1. Introduction

This chapter is an attempt to develop a theoretical framework which will provide some analytic tools to explain the empirical evidence put forward in the following chapters. Because policies for national communications are taken within an international/regional context, we will start by using International Relations theories (mainly the so-called Inter-paradigmatic debate and integration theories) and then we will move to the national level of analysis, using particularly state theories to explain the policy-making process in the communications arena.

So, taking a multi-disciplinary approach, we will try to elaborate an explanatory setting for the increasing interdependence between Portugal and the EU in the telecommunications sector and for the increasing dependency between Portugal and the US and Brazil in terms of broadcasting products. Both interdependency and dependency theories offer us useful analytical elements, although the situation of the broadcasting sector in Portugal might be better understood within the 'cultural industries' approach. Dependency theory identifies the problem, but does not deal clearly with its causes, whilst the cultural industries approach focuses on the economic characteristics of the broadcasting product and explains the competitive advantages of countries such as the US.

Despite technological convergence, the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors have developed quite distinctively in their relation with the EU. In the broadcasting sector, there is no discernible relationship as EU policies are not adequately developed and member states can still decide by themselves on all relevant issues. In the telecommunications sector however there has been progressive integration. The government was prepared to trade off the opening up of the telecommunications market for EU financial rewards (through programmes such as STAR and Telematique). Such trade-offs are non-existent in the broadcasting arena. The main reasons for these differences can be explained (partly at least) with the backing of integration theories. Yet, although we acknowledge an increasing high level of international connections between Portuguese communications and international organisations and markets, we still believe that the nation-state is the main locus of power in terms of defining policies for Portuguese communications.

A neo-realist approach is therefore indispensable to the analysis of communications policy in Portugal. Increasing interdependency and/or dependency does not necessarily mean that - at least in the Western World - the most relevant political decisions are not taken at a national level. States have lost part of their scope of action in the last few decades, but none of their core characteristics have been lost and international organisations like the EU and the UN are, in fact, based on the principle of the association of states. This neo-realist approach will take us to the domestic level of analysis in which state theories will help us to explain some characteristics of the Portuguese communications policy. The state theories which are most likely to provide us with useful insights concerning the main characteristics of national political intervention in communications are elitism, authoritarianism, corporatism and pluralism (including the concept of policy networks).
 
 

2. The Relevance of the IR Inter-paradigmatic Debate

The theoretical construction we are attempting to build up in order to explain the main developments in recent communications policy in Portugal will benefit from various elements of the IR Inter-paradigmatic debate. Portuguese communications do not perform in isolation and communications policies are taken within a wider frame of international and/or regional developments. The IR three main general theories or paradigms, namely realism, pluralism or interdependency and structuralism or dependency, offer us some useful insights to examine Portugal in context.

In spite of the extreme complexity surrounding each paradigm, each of the three has traditionally been represented by a wholly different basic image. 'For realists, the world society is a system of 'billiard-ball' states in intermittent collision. For pluralists, it is a 'cobweb', a network of numerous criss-crossing relationships. For structuralists, it is a 'multi-headed octopus', with powerful tentacles constantly sucking wealth from the weakened peripheries towards the powerful centres' (Banks, 1985: 12). When trying to understand recent developments in Portuguese communications with the support of some of the analytic tools developed around these general perspectives, it will become clear that - although these approaches are usually perceived as contradictory in terms - they can, in fact, be used in a complementary manner.

Realists see the state as the only relevant actor in the international scene and they regard politics as being governed by objective laws that have roots in the human nature which is intrinsically evil. For realists, power is a key concept: 'International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power' (Morgenthau, 1967: 25). This approach perceives the state as a unitary being, acting always in its own interest and to increase its own power. Realism reigned supreme during the Cold War, in spite of the challenges of pluralism and structuralism mainly after the early 1970's. Reducing the state to a homogenous apparatus guided by rational decision-makers representing the 'state interest' and seeking 'power' has been considered one of the major weaknesses of the realist view. Indeed, the recognition that political systems are influenced more and more from abroad means that the boundaries of the state need to be re-examined, but it does not necessarily mean that the state as an entity has lost its importance.

