instead of a costly fixed rate per telephone line. 'The client used to pay a fixed rate that was far too expensive for small business or for the middle-class' (Santos, 1989:4). However, if considerable progress was made in the APT concession area, improvements were far slower in the rest of the country.

The first decade of CPRM was one of the most difficult periods in the corporation's history. Although the company progressively established wireless communications with the Portuguese colonies together with European and American countries, it did not succeed financially. In the first two years, direct wireless communications were established between Continental Portugal and England, Madeira and the Azores islands, North America, Berlin, Paris, Cape Verde, Angola and Mozambique (see Faria, 1994:71-85).Progressively, more and more countries were connected but the company was unable to make a profit. The first ten years of CPRM were doomed by successive deficits. Indeed, various factors contributed to the situation the company was in. The volume of international traffic was very limited because the submarine cable company, Eastern, was well established in the country and had loyal clients. In addition, the Portuguese Post and Telegraph Administration favoured the cable company. 'Marconi was not allowed to price its services lower than Eastern and non-preferential traffic, which according to the contract would have to go to Marconi, was diverted to Eastern' (Faria,1994:82). The Portuguese Navy also accepted illegal commercial traffic(Faria, 1994:82), compromising even further CPRM's viability as an exclusively wireless company.

Throughout the 1930's, APT, continued developing its services. The first Strowger automatic exchange (Central da Trindade) was inaugurated on the 30th of August 1930 (TLP, 1989:24) and from then on, automation advanced, although sluggishly. In Oporto, the first automatic exchange (Central da Picaria) was set up in 1952 followed by the gradual automation of the Oporto urban network. Only after the automation of the Lisbon and Oporto networks would the automation of the regional network be started (TLP, 1989:35). In the APT concession area, the number of lines increased faster than in the rest of the country. It expanded from 16,477 in 1928 to 36,769 in 1938 (TLP, 1989:27). In 1950, APT reached100,000 telephone lines but the waiting list was around 23,000 (TLP, 1989:33).Despite the progressive automation of the urban networks of Lisbon and Oporto, automatic calls between the two main cities have only been possible since 1961 (TLP, 1989:37).

This scenario of overall underdevelopment of Portuguese domestic telecommunications suggests that no major political investment was made in the sector. The improvement of communications for civilians would hardly be considered a priority for a dictatorial regime and, additionally, Salazar - in contrast to Marcello Caetano - did not have any interest in technological developments. TLP and CTT were basically allowed to operate with sparse resources and without specific targets of either telephone penetration or network modernisation. Still, the situation was quite different in terms of international communications.

After Marconi's struggling first decade, the company saw gradually its interests coinciding with the interests of the New State. Salazar himself intervened to put an end to illegal commercial operations practised within the Navy and tried to co-ordinate conflicting views between Marconi and CTT and between state departments involved in the sector, namely the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications, the Ministry for the Colonies and the Navy (see Faria, 1994:95-97). This interest in Marconi's success and consequent expansion of affordable international telecommunication services was perceived by Salazar as crucial to the consolidation of the Portuguese overseas empire. Especially from the late 1940's onwards, Portuguese civilians were persuaded to settle in the African colonies of Angola and Mozambique and accessible communications would bring the populations together, to use the argument put forward at the time. To sum up, during the dictatorship, Marconi was useful to the development of Salazar's nationalist project.

The basic market structure of the Portuguese telecommunications set up in the 1920's was only shaken in the 1960's when major reforms were introduced and the control of telecommunications went, for the first time, to the public sector. Marconi's contract with the Portuguese government was due for renewal in 1966 but the company had been preparing itself for these negotiations since the mid-1950's. In 1958 and 1959, it signed two agreements with the submarine cable companies which were operating in Portugal at the time, Italcable and Cable and Wireless, respectively. These contracts granted Marconi a co-ordinating role over the three long-distance operators. That was particularly important for Marconi because CTT had managed to secure for itself both terrestrial and wireless connections to Europe. So, if Europe was out of Marconi's grasp, the company was keen in gaining the monopoly of all inter-continental communications. 'The CPRM was not only fighting for the renovation of the 1922 contract but also for its expansion' (Faria, 1994:128).

Indeed, the Portuguese government did not have any other choice but to renew the contract with Marconi because only this company had the human and technical expertise to continue developing international links and keep updated with new technologies such as satellite telecommunications. In any case, international communications were at that time far too sensitive to be left in the hands of a partly foreign company. In the early 1960's,the nationalist movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau were fighting for independence whilst the number of Portuguese soldiers and settlers was increasing greatly. Communications with the colonies were more important then ever. So, because the contract with Marconi had to be renewed or even expanded in 1966, the Salazar government decided to nationalise 51% of CPRM's capital, gaining in this way effective control over the company. The last British share holders left the company in 1972(see Marconi's 1972 annual report quoted in Faria, 1994:131) when the Marcello's government - in power since 1968 - bought their shares.

The nationalisation of Marconi was followed by the nationalisation of domestic telecommunications which were at the time in private hands. The APT contract to provide telecommunications services in Lisbon and Oporto was not renewed. On the 26 of October 1967, the APT patrimony was transferred to the newly born public company, Telefones de Lisboa e Porto (TLP)(TLP, 1989:38). Since 1963, the company had suspected that its contract would not be renewed and since then it had stopped investing in network automation and telephone penetration while its prices went up (Santos,1989:8). When TLP started operating, 312,000 main lines had been installed and there were 1,701 public telephones (TLP, 1989:38).

CTT was the only fully national operator and as such there was no need for ownership changes. Yet in the late 1960's, the government also decided to change the status of CTT from state department to a state-owned enterprise. So, on the 1st of January 1970, the CTT became the public company named Correios e Telecomunicações de Portugal and since then, TLP and CTT have the same Board of Directors (TLP, 1989:40).Governmental plans to merge the two companies were dropped due to the political instability which followed the 1974 coup d'etat.

The structural changes introduced during the mid-1960'swere part of an effort by Salazar to gain control over Portuguese communications which were perceived as increasingly important in political terms. Salazar's successor, Marcello Caetano, saw telecommunications as a means to help revive the economy and, in fact, from 1968 up until 1974, important investments were made in both domestic and international telecommunications. 'If automatics witching centres in urban areas had been installed until mid-1950's, the automation of regional and sub-urban exchanges took place throughout the1970's' (Santos, 1989: 8). CPRM too has invested heavily in new cable and satellite technologies both domestically and in the colonies. In 1972,for example, CPRM bought ITT Space Communications satellite stations for Lisbon, Luanda and Lourenço Marques (renamed Maputo after independence) for telex, telephone and broadcasting services (see Faria, 1994:142-144).

2.2. From 1974 until the late 1980's

From the 1974 revolution until themid-1980's, there was acute political instability (see table 7) which made it very difficult for minority governments to introduce any significant change in the telecommunications sector. Despite the political changes introduced in the late 1960's and investments of the 1970's, compared with most Western countries, Portuguese telecommunications were still backward. Relevant political changes would only be introduced in the following decade.