The realists' view was therefore challenged by both pluralists and structuralists. Pluralists emphasise the interdependent nature of international relations. They see the nation-state as one actor among many others like international organisations and Trans-National Companies (TNCs). They believe that the state is losing its relevance as a major actor in the international context due to the increasing economic links between states and companies which are inter-related with the transnationalisation of capital and developments in communications technologies. Keohane and Nye (1977:3) sum up these ideas quoting a Kissinger speech: 'We are entering a new era. Old international patterns are crumbling; old slogans are uninstructive; old solutions are unavailing. The world has become interdependent in economics, in communications, in human aspirations'.

So, the world is no longer seen as a state-centric arena, but as a global-centric. The creators of this new World Society paradigm see individuals as its main constituents, who continuously form and reform groups for self-expression, whether states, nations, religions, trades unions or professional associations. The main objective of IR is the resolution of conflict which no longer is based on the wickedness of human nature. Indeed, human nature is 'rehabilitated'- Burton says that the US defeats in Vietnam, Iran and Lebanon are not anomalies, they are the indication that the 'power model has failed' (1985:51); he argues that the concept of 'human needs' is the one we can use to explain events in world society. However, other international events such as the Falkland war, for example, could be used to argue precisely the opposite; that the more powerful state still has the means to impose its will.

By putting aside the state and by arguing that the multiple interaction systems (cobweb model) would eventually render it obsolete, some of the idealist pluralist authors might have gone too far in the simplification. Young argued that the growth in the level of interdependence would precipitate the emergence of a 'world community' or a 'world culture' which in turn would lead to the 'development of a world 'state' capable of managing the rising level of interdependence' (in Maghroori and Ramberg, 1982:17-18). The pessimists, among pluralists, do not adopt this idea of progression towards a state of 'total bliss' - in fact, they recognise that growing interdependence increases the possibilities of conflict - but they do, however, see world peace as the main objective of every unit in IR and argue that this objective can be pursued through co-operation. A common feature in both pluralist perspectives is the assumption that all IR units will trade in - at least partially - their autonomy for the 'greater good', without guarantees.

Realism was not only attacked from pluralists. Particularly since the 1960's, another school of thought - rooted in Marxist ideology - has emerged in Latin America. Structuralists or dependency writers were not concerned with the states per se in the international scene nor with the increasing interdependencies and linkages which were being developed world-wide. Although dependency theory is not a coherent body of literature in the sense that it subsumes several distinct theories (e.g. centre-periphery analysis, world system analysis and dependencia), there are a few common concerns amongst these authors: they are concerned with asymmetrical relations between two groups of countries, between the so-called 'first' and 'third' world and they have a rather pessimistic view of Less Developed Countries' (LDCs) possibilities of growth once they are trapped within a global system which is highly unfavourable to their economic, social and cultural development.

Galtung develops these general arguments using the concept of imperialism which is a relationship between a Centre and a Periphery nation so that i) there is harmony of interest between the centre in the Centre nation and the centre in the Periphery nation, ii) there is more disharmony of interest within the Periphery nation than within the Center nations and iii) there is disharmony of interest between the periphery in the Center nation and the periphery in the Periphery nation (1971). Differently from Galtung, Wallerstein and Frank suggested that not only new actors had to be incorporated into the theoretical IR framework (e.g. TNCs) but more fundamentally that a new, fifth and principal level, had to be added too: the world system - an entirety which is more than the sum of the parts and which explains behaviour and functioning (Joostein, 1993). Still, despite using quite distinctive analytic tools, dependency perspectives imply that the real actors in world politics are dominant class or economic interests and that those in a dependent position within the global structure are systematically prevented from achieving any capacity for autonomous action.
 
 

2.1. Telecommunications: What Case for Interdependency?

In the case of Portuguese communications, the most clear external links concern the telecommunications sector and the EU, and the broadcasting sector and the US and Brazilian TV production industries. The EU has not become a relevant actor in the broadcasting arena where Portugal retains ample autonomy in terms of policy-making which gives credence to a realist/neo-realist approach. So far, the EU has not reached any binding compromise around crucial television issues and has merely developed a generalist and vague framework on uncontroversial aspects and has designed a few poorly financed audio-visual programmes such as MEDIA 92 and MEDIA 95.

However, in the telecommunications sector, the EU initiatives and policies are having a significant impact in both core and peripheral countries. In this sub-section, we will try to analyse the Portugal-EU links in the telecommunications arena taking some elements from the interdependency theory. 'Interdependence, most simply defined, means mutual dependence' (Keohane and Nye, 1977:8). Yet, if one wants to examine the relationship between Portugal and the EU through this IR approach, it is important to highlight that it does not only mean situations of mutual benefit. 'Interdependent relationships will always involve costs, since interdependency restricts autonomy; but it is impossible to specify a priori whether the benefits of a relationship will exceed the costs' (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 9). In fact, although the benefits of this relationship are visible in Portugal, they are indeed very modest if compared with the benefits of the core countries.

When Portugal joined the EEC, in 1986, the Community had little to offer to LFRs in the telecommunications sector. Its policy had been designed to benefit the well established core countries. Massive sums of money were already streaming to R&D programmes (e.g. ESPRIT) which would benefit countries with a solid telecommunications manufacturing basis, such as Germany, France, the UK and The Netherlands. At the same time, these countries/companies argued that a community-scale market was needed in order to compete with the US and Japan. National markets for some telecoms products (e.g. public exchanges) were too small to support competition. The more experienced and powerful EU actors (mainly telecommunications manufacturers and big business) pushed simultaneously for wider liberalisation and for R&D subsidies. They wanted both highly advanced services and an open market to facilitate the export of services and products. In the mid-1980's, Portuguese telecommunications were lagging behind those of the core countries. Telephone main line penetration was just around half of the Community and advanced services were virtually non-existent.

Portugal joined the EEC in rather difficult circumstances: serious economic hardship and political instability were very much part of national life and would not seem to fade away. At European level, there was a fear that Portugal could go back to either a right wing or a left wing dictatorship which, in any case, was not a desirable outcome for a Western European country. Given that the Portuguese economy was in disarray, Portugal was received in the 'European club' mainly for political reasons - the Western section of the continent was prepared to pay in order to avoid further political turmoil in the continent. But, if the European counterparts were ready to accept a country which - at that time - lagged so far behind the core countries, Portugal was clearly ill-prepared to take full advantage of the situation and to effectively negotiate for further concessions out of Europe.

As an inexperienced country in the international arena, Portugal was keen to be perceived as a responsible member of the Community. With a backlog of isolation during half a century of dictatorship and with a highly volatile political and economic situation up until the accession to the EEC, politicians had little time to develop their bargaining skills in the international fora. There was poor understanding of international economics and politics and only a few were fluent speakers of European languages. This lack of expertise abroad was matched with lack of accountability at home. Indeed, because of the tradition of political impunity and absence of public consultation and debate, politicians managed to get away with unsatisfactory results without even being noticed.

In the telecommunications arena, technical and political elites did not understand what was there to be negotiated. Portugal agreed to open up its telecommunications market before the EU directives were adopted. The separation between operators and regulators was also approved at national level when it was still being argued for at European level. This suggests that, instead of trying to get something out of the opening up of its domestic market, Portugal went for it at full thrust hoping to be seen as a model member-state. The elites' reference group has been their European counterparts, not the domestic public. The national authorities looked outside rather than inside for recognition and acceptance. Furthermore, the EU policies have been used by this small elite as a means to manipulate internal politics. Even if the EU telecommunications framework is still quite vague (not as vague as the broadcasting though), measures which would hardly be popular were presented as 'inevitable', given that Portugal had become a EU full member and had to comply with EU policies. The merger of national operators into Portugal Telecom (PT) and its subsequent privatisation, for example, were displayed as the 'natural' outcome of the European context, even though the EU has never developed a policy in these specific areas.