In 1981, telecommunications reform was attempted and a significant Law Decree (188/81) was passed in accordance with the government programme (see Assembleia da República,1981). This piece of legislation recognised that until then the government had been unable to co-ordinate public communications operators due to alack of infrastructures and contemplated the setting up of the Instituto Português das Comunicações (ICP) to support the Ministério das Obras Públicas Transportes e Comunicações (MOPTC) in the co-ordination of the telecommunications sector. Public postal and telecommunications services were to be maintained as a state monopoly, but the terminal equipment market was to be opened up to competition. Users of the public network were to be allowed to buy any terminal equipment approved by ICP.

Table 7: Government Tutelage for Telecommunications since 1974

Governments	Tutelage	Tutelage Head	Prime Minister
1st Provisional (1974-1974)	Secretaria de Estado dos Transportes e Comunicações (SETC)	Manuel Ferreira Lima	Palma Carlos
2nd Provisional (1974-1974)	SETC	Manuel Ferreira Lima	Vasco Gonçalves
3rd Provisional (1974-1975)	Ministério do Equipamento Social e do Ambiente	José Augusto Fernandes	Vasco Gonçalves
4th Provisional (1975-1975)	Ministério dos Transportes e Comunicações (MTC) SETC	Álvaro Veiga de Oliveira António Machado Rodrigues	Vasco Gonçalves
5th Provisional (1975-1975)	MTC	Henrique de Oliveira e Sá	Vasco Gonçalves
6th Provisional (1975-1976)	MTC SETC	Walter Gomes Rosa (substituted by) José Augusto Fernandes António Machado Rodrigues	Pinheiro de Azevedo
1st Constitutional (1976-1977)	MTC SETC	Emílio Peixoto Vilar António Machado Rodrigues	Mário Soares
2nd Constitutional (1978-1978)	MTC	Manuel Ferreira Lima	Mário Soares
3rd Constitutional (1978-1978)	MTC	Gouveia Marques	Nobre da Costa
4th Constitutional (1978-1979)	MTC SETC	José Marques da Costa Rogério Lameira	Mota Pinto
5th Constitutional (1979-1979)	MTC	Frederico da Silva	Maria de Lurdes Pintassilgo
6th Constitutional (1980-1980)	MTC	Viana Baptista	Sá Carneiro
7th Constitutional (1981-1981)	MTC Secretaria de Estado das Comunicações(SEC)	Viana Baptista Carlos Carreira	Pinto Balsemão
8th Constitutional (1981-1982)	SETC	José da Silva Domingos	Pinto Balsemão
9th Constitutional (1983-1985)	SEC	Raúl Junqueiro	Mário Soares
10th Constitutional (1985-1987)	Ministério das Obras PúblicasTransportes e Comunicações (MOPTC) SETC	Oliveira Martins Sequeira Braga	Cavaco Silva
11th Constitutional (1987-1991)	MOPTC	Oliveira Martins (substituted by) Ferreira do Amaral	Cavaco Silva
12th Constitutional (1991-1995)	MOPTC	Ferreira do Amaral	Cavaco Silva

Source: Combined data from the Portuguese Parliament's library

With the legal creation of ICP, some aspects of separation between regulatory and operational functions were contemplated for the first time. Although the effective setting up of ICP was postponed, according to the approved legislation, it should have had a role as a political initiator and as technical assistant to the government. Among other things, the Institute - under the tutelage of the MOPTC - would have had to prepare legislation, supervise public operators, approve equipment and manage the radio spectrum. Yet, despite this legislative effort, there was no implementation of the law and the ICP was not actually established until 1989, after the approval of the Law Decree 283/89 which stated that ICP should start its activities within six months (Art. nº 27). Apart from the political instability the country was in, the main reason why ICP did not start operating in the early or mid-1980's was related to the fact that the 9th Constitutional government (1981-1983) - led by the socialists- did not regard ICP favourably. In these circumstances, the liberalisation of terminal equipment, though contemplated in the law, did not materialise.

By 1982, in the TLP concession areas there were about one million telephone lines which represented three quarters of the national telephone lines. The automation of the TLP and CTT network was only concluded in the mid-1980's (TLP, 1989:45-49). At that time, it was widely accepted that Portuguese telecommunications were lagging behind and that digitalisation and optic fibre would have to be introduced if the country was to catch up with the EU core countries. If agreement could be achieved about the need to modernise and update the sector, no consensus was possible on the strategy to be followed. Some argued for a progressive introduction of new technologies so that the Portuguese industry could adapt, but the political power favoured rapid change. 'Only big multi-nationals could supply public digital exchanges given that there was no internal industrial or technological basis to do it' (Tribolet, interview:17.11.94).The 1983-1985 government decided to open up the switch contract bidding to seven different companies to - according to Noam (1992:261) - 'demonstrate openness to the European Economic Community'.

The allocation of these large procurement orders for central electronic switches was a multi-year story of intrigue at many levels. At the time of the award of the contract, Centrel (a national manufacturing company) had just entered a joint venture with Siemens for the production of switches developed by the German firm. Alcatel's interests were personally pushed by President Mitterand (a personal friend of the then prime minister, Mário Soares). German politicians also got involved in similar lobbying for Siemens and ITT's interests were advanced by CTT and TLP. A highly politicised inter-ministerial commission decided to allocate 55% of the order to Siemens and 35% to Alcatel, despite the latter's lack of Portuguese production facilities. The remaining 10% were allocated in a complex manner among the winner companies. The allegations of impropriety forced the first social democrat government (1985-87) tore-open the case. The Siemens/Centrel contract was maintained but Alcatel lost its share and Standard Electric received 45% of the contract. When all seemed lost for Alcatel, its parent company, CGE, acquired controlling interests in most of ITT's international telecommunications operations, allowing Alcatel to crack the Portuguese market after all (see Noam, 1992:260-261).

In addition to the procurement contracts for digital exchanges, 1985 was also relevant for national telecommunications because the first optic fibre cable was installed allowing the future introduction of new services such as videoconferencing and cable TV (Santos, 1989:10).The first Siemens' EWSD digital exchange was installed in June 1987 by TLP (TLP, 1992:75). Although the mid-1980's were a turning point in terms of network modernisation, it was done - as Tribolet points out - without safeguarding Portuguese industrial capability (interview, 17.11.94). Yet, rapid technological change, even at the expense of the national telecommunications industry, was perceived as being of crucial importance on the eve of Portugal's entry into the Community.

By 1986, the EU telecommunications policy had already been designed around two contradictory trends: the support of the most competitive IT companies through R&D programmes and, following the US example, the endorsement of more competition and liberalisation of equipment and services (see Chapter III). Therefore, since Portugal joined the EU, the pressure to modernise and re-organise the telecommunications sector has intensified and, on May 1986, Sequeira Braga, head of SETC, requested a study to examine Portuguese telecommunications and to report on the most pressing issues in this area. In May 1987, the Comissão para o Estudo do Desenvolvimento Institucional e Tecnológico das Comunicações (CEDITC) presented the study to the ministério of Public Works, Transport and Communications.

This study argued that Portuguese telecommunications were lagging behind those of most European countries (by an estimated 15years) and recommended the following changes:

- The Institute of Communications should be inaugurated and regulatory functions should be transferred to this institute;

- A holding company should be set up to increase the efficiency of operators (CTT, TLP and Marconi). This company should guarantee a global and integrated strategy for the national telecommunications sector;

- Postal and telecommunications services should be separated. Until then, CTT covered both activities;

- Measures should be taken to prepare the opening up of telecommunications operators to private capital;

- More flexibility should be introduced into new telecommunications services. Possibly, competition should be introduced;

- Prices should be liberalised in the non-basic telecommunications sub-sector (Ministério das Obras Públicas Transportes e Comunicações, 1987:C1-C8).