Because of the national authorities' lack of expertise and because the opposition, trade unions, consumer associations and the public in general knew little about the telecommunications sector, Portugal has not fully benefited from what should have been a more equitable inter-dependency relationship. This is not to say that Portugal has not, in any way, benefited from the EU policies but that it has benefited in very limited terms when it could have benefited more substantially. Although there are conflicting and even contradictory interests within the EU, powerful actors had very concrete interests in having the market opened up. For manufacturing companies - which have been arguing for wider liberalisation - Portugal is yet another market where they can freely place their products or provide their services. The Commission itself had been keen to foster economic and political integration. Telecommunications were perceived as a crucial area of intervention if these objectives were to be achieved. Since Portugal became a full EU member state, it can be said that the Commission depended on Portugal - as indeed on all LFRs - to foster integration.

In the telecommunications sector, Portugal has traditionally relied on foreign expertise and products but since the equipment and services markets were opened up, it has lost (partly at least) the ability to select who can and who cannot enter the national market. Furthermore, Portugal has no telecommunications manufacturing basis and - because of inherited technological backwardness - it has not played any relevant role in terms of products and services innovation. In these circumstances, it was very unlikely that Portugal would directly benefit from the most important aspects of EU telecommunications policy. Still, recognising that inadequacy of its sectoral policy for LFRs, the EU has put forward a few programmes to deal specifically with the needs of countries such as Portugal (STAR and Telematique were the most visible). Despite the meagre resources allocated to these programmes (particularly if compared with the resources allocated to programmes such as ESPRIT and RACE which benefited the core countries), Portugal managed to expand its basic network and to speed up the introduction of a number of advanced services.
 
 

2.2. Broadcasting: Dependency, Reverse Dependency and the 'Cultural Industries' Approach

In the broadcasting arena, Portugal has not been significantly affected by the EU legal framework. The EU broadcasting policy has not yet been properly developed and Portugal has not fully participated in the existing EU audio-visual programmes. In almost all MEDIA sub-programmes, Portugal is one of the countries with less projects submitted and approved, and significantly, the Portuguese broadcasting companies have no close relationship with the Union - they have not applied and benefited from EU programmes. The extreme difficulties of the national broadcasting sector cannot be justified or explained by 'European policies' arguments. National actors, namely politicians and broadcasting companies, are mainly responsible for the poor quality programming and for the non-existence of national production.

Broadcasting is very much related to electoral politics and - as such - it is perceived as a dangerous political instrument, if not properly (though covertly) controlled. Financial dependency has been an effective way of maintaining political subservience. Contrary to the telecommunications sector, which has been generously financed by recent governments, broadcasting has been financially stretched to the limit. The opening up of two private channels in 1992/93, coupled with the abolition of the license fee for electoral reasons, compelled four TV channels to compete fiercely for a small advertising cake (around £160m). Both so-called Public Service and commercial channels have no resources for quality programming and substantial investments in national production are out of question. In any case, had not the national television policies been so crudely developed, alternative ways of financing would have had to be found and broadcasters would have had to be legally obliged to raise their standards.

Although the national broadcasting systems operates quite independently from EU influence and pressures, the programming output is dependent on American and Brazilian cheap imports. The US is the main supplier of fictional content, providing 41% of all fiction programmes transmitted on Portuguese television whilst Brazil is the second most important supplier (25%) largely due to the soap opera genre (see Traquina, 19951). With the exception of the UK, the EU countries have not been successful in exporting their audio-visual products to Portugal and national production is irrelevant. Prime time television in Portugal is dominated by Brazilian soap operas, reality shows and quiz shows (mainly from foreign formats), and US movies.