These recommendations - which were broadly in line with what was being discussed at European level at the time - were largely adopted by the 11th Constitutional Government (see Assembleia da República, 1987:33) and constituted an important input to the 1989 Basic Telecommunications Law. This basic law was a real watershed in the Portuguese telecommunications legal history because the general principles of this sector were, for the first time, compiled in the same piece of legislation. Since the 1987 CEDITC recommendations were published, there was a dramatic increase in political activity surrounding telecommunications. This aspect will be examined in Chapter VI.

3. Main Actors in the Telecommunications Arena

In Chapter III, we have already presented the most relevant international organisations involved in telecommunications. We will now present the national actors which are most likely to have an impact on Portuguese telecommunications policy. The existence of various actors and pressure groups involved in telecommunications does not rebut the elitist nature of the policy-making process because, amongst these, only a few individuals have actual power in the determination of political outcomes.

First and foremost, it is the government which has the responsibility for the definition of a strategy for the sector. As the social democrats have been in power with a majority since 1987 they have had no difficulty passing laws in the National Parliament. Most relevant political decisions have been taken by the Ministério das Obras Públicas, Transportes e Comunicações (MOPTC), and more specifically by Ferreira do Amaral, the head of MOPTC. Within MOPTC, it is the Secretaria de Estado da Habitação (Housing department) which has specific tutelage over the sector. Most of the decisions are taken by the MOPTC behind closed doors without public debate or consultation. Occasionally, other governmental departments also have a say in the sector, namely the ministério of Industry and Energy, the ministério of Finances and the direcção-geral for Competition and Prices.

If it is up to the government to define a policy, it is up to the Instituto das Comunicações dePortugal (ICP) to regulate or to implement government policies. Although ICP is supposed to advise the executive in matters of communications policy (see Law Decree nº283/89), major decisions are believed to be taken without actually taking ICP views into great consideration. In practice, ICP's main tasks are the granting of licenses to the communications operators, the approval and standardisation of equipment, spectrum management and the representation of Portugal in international fora. Since it started operating, in 1989, ICP tried to gain effective autonomy from the government and operators but it has not been an easy task. Most of the ICP personnel came from the public telecommunications operators and entrenched dependencies are difficult to eradicate. ICP is likely to become more relevant when the re-organisation of the sector is completed.

Another government advisory body is the Higher Telecommunications Council which is legally responsible for the co-ordination of different civilian, armed forces and security forces telecommunications services (Law 88/89, article 6). Although this council is mentioned in the Basic Telecommunications Law, it has no public visibility.

Within the state apparatus, other actors should have played a role in the definition of telecommunications policy but they have largely neglected their duty. The government's opposition is ill-prepared to voice critical positions and/or to propose alternative policies. During the highly questionable re-organisation of the telecommunications sector, no opposition spokesperson put forward the competitive arguments needed for an informed and debated outcome. Political parties, in general, have no interest in participating in this area. When, in 1987, CEDITC prepared a significant study about the future of Portuguese telecommunications, questionnaires were sent to six major political parties and only two leftwing parties, representing 13% of the voters, answered back. The party in power, the Social Democrat Party and the main opposition party, the Socialist Party, did not respond (Ministério das Obras Públicas Transportes e Comunicações, 1987:B1).

The main telecommunications operators(CTT, TLP and Marconi) have had different weight throughout the history but they have always defended their interests, acting as distinct lobbies. Recently, the most influential has been by far CTT/Telecom Portugal(TP) which absorbed TLP in August 1994 and is now called Portugal Telecom(PT). The president of the company, Luis Todo Bom, is believed to have disproportionate power as his views have systematically been accepted by the government and decisions have been taken without taking into much consideration the interests of the other actors involved in the process. Being the vice-president of the Social Democrat Party and close to a strong faction, he was the clear winner of the sector's re-organisation.

Another relevant - although short-lived- actor in the telecommunications scene was the holding company Comunicações Nacionais (CN). The holding, set up in 1992/93, comprised five independent companies: CTT (only postal services), the company which distributed broadcasting signals, Teledifusora de Portugal (TDP), Marconi, TLP and Telecom Portugal. The holding company, chaired by Cabral da Fonseca, aimed to co-ordinate the sector, to define investment/business strategies, to keep telecommunications in national hands and to deal with future privatisation. Indeed, CN's chairperson argued that it was better to set up the holding to 'rationalise' the sector rather than to merge the telecommunications operators in a Portugal Telecom which would be highly disadvantageous (see interview in Público newspaper, 9 December 1992). As we will examine in the following chapter, mergers did occur and CN was dismantled in 1995.

Amongst the sectorial associations, the Associação Portuguesa para o Desenvolvimento da Comunicação(APDC) managed to gain considerable influence. It represents business interests and has been a firm supporter of EU communications policies. APDC has its own magazine (Comunicações)and organises non-scientific conferences. In both Comunicações and in the APDC conferences, the government's achievements are commonly praised and the social relevance of new technological developments tend to be highly exaggerated.

In 1994, a telecommunications platform(Plataforma para Modernização das Telecomunicações) was set up by Roberto Carneiro, chairperson of the private TV channelTVI, and by Sequeira Braga, the former chairperson of Marconi and currently chairing Maxitel, a private company. The platform was founded - although with little success - to specifically fight the government telecommunications policy. The platform defended wider liberalisation before the privatisation of the main operator, PT, so national groups could develop their business strategies and be able to bid for a stake in this operator. According to Roberto Carneiro, the authoritarian behaviour of the government served foreign interests rather than national and argued that the current policy would asphyxiate embryonic private telecommunications companies(see e.g. Diário de Notícias, 18 November 1994:4 Negócios).

Unions such as SINDETEL (SindicatoNacional dos Trabalhadores dos Correios e Telecomunicações) and FCTA (Federação das Comunicações, Telecomunicaçõese Audiovisuais) have played a minor role in the definition of policies. Politicians do not trust unions and the managers of telecommunications companies do not see them as legitimate representatives of the work force but essentially as a nuisance. In addition to unions, telecommunications research centres, the industry and new operators of value-added services might eventually put their views forward, but they cannot be seen as relevant actors in the political process.

There are no specific organisations representing the interests of telecommunications consumers. Their interests can only be represented through general consumers associations, such as DECO (Associação Portuguesa para a Defesa do Consumidor)and the INDC (Instituto Nacional de Defesa do Consumidor), which have difficulty in dealing with the complexity of the telecommunications sector. Still, DECO managed to run a few successful public campaigns against Portugal Telecom's abusive behaviour. PT has, for instance, cut lines to consumers without any notice and has charged consumers 13 times instead of 12 times per year for the so-called monthly line rental (see DECO brochure 'Deixe a Portugal Telecom Pendurada', 1994). In fact, DECO received more complaints about PT than about any other Portuguese company (Diário de Notícias, 15 March 1995:36). In 1983, a consumer association for telecommunications users (UT3) was set up but its existence was ephemeral. At the time, UT3 chairperson, Matos Pereira, argued that the telecommunications companies could take complaints lightly because outside those companies there was no entity with technical competence to support consumers (Pereira,1983:5). With the deactivation of UT3 and with no new associations dealing exclusively with telecommunications, consumers remain largely on their own.

4. Broadcasting and Media Policy

For historical reasons, broadcasting policy cannot be disassociated from the wider context of media policy. Since Salazar, the media in general and the electronic media in particular have been used by the political power to such an extent that it is impossible to fully understand the media developments without bearing in mind the political context examined in the previous chapter. The political history of Portugal and the evolution of media policy are deeply ingrained.

Despite the intimate relationship between political intervention for television broadcasting and for media in general, it is in the television arena that the most fundamental contradiction between overt policy or law and covert policy or practice can be identified. Television has throughout the time been perceived as too important to be left in the hands of communicators/regulators and detailed attention has been given to it. However, the true objectives of political information control could not be publicly expressed either during the dictatorship or after the 1974coup d'etat.

The setting up of RTP in 1956 and the break up of RTP's monopoly in 1992 were the two most important political initiatives in television history. In between, significant changes took place but there has not been any structural alteration in the relationship between the medium and the political establishment. Since its creation until the 1974 revolution, RTP served the interests of the New State. From the revolution up to the present day, RTP has been used by all governments to defend and often to promote themselves. What changed in 1992 was not the government's eagerness to control RTP but its inability to directly control the two new private TV channels. In this sense, the paradigmatic shift in the relationship between television and political power occurred when television started representing interests other than those of the political establishment of the day.

The prolongation of political control over the media, despite some anarchist pluralism which followed the 1974coup, was not startling considering that Portugal 'had to make a democracy without democrats', as Schmitter (1991:4) puts it. In fact, after a dictatorship which lasted almost half a century, Portugal could hardly have had a basis of democratic values to build on. Hence, it comes as no surprise that media policy in Portugal has been mainly confined to the control of contents. Only after the mid-1980's, and partly due to external reasons, was the government forced to pay some attention to matters of economy and structure.

4.1. The Salazarist period

When Salazar came to power in the late1920's (see Chapter IV), he was faced with an outspoken and relatively diversified press. During the first Republic (1910-1926), the press managed to gain freedom from the constraints imposed by the Monarchy (see e.g. Tengarrinha, 1989; Crato, 1982). Despite this relative freedom, no changes were introduced - at the very beginning of the Salazar rule - in the market structure of the media: the press remained in private hands and amateur radio broadcasts were not a pressing political issue.

As the regime became consolidated, in the mid-1930's, press censorship was installed. Showing no interest in owning newspapers, the Salazar regime concentrated on controlling their content. The 1933 Constitution, although guaranteeing - in principle -freedom of the press, opened up the possibility of institutionalising censorship once it stated that 'special laws will regulate the exercise of press freedom[...] in order to avoid distortion of public opinion in its social function'. This 'special law' was soon passed, establishing that publications 'about political and social issues will be under pre-censorship' (Carvalho, 1973:55-56).

The tight control over content had a major negative impact in the quality and quantity of newspapers. 'The main function of the press under the dictatorship was not to inspire, enlighten, or convince but to communicate official attitudes' (Seaton and Pimlott,1983:94-95). Restrained in content, with poor distribution facilities and readership (see illiteracy rates during Salazarism in Chapter IV), there was a steady decline in the regional press: 'from 210 papers in 1926, to170 in 1933, 80 in 1944, and to a mere 17 by 1963' (Seaton and Pimlott,1983:94) (national press was virtually non-existent). Most city newspapers were family businesses whilst in towns and villages papers were mainly controlled by the Catholic Church. The press was generally under funded, with very low or non-existent profits .

Contrary to what was happening in other European dictatorial regimes, the Portuguese authoritarian leaders were more concerned with preventing opposing ideas coming to the fore than with the diffusion of a new ideology. Media control was an important instrument of 'pacification'. From the beginning of the Estado Novo, and -up until the 1960's - newspapers, radio and television were not perceived as important political tools to promote ideas and values. 'Indeed the censorship reflected the unusual nature of Portuguese fascism, which was not dynamic, failed to develop a mass movement, and whose main objectives were to maintain stability and order' (Seaton and Pimlott, 1983:94).

The evolution of the electronic media in the first stages of Salazarism was slow and limited in scope. Amateur radio broadcasts started thriving in the capital in the mid-1920's. After these early beginnings, local and neighbourhood stations emerged in Lisbon and, soon afterwards, in Oporto, as well as some minor regional stations which were permitted to continue their operations during the Salazar regime. The first relevant political intervention by the Salazar regime in the electronic media was the creation of the government station Emissora Nacional (EN) (now called Rádiodifusão Portuguesa- RDP). EN resulted from the incorporation of almost all existing private stations and began transmitting regular broadcasts from Lisbon on short and medium wave on the 1st of August 1935. Nevertheless, due to the country's overall underdevelopment, 'it was not until 1955 that some 80 per cent of the population were technically capable of listening to radio broadcasts, and not until the second half of the 1960's that the country came anywhere near a full nation-wide coverage' (Optenhögel, 1986: 240).

Recognising the importance of the new medium, the Catholic Church - with a traditional involvement in the regional press - also set up its own radio station, Rádio Renascença(RR) which started broadcasting in 1937. The early days of radio stations were difficult because, up to the 1950's, advertising was not allowed, which caused enormous financial hardship to most private radios (EN was financed by the licence fee). Rádio Renascença and Emissora Nacional were clearly the most significant radio stations whose importance has grown not only during Salazism and Marcelism but after the 1974 revolution as well. The so-called radio oligopoly was only challenged in the 1980's with the explosion of illegal radio stations and with the subsequent attribution of frequencies to local and regional stations.

If Salazar did not object to the development of radio broadcasting, the same did not happen in relation to television. 'Salazar felt at ease with radio but deeply mistrusted television' (Louro, interview:12.01.95). Indeed, Salazar was not particularly keen in having television in the country and resisted its introduction. 'The old New State was against television; the new New State was in favour. Hence, it can be said that television was a concession of Salazar to his dauphin, Marcello Caetano' (Louro, interview:12.01.95). Contrary to Salazar, Marcello was interested in cinema and television and got actively involved in the setting up of Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa(RTP).

Marcello Caetano, believed that 'the survival of the regime depended on its ability to modernise itself and television was perceived as a necessary condition for it' (Gonçalves,1992). So, overcoming internal resistance, a more liberal faction of the regime created in 1953, a study group to look at the introduction of television in the country. The Grupo de Estudos de Televisão, operating within the confines of public radio station (EN), completed its report A Televisão em Portugal, in the following year. Whilst this group developed its studies, Marcello - by then secretary of state of the Presidency - appointed in January 1955 a Commission which largely agreed with the EN study group recommendation that television should be underone company of mixed ownership (see e.g. TV Guia, 17 April 1982;RTP, 1992).

On the 15th of December 1955, complying with previous legislation (notably the law-decree nº 40341 of 18thof October 1955), the government finally constituted Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa (RTP), granting the company the exclusive concession for television broadcasting in the country. The government had issued this exclusive license for twenty years, with a provision for extending it by consecutive periods of ten years, and an option for the government to purchase the corporation after its first ten years in operation. The RTP's statute had been drawn up personally by Marcello Caetano.