Authors such as Galtung (1971) and Wallerstein (1974; 1979) used structural models to analyse the dependency relationship between the core and the periphery, between the West and its former colonies. Dependency authors did not see this unfavourable relationship only in economic terms (although it was the main focus); they have dedicated a considerable part of their work to political, military and cultural spheres. In all these areas, the peripheries would be trapped by the interests of the centre (or the centre within the centre) which would prevent the peripheries from freeing themselves from this vicious cycle. The state of Portuguese broadcasting does indeed suggest that all TV channels depend on cheap imports to survive because they cannot afford national production which is far more expensive and cannot a priori guarantee large audiences. If Brazil was not a major exporter of television products to Portugal, dependency theory would - in this particular case - appear as a more coherent discourse. However, dependency theorists have never put forward a framework which could explain how Brazil, a former Portuguese colony (and therefore part of the periphery in the dependency model), would end up as a major player in the Portuguese broadcasting sector. The relationship between Portugal and Brazil in the broadcasting sector is a case of 'reverse' dependency. Brazil is the centre and Portugal is the periphery.

Though dependency, imperialism and cultural imperialism (for a critique on the latter see Tomlinson, 1991; Sinclair, 1994; Maxwell, 1994) still describe some relevant economic, political and cultural/media aspects in the 'world system' (to use the wording of the dependency paradigm), this body of literature does not stand up to close scrutiny. The major weaknesses of these perspectives are related to the fact that, being global and non-distinctive, they do not look at the political and economic forces within the countries. Ignoring the countries' history and politics, dependency theorists tried to explain too much with too little. The cultural imperialist thesis tell us that indigenous cultures are invaded by foreign ones (mainly the US) which has generally a negative impact on the cultural autonomy of the recipient countries. Cultural imperialists have described the media flows and have alerted us to the dangers of 'cultural synchronisation' (see e.g. Hamelink, 1983) but they have not managed to provide adequate answers as to the root causes of this cultural dependency.

The cultural industries approach, resulting largely from the work of Garnham (1990), Collins et al. (1987) and Locksley (1989), has been far more useful in demonstrating why countries such as the US (and indeed Brazil, although it is not mentioned in their work) have competitive advantage in the programming production industry and why recipient countries do not fight back in an attempt to resist cultural homogenisation. Within a broader political economy2 perspective, these authors do not see the asymmetric flow of cultural products as a pre-designed ideological imposition but rather as a consequence of the capital logic of cultural production.

According to Collins et al., the broadcasting commodity 3 is fundamentally different from other non-cultural goods. The essential quality from which it derives its value is immaterial/symbolic and as such it is not destroyed by the act of consumption (1987:6-8). Unlike manufacturing industries, in programming production almost all costs are prototype costs. Each programme is indeed a new (high risk) product (Locksley, 1988). The costs of reproduction and distribution are comparatively very low. 'This means that there are exceptionally high returns to economies of scale leading to a constant push towards audience maximisation' (Garnham, 1990:122). In addition, because of what became known as Baumol's disease 4 , the costs of the broadcasting prototypes - which are inherently labour intensive - have been rising steadily.

In these circumstances, neither the US nor Brazil have to impose their products on countries such as Portugal. 'The risks of cultural production can only be lowered to an acceptable level by a high and sustained level of investment in a whole production programme' (Garnham, 1990:122). The Portuguese broadcasting system cannot afford a sustained level of investment and has no production programme. Both the US and Brazil have an important competitive advantage: they have huge domestic markets which enable their companies to recoup investments within the country. So, broadcasting products can be sold in the international market at marginal costs (no anti-dumping 5 legislation has been used so far). Once these programmes are very cheap, it is economically more rational for the Portuguese broadcasting companies to buy their products in the international market rather than make their own investments in 'home' productions.

The cultural industries approach has relevant aspects for the Portuguese broadcasting scenario. It partly explains why broadcasting companies do not invest in national productions. However, the lack of investment in national production and the systematic acquisition of cheap poor quality imports is only possible because television policy was so crudely developed by the national authorities. In addition from being asphyxiated by financial constraints, both public service and commercial television have no effective legal restraints and, consequently, programming is unconditionally designed to maximise audiences. Politicians have been almost exclusively concerned with political output and have paid no attention to the consequences of the generalist TV legal framework for programming in general.
 