RTP's shares were divided into three parties, held by the government, Portuguese commercial radio stations, and banks and other private companies. It was to be financed mainly by license-fee and advertising revenue. Its technical operations were to be regulated by the PTT while its in-house management was to lay with a Board of Directors partially appointed by the government. RTP initiated experimental broadcasts on the 4th of September 1956 but regular programming would begin on the 7th of March 1957. During the first 15 years, RTP managed only one national channel. This was changed in 1968 when a second national channel,RTP-2 (now called TV2), was introduced. Regular television broadcasts were initiated in the autonomous region of Madeira in August 1972 and in the autonomous region of The Azores in August 1975 (for more information on RTP's channels, see Chapter VII)

Despite financial shortcomings and technical difficulties, one year after the first regular broadcasts in the mainland, 58% of the population could receive the broadcasting signal, although only 18,000 TV sets had been sold (TV Guia, 17 April 1982:VI).In 1966, ten years after the first experimental broadcasts, 219,117 TV sets were registered, and around 80% of the population could potentially watch television in regular conditions (TV Guia, 17 April 1982:VIII).Considering the overall underdevelopment of the country (see Chapter IV),these levels represent both considerable technical progress and popular interest for the new medium. The expansion of television can also be partly explained by high illiteracy rates (newspaper circulation was very low)and by the poor infrastructure of the country: without a good road system, for instance, daily newspapers would often reach their destination the day following their publication.

Although television was set up by amore liberal faction of the Salazar regime, the same repressive mechanisms applied to television as indeed to any other medium. However, when Salazar withdrew from power, in 1968, Marcello Caetano took over and a somehow different approach towards the media was taken. At that time, it should be remembered, important changes were taking place: internal dissatisfaction with the regime was increasingly evident; liberation wars were being fought in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, and Portugal was being progressively ostracised by the international community due to the authoritarian nature of the regime and its colonial policy.

In this political context, Marcello tried to convince the country that change could be introduced from inside the regime. Thus, a certain degree of liberalisation became inevitable and the media started being used to promote the regime's views and achievements. Marcello was, by far, more interested in using the media than Salazar. In 1965, he considered the media an indispensable tool: 'It is only convenient for state's men to use to advantage the available means of diffusion, in order to obtain a more intimate union between government and the people'(quoted in Carvalho, 1973:104). Marcello was a believer in the power of the media and, although he used the press and radio as well, he was particularly keen in being on television to put his views across: he gave regular TV interviews and used TV peak time to indoctrinate the population in the well publicised programme Conversas em Família (Talking in Family).

Compared to Salazar, Marcello Caetano was far more liberal and some of his measures reflect this new perspective. Although press censorship was not abolished, there was a relaxation of the rules. The possibility to criticise and cover more issues had clearly expanded (Carvalho, 1973:88). Furthermore, on the 14th of March 1969, Marcello revealed to the Brazilian newspaper Estado de S. Paulo his intention to publish a Press Law (Carvalho, 1973:90). Indeed, on the 2nd of December1970, the government submitted to the National Assembly a law proposal which was approved in the following year. Although more press freedom was expected from this Press Law, no relevant changes took place. The new law contemplated censorship (so-called 'previous examination') in case of a state of emergency and when 'grave subversive acts were taking place in any part of the national territory' (quoted in Carvalho, 1973:114). As Portugal was at that time fighting on three fronts in the African provinces, the 'previous examination' was allowed to continue. According to the former RTP and RDP chairperson, Soares Louro, Marcello tried to open-up, allowing in some instances, live debates and interviews: 'However, the Marcelist Spring was short-lived. The intensification of the colonial wars led to a hardening of the regime and a more radical right-wing faction managed to impose their views' (interview: 12.01.95). More liberal RTP elements were removed and there was a return to a purely repressive phase which would only be over with the 1974 revolution.

Despite these variations, under Marcello leadership, the ownership pattern and the structure of the electronic media was not modified. The EE/RR radio 'oligopoly' remained untouched whilst RTP continued to have the exclusive concession over television broadcasting in the country. The company's mixed ownership prevailed. Only the press underwent dramatic market changes. In order to control what Marcello Caetano perceived - at the beginning of his premiership at least - as inevitable liberalisation, he encouraged the most important economic groups - traditional supporters of the regime - to buy newspapers and magazines. If the most important newspapers were in 'safe' hands, the relaxation of the press rules would not be particularly damaging. Therefore, immediately before the 1974 revolution, the most important press was controlled by economic groups which owned banks or were linked to banking activities. This effort, however, would prove to be worthless as the regime was unable to reform itself and the media on its own would not have the strength to rescue it.

4.2. From 1974 until the early 1990's

After the 1974 coup d'etat (for more on political history, see Chapter IV), the media endured major convulsions. Pre-censorship was immediately abolished whilst a ferocious confrontation for the control of the most important media had just started. Very different factions co-existed within the so-called 'winners' of the revolution. Hence, no consensus would be easily achieved as to what role the media should play in a post-dictatorial society and a chaotic situation could hardly have been avoided. (See how rapidly governments were overthrown in table8).

Mesquita et al. (1994:360-361) identify three conflicting tendencies in the aftermath of the revolution:

- The inheritors of the old regime who tried to postpone the dismantling of censorship mechanisms. In terms of further legislation, this faction was in favour of a posteriori repressive measures ;

- The defenders of revolutionary Marxist ideas who were also favourable to a posteriori censorship;

- The adherents of a pluralist concept of the media, based on a Western model of democracy. This faction argued for the abolition of any form of censorship mechanisms, arguing that the courts would be the appropriate stage for media disputes.

Table 8: Government Tutelagefor the Media since 1974

Governments	Tutelage	Tutelage Head	Prime Minister
1st Provisional (1974-1974)	Ministério da ComunicaçãoSocial (MCS)	Raúl Rego	Palma Carlos
2nd Provisional (1974-1974)	MCS Sub-Secretaria de Estado da ComunicaçãoSocial (sub- SECS)	José Sanches Osório Luís Barros	Vasco Gonçalves
3rd Provisional (1974-1975)	MCS SECS Sub-SECS	Vitor Rodrigues Alves Guilherme Conceição Silva Luís de Barros	Vasco Gonçalves
4th Provisional (1975-1975)	MCS	Jorge Correia Jesuíno	Vasco Gonçalves
5th Provisional (1975-1975)	MCS	Jorge Correia Jesuíno	Vasco Gonçalves
6th Provisional (1975-1976)	MCS Secretaria de Estado da Informação	Almeida Santos José Pereira da Cunha	Pinheiro de Azevedo
1st Constitutional (1976-1977)	SECS Sub-SECS	Manuel Alegre (substituted by)José Roque Lino João Soares Louro	Mário Soares
2nd Constitutional (1978-1978)	SECS	João Joaquim Gomes	Mário Soares
3rd Constitutional (1978-1978)	SECS	António de Figueiredo	Nobre da Costa
4th Constitutional (1978-1979)	MCS	Proença de Carvalho	Mota Pinto
5th Constitutional (1979-1979)	No specific Ministry or Secretary for the media		Maria de Lurdes Pintassilgo
6th Constitutional (1980-1980)	SECS	Carlos de Sousa e Brito	Sá Carneiro
7th Constitutional (1981-1981)	Secretário de Estado Adjunto do Primeiro Ministro (SEAPM) para a Comunicação Social	Carlos Pinto Pereira	Pinto Balsemão
8th Constitutional (1981-1982)	SEAPM para a Comunicação Social	José Pereira	Pinto Balsemão
9th Constitutional (1983-1985)	No specific Ministry or Secretary for the media		Mário Soares
10th Constitutional (1985-1987)	Secretaria de Estado da Presidência do Conselho de Ministros (SEPCM)	Santana Lopes	Cavaco Silva
11th Constitutional (1987-1991)	SEPCM	Marques Mendes	Cavaco Silva
12th Constitutional (1991-1995)	SEPCM	Marques Mendes	Cavaco Silva

Source: Combined data from the Portuguese Parliament's library

Notwithstanding these conflicting views, two major pieces of legislation approved after 1974 were strongly against the control of the media by any form. The 1975 Press Law guaranteed that the 'press freedom will be exercised without subordination to any form of censorship' (Art.4º). Similarly, the 1976 Constitution suggested that the pluralist view of the media was clearly successful. It stated that the freedom of the press was guaranteed and that no group was allowed to exercise censorship or obstruct journalistic creativity (Art. 39º). These documents could be understood as pluralist, in the sense that they expressed the view that different interests in society should have the right to express themselves and to influence the political process. But, if this view succeeded in legal terms, a very different non-expressed policy was being implemented.

Arguably because of the dangerous 'reactionary forces', leftist elements within the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA) contended that the media would have to be controlled during the revolutionary period. There was a clear contradiction in the MFA programme which contemplated both the 'abolishment of censorship and previous examination' and the creation of an 'ad hoc committee to control the press, radio, television, theatre and cinema' in order to 'safeguard military secrets and to prevent disturbances which could be provoked in public opinion by ideological aggressions from the most reactionary sections of society' (quoted in Bruneau and MacLeod,1986: 165-166).

This ad hoc committee transformed itself enormously, according to which faction was more powerful within the MFA movement and within the Junta de Salvação Nacional. First, radical leftist media were censored but, with the removal of the more conservative General Spínola, after the 28th of September crisis, the leftist wing gained progressive strength and the ad hoc Committee concentrated its activity among the rightist/conservative press. From the 6th of September1974 to the 28th of February 1975, 28 publications were suspended whose majority was close to the Catholic Church (Mesquita:1988:89).

The battle for media control right after the revolution and, particularly, after the 28th of September, was far from being fought only within the ad hoc Committee which had powers to suspend and punish newspapers which were out of the leftist 'revolutionary' line. Elements close to the MFA movement were appointed to leading posts both in radio and television. By early 1975, the panorama in the electronic media was perceived as being chaotic. In Salgado Zenha's words, 'what is now going on in the Emissora Nacional and on television is very grave because there is no single censorship but several' (quoted in Mesquita,1988:102). This highly volatile situation got even worse with the installation of the communist provisional governments of Vasco Gonçalves, after the 11th of March coup. The publication of the pluralist Press Law, the month before, did not prevent the increasing levels of media instrumentation.

In addition to the creation of a Press Council (Conselho de Imprensa) to safeguard press freedom, the Press Law contemplated extensive guarantees for journalists such as freedom to inform, freedom of thought, freedom of access to official sources of information, freedom of publication, among others. This legislation was however in clear contradiction with the Vasco Gonçalves' view of a communist society. So, in parallel with this law, the Social Communication minister, Vitor Alves, has created a new organism, the Conselho de Informação. The creation of this council was justified by the need of 'an ample and internal debate and inter-change of ideas between the ministry of Social Communication and the State's media' (quoted in Mesquita: 1988:107). In reality, the goals of Conselho de Informação were directly related with the Communist Party's intention to decide directly the state's media agenda and discourse. The RTP and EE, in particular, were to be used in the construction of a 'People's democracy'.

Indeed, in this revolutionary period, the press which was still in private hands was 'transferred' to public ownership. Three days after the leftist coup of 15th March 1975, important sectors of the economy such as banking and insurance were nationalised. Because many leading newspapers were owned by strong economic groups and banks, they became state property. 'From the important dailies, only the República in Lisbon and O Primeiro de Janeiro, in Oporto remained in private hands' (Mesquita et al., 1994:368). The nationalisation of the press was never explained as a political option. 'It was presented as an indirect consequence of the nationalisation of the banking sector'(Mesquita et al., 1994:368). But behind this option was clearly the willto control what was left out of government's direct influence. Significantly,the nationalisation process was not reversed with the removal of the communistprime minister, Vasco Gonçalves, in November 1975.

Under Gonçalvismo, the electronic media were directly controlled by leftist forces, but the 'moderate' VI provisional government would only increase the state's media ownership. Radio was nationalised, with the exception of the Catholic Rádio Renascença, which had been in communist's hands during Vasco Gonçalves's governments. The newly created national radio company was called Empresa Pública de Rádiodifusão (EPR), although it would later be re-named Rádiodifusão Portuguesa (RDP). RDP and RR came to be known as the radio duopoly which remained untouched until the explosion of illegal radio stations in the mid-1980's. The television company RTP (Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa, SARL) which had been managed directly by the government since the coup (law-decree nº 278/74) was also nationalised by late1975 (law-decree nº 674-D/75 of 02.12.75), being established as the public company RTP-Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa, EP. The RTP monopoly only ended with the opening up of TV channels to private initiative in the early 1990's (see Chapter VII).

Both RDP and RTP have been under the control of successive governments. 'Clear evidence of this is given by the fact that since 1974 the eleven seats on the board of governors and the 20 directors posts at RTP and RDP have been held by 80 and 130 different people respectively, whose qualifications for the job were considered less important than their party membership cards' (Optenhögel, 1986:243).Indeed, administrations have changed even more frequently than governments. The height of that instability was reached during the three and a half years of the Aliança Democrática (AD) which made the most blatant move to put radio and television at the service of the government. In the words of the first chairman of the board appointed by the AD and15º President of RTP (from February 1980 to July 1980), Victor Cunha Rego, 'impartiality in state television was unthinkable' (quoted in Bruneau,1986:173).

What is particularly remarkable about the media development in Portugal is that laws drawn up during an exceptional period shaped the media until the 1980's. This aspect suggests that the authoritarian nature of the provisional leftist governments suited the newly created democrats. Despite the 1976 Constitution (with its impressive display of civil liberties), no elected government was prepared to grant freedom to the press. Generally, following the political measures introduced during the revolutionary period, politicians from all affiliations have not openly designed media policies but have merely taken the necessary steps to ensure that the nationalised media would be favourable to those in power.

Given the nature of political, economic and technological developments in the mid-1980's, changes in the national media policy were bound to be introduced. At a regional level, the European Union was developing its policies for telecommunications and television broadcasting as radio and the press were not high on the EU agenda (see Chapter III). Conservative governments in the UK, Germany and France (not to mention the US) persuasively argued for liberalisation of markets and privatisation of state property; and last but certainly not least, important technological advances - mainly the development of satellite and optic fibre and the subsequent convergence of distribution technologies - had enormous implications. The proliferation of European satellite TV channels, for instance, started being used as an argument against the national RTP monopoly. RTP's critics argued that, once one could receive international private TV channels, there was no reason why one should not have national private channels.

At a national level, important changes were also taking place. Up to the mid-1980's, the political instability in the country was so acute that any comprehensive set of political decisions was hard, if not impossible, to implement (see table 8). In 1987, one year after Portugal joined the EEC, the first majority government was elected since the 1974 revolution. At that time, the country's economy was booming(see Chapter IV) that being the main reason for a substantial rise in advertising revenue which had increased, in total, from around £52 million in1986 to around £400 million in 1994. In this economic context, relatively unconstrained newspapers such as O Independente and Público were set up and their existence seriously impaired the government's ability to suppress politically damaging material. In addition, the climate of opinion was turning against the concentration of the media in the state's hands. The Cavaco Silva's government itself believed that if Portugal was to be seen as a truly European partner, changes in the economy, and consequently in the media market, had to be introduced. A pro-business approach was taken and the liberalisation of the media market and privatisation of a substantial share of state media was imminent.

In Portuguese recent history, this would be the second time that a government opened up the media and picked winners. In the 1970's, Marcello Caetano tried to maintain power over the press by allowing economic groups close to the regime to own periodicals. As the country was supposedly opening up and censorship was bound to be abolished, Marcello urged economic groups to buy out newspapers. In a different context, in the late 1980's and early 1990's, Cavaco Silva chose carefully the actors which would be allowed to participate in the newly liberalised broadcasting market and privatised state press. In other words, if liberalisation and privatisation could not be avoided, the media should be in the safest possible hands.

In this context, the two Cavaco Silva's majority governments undertook the most comprehensive changes in the media since 1974-75. Although the governmental programmes (see Assembleia da República, 1987; Assembleia da República, 1992) are vague and do not clearly set out the government's objectives for the sector, the following lines of action can be identified:

- the nationalised press should return to the private sector

- a minimum radio and television public service should continue to be provided by the state

- the radio sector should be liberalised and/or privatised (e.g. Rádio Comercial)

- a television act should be approved so two TV channels could be granted to private operators

- the national news agency, Lusa, should continue to be publicly owned

- attention should be given to the Portuguese communities abroad, to the Portuguese speaking peoples, and to the regional press and professional training.

Although not expressed, some of these lines of action are still directly related to the control of content. The state's ownership and subsequent government's control of the national news agency (Lusa) for example, is crucial for the executive's dominion over political content both in the national and local media. This is mainly due to a lack of human and material resources in the media which forces them to rely heavily on Lusa. However, some policy proposals in his programme deal with structure of the media which is a shift from previous minority governments.

The first set of measures directly related to the structure of the media concerned the re-organisation of the radio broadcasting sector. By mid-1980's there were so may illegal radio stations operating that the government could no longer ignore that reality. Nevertheless, it was only in 1989 that 310 local frequencies were allocated. In the following year, two regional frequencies were attributed: one went to Rádio Press, part of the Lusomundo group and the other to Correia da Manhã Rádio which belonged to the Carlos Barbosa group. As early as 1976 there were calls for the legalisation of local and regional radio stations but no government was keen on doing so.

In 1991, the two most important state owned and controlled newspapers were privatised. The government had been following a wide privatisation programme and there were no grounds to justify the maintenance of Jornal de Notícias and Diário de Notícias under state control. The government was in a dilemma between the perceived need to control those newspapers and the ideological and political belief in privatisation. In a controversial process, both were bought by Lusomundo, one of the most important multi-media groups in Portugal, perceived - at the time - as having close links with the government.

The opening up of TV channels to private ownership has been on the political agenda throughout the 1980's. Many groups have shown interest but only three have bid for the two TV channels which would be set up to add to the existing ones: RTP1 and RTP2 (later re-named TV2). One channel was granted to the Catholic Church; the other went to the former prime minister, Pinto Balsemão, who is an historic member of the Social Democrat Party (see Chapter VII). The liberalisation of telecommunications is having some implications in the way broadcasting actors are defining their strategies. The TV channel attributed to the Catholic Church, for example, decided to set up its own terrestrial network, planning to use it for telecommunications services.

5. Main Actors in the Broadcasting/Media Arena

The state/government has traditionally been the main actor in the media arena, not only regulating but also owning and controlling the media. In the current government structure there is no specific department dealing with broadcasting and/or the media. During Cavaco Silva's mandates, the media have been under the tutelage of the Secretaria de Estado da Presidência do Conselho de Ministros (see table 8). Although Marques Mendes has chaired this secretaria, it has been the prime minister who has managed personally the most important portfolios such as the opening up of television to private operators. Marques Mendes has been dealing with politically safe issues such as violence on television and the RTP's broadcasts to the Portuguese emigrant communities and to the Portuguese speaking African nations. Despite the grave situation the national broadcasting sector is in (see Chapter VII), Marques Mendes' intervention has been limited to uncontroversial issues. Just as in the past, the selection of chief and middle-range editors close to the government for the public sector media has been the most efficient way of controlling political output. Once the agenda is shaped there is no need for direct censorship.

Within the institutional framework, the Alta Autoridade para a Comunicação Social (AACS)is the high authority for the media. AACS was contemplated for the first time in the 1989 version of the Portuguese Constitution and its objectives are, inter alia, to guarantee the freedom of the press, to have a say in the attribution of TV channels to private initiative and in the selection of public media editors (Art.39). The high authority has never had any credibility because it has been dominated by the government of the day. From its 12 members, one is a magistrate, five are members of the Parliament (the government's majority is reflected here), three members are designated by the government itself and the last four elements are so-called representatives of the public opinion (see Art.39). The composition of AACS alone would prevent it from operating as an independent entity.

Political parties in general and the opposition in particular tend to be more attentive to government intervention in the media than in the telecommunications sector. Criticisms about the government's direct intervention in the RTP's political output are commonplace (see e.g. 'PS declara guerra à RTP' in Público,22 June 1995:5). The President of the Republic himself has publicly intervened to denounce the 'governmentalisation of RTP' (Soares, 1991:2) This does not necessarily mean that these actors do influence major decisions, but they create an awareness and visibility of broadcasting issues which has no parallel in the telecommunications arena

Although a few senior politicians were crucial to the definition of the current broadcasting scenario, two non-institutional actors successfully lobbied to determine the outcome that best suited their interests. The Catholic Church and the Balsemão group managed to be granted the two available national TV licenses in what turned out to be an extremely controversial process.

The Catholic Church has a long history of involvement in the media and the acquisition of a TV channel has been a long-standing claim (see Chapter VII). Although the Church does not have a clear strategy for the media, there is a general view that its moral principles should be put forward, once more than 90% of population is catholic. According to Magalhães Crespo, head of RR, in an interview to the weekly Expresso (19/12/93:A16), it is vital that a multi-media group of Christian inspiration is set up. This urge to expand Catholic values is also related to the fact that other media groups are gaining 'enormous influence amongst the public opinion', says Magalhães Crespo (Ibid.).Although RR has been a profitable radio network, the Church is more concerned with its influence in the Portuguese society than with the economic aspect of this venture. Indeed, if the Church was operating merely with economic goals, it would not have invested in a TV channel, when it was well known that - due to lack of advertising revenue - it would be extremely hard to support four national TV channels financed almost exclusively by advertising(the license fee was abolished by the last Cavaco Silva's government without public consultation or debate).

The Controjornal group, whose figurehead is the former prime minister Pinto Balsemão, has started with the successful weekly Expresso and has been consolidating its position in the media market. In addition to Expresso, it owns a daily newspaper (Capital), several specialised magazines, and it also has a solid position in the printing industry. The acquisition of a national TV channel (SIC) was the most important recent development in Balsemão's media plans. This group has been perceived as having good quality media products, SIC's programming being a clear exception. Because of lack of resources, SIC has had a very populist programming with, for instance, Brazilian soap operas and soft-porn shows on prime-time.

Another very powerful group in the media arena is the Lusomundo group. Lusomundo started with film distribution and later expanded into exhibition and real estate. Now it has a dominant position in cinema distribution and exhibition sectors in Portugal. It also controls two of the five major daily newspapers (Jornal de Notícias and Diário de Notícias) and has a strong position in the printing industry. During the allocation of regional radio stations, Lusomundo has successfully bidden for the Northern frequency which has already been absorbed by TSF Rádio Jornal, where Lusomundo got a solid position in March 1993. Although this group was not too keen in making investments in terrestrial television, the head of the group, Luís Silva, has revealed in an interview to Diário de Notícias that Cable TV would eventually be 'more interesting' (8th March 1993:8).

Just like in the telecommunications sector, other actors such as consumer groups (e.g. APT -Associação Portuguesa dos Telespectadores and APET - Associação Portuguesa de Espectadores de Televisão ) and trade unions are too weak to have any significant impact in the determination of political output. In the new competitive broadcasting environment, the courts have had some influence in the determination of what should have been merely political decisions. As public authorities are unsure about their own policies, broadcasting companies have tried to change the status quo through the courts. In 1994, for instance, SIC tried unsuccessfully to prevent RTP'sTV2 broadcasting of so-called 'big audience' programmes such as soap operas and football. On the 24th of August the same year, the Supreme Court ruled that, although TV2 should be a channel for minorities, it could not be prevented from broadcasting such programmes.

6. Conclusion

From what has been said, some common characteristics between telecommunications and broadcasting policies can be identified. Indeed, the analysis of the evolution of both sectors demonstrates that there is a strong tradition of political centralisation. Relevant policies are taken by a few senior politicians (generally the prime minister and a few close governmental figures) with very limited - if any - public debate. Although, as we have shown, there are a number of actors which are supposed to have a say in the sector's political outcome, only a handful of them manage to have some influence. Most decisions are taken behind closed doors with no justification being provided by governments. Secretism has been used to have the governments' interests protected from criticisms during what should have been consultation periods. Generally, governments have been ill-prepared to deal with the very specific needs of these sectors and have acted without public consultation or expert advice. In fact, political power has been concentrated in the hands of a small minority and it can be argued that an elitist mode of decision-making is more open to manipulation than an approach involving public debate and alternative policy proposals.

Despite these common aspects, broadcasting and telecommunications have very distinct traditions and have been considered as distinctive policy areas. Broadcasting policy has always been, first and foremost, about the control of content. Only in the mid-1980's was the structure of the sector seriously questioned and changes were consequently introduced. Apart from that, only the control of content has had crucial political significance. Telecommunications, on the contrary, have been related to economic development and, from the very beginning, have been perceived as important for the modernisation of the country. It was only during the Salazarist period, that international telecommunications were used for a specific political purpose - to unite the scattered parts oft he Portuguese overseas empire.

Notwithstanding the 'national' objectives, telecommunications were for a long period of time largely controlled by foreign companies, the British Marconi and APT. The country did not have resources to fully develop national and international telecommunications and contracting out seemed - at the time at least - the best alternative. In the 1960's, however, Salazar perceived the need to control transmission technologies and decided not to renew APT's contract. Marconi's shares were also bought by the Portuguese state. Telecommunications became then, for the first time, part of the public sector. Marcello Caetano was not so concerned with the security issues as Salazar and perceived telecommunications as a means to help revive the economy. Important investments were made before the 1974 revolution. Despite some failed attempts to energise the sector, it would only be in the mid-1980's, when Portugal joined the EC, that dramatic changes would take place.

Differently from what happened in the telecommunications sector, broadcasting has always been in national hands and firmly under the control of governments. Apart from the import of hardware and software products, no government would allow direct foreign interference in the sector which could - in any way - threaten its ability to control the political output. Since the setting up of television broadcasting in Portugal, in 1956, until the break up of the RTP's monopoly, in 1992, no structural change took place in the relationship between the medium and the political establishment. Television has served the interests of the Salazar regime and has served the interests of all governments ever since. With the two new private channels (SIC and TVI), the government lost the monopoly of power over television broadcasting. Although the channels were granted to the two politically less damaging actors (the Church and to the former social democrat prime minister, Pinto Balsemão), the government has lost, for the first time, direct control over television broadcasting. It was not by chance that the first majority social democrat government decided to attribute the TV licenses after the 1991 legislative elections (on which they gained a second majority), and not well before as previously announced.

In fact, it is in the broadcasting arena that there has been the most acute contradiction between expressed governmental objectives and the actual political performance. Although the governmental programmes since 1974 (Assembleia da República,1978; 1979; 1979a; 1980; 1981; 1982; 1983; 1986; 1987; 1992), have systematically expressed the importance of press freedom in a democratic society and the need for independent media, no government (elected or not) has refrained from intervening in the control of news content. Some areas of programming, such as entertainment, have been notably freer. In the telecommunications sector, there are also political objectives which are not expressed, but the contradiction between what is said and what is done is not so obvious. Telecommunications policy objectives are mainly related with economic development and generally - despite undisclosed interests - the general objectives for the sector are not politically damaging.

Although telecommunications is much more relevant in terms of investment and employment (see Chapter VI), it is a relatively non-controversial area. Broadcasting, on the other hand, has almost no economic significance - if compared with the telecommunications sector - but it has great political significance. In his recent book, As Reformas da Década (The Reforms of the Decade) the prime minister, Cavaco Silva (1995), dedicated a full chapter (the first one) to the achievements of his government in the media arena whist telecommunications is referred to in three paragraphs (p. 132-133) within a general chapter about the opening up of several sectors to private initiatives. Indeed, at this stage, the economic relevance of broadcasting might be negligible but politically it is as relevant as ever.

Summing up, in this chapter, we analysed the development of communications policies from the 19th century up until the mid-1980's and we tried to assess the similarities and differences in the political approaches towards broadcasting and telecommunications. It is relevant to point out - at this stage - that although Portugal joined the EEC in 1986, the Community began to impact on telecommunications policy since the early 1980's. A number of policy orientations - even if not implemented in the early 1980's - such as liberalisation of terminal equipment market and the legal creation of Instituto Português das Comunicações - suggest that the country wanted to be perceived as a potential responsible (i.e. liberal) member of the Community. Furthermore, the 1983-85 government decided to open up the switch contract bidding to seven foreign companies to demonstrate openness to the EC. Indeed, the EU began to impact on telecommunications before the country became a full member-state mainly because national politicians were looking for acceptance and recognition.