 

2.3. Neo-realism and the Emphasis on the Nation-state

Although it is quite clear that there are increasing levels of international connections between Portuguese communications and international organisations and markets, it still can be argued that the nation-state remains the main locus of power in terms of defining policies for Portuguese communications. So, in a neo-realist perspective, this study recognises the multiplying interdependencies amongst states, but argues that the core characteristics of the state have not been lost.

Realism has been challenged since the 1960's because its shortcomings were becoming too obvious and new perspectives were needed to explain the increasing complexities and developments in the international scene. But soon after realism began to tremble in the 1970's, a number of authors (Waltz, 1979; Cohen, 1974; Tucker, 1977; Bull, 1984; Krasner, 1978; Gilpin, 1984) fought back and re-asserted some of the realist original views and developed these perspectives taking into consideration most recent changes. More recently, writers such as Giddens go as far as to imply that the gigantic growth in international organisations was no more than a reflection of the strengthening of the world system of states (1985:263) - thus, that interdependency amounts to no more than the solidification of inter-state power relations. Giddens argues that 'international relations are not connections set up between pre-established states, which could maintain their sovereignty power without them: they are the basis upon which the nation-state exists at all' (1985:263). Mayall represents a more moderate perspective, stating that the modern world is still a world of states, but states which are forced to coexist in a more uncomfortable intimacy then ever before (1982:4).

Advances in telecommunications are often seen by pluralists as good examples of interdependence and globalisation. However, even in this area, the states continue to play a crucial role. Most operators remain dependent on their national markets which are mainly regulated by national governments. The state is equally decisive for the internationalisation of the so-called 'global' operators such as AT&T, MCI and BT. Even when functions such as standards, tariff setting and market entry are being decided in international bodies, states remain powerful entities, backing national delegations and promoting their industries and operators. The same logic applies to the broadcasting sector where national markets are still of crucial importance and where the state still has an important role to play in the definition of policies.

Despite the unquestionable intensification of transnational links, pluralists went too far in the dismissal and/or devaluation of some realist concepts and ideas. The empirical evidence in this study shows that the basic assumption of realism and interdependency are not exclusive of one another: there is more interdependency and states are still crucial actors in the international scene. As far as the Portuguese case is concerned, the previous considerations about dependency and interdependency do not imply that the state has lost its grip over the definition of national communications. In the telecommunications sector, the government's ability to determine political outcomes has been eroded by the EU but there is still ample room for manoeuvre. Particularly in the broadcasting arena, the EU's impact has been so minimal that literally all important measures have been taken by national governments.
 
 

3. IR Integration Theories and EU Communications Policy: What Can Be Proved and Disproved?
 

What has been said so far suggests that the Portuguese telecommunications and broadcasting sectors have developed quite distinctively in their relation with the EU. In the broadcasting sector, there is no discernible relationship as EU policies are not adequately developed and member states can still decide by themselves on all crucial issues. In the telecommunications sector however there has been considerable integration. The main reasons for these differences can be explained (partly at least) with the help of integration theories. The inter-paradigmatic debate did not provide us with adequate explanations as to the nature and the speed of the linkages established between member states and the EU. Despite the frailty of these linkages, the EU has been the most influential international actor in Portuguese communications.

The point of departure for integration theories is the perception that either for political or economic reasons an enlargement of space is needed, from separate national territories to wider regional areas. Amongst various traditions of thought about international integration, we will outline federalism, pluralism, functionalism and neo-functionalist, though the latter will prove to be more relevant than the others. Though the model of a consociational democracy cannot be understood as an integration theory, we believe that it will provide some useful analytic tools for this section.
 
 

3.1. Federalism and Pluralism

Federalists see the ultimate goal of integration as being the creation of a supra-national state which possesses sufficient political authority and coercive and material power to satisfy the member-states' needs for collective defence, internal security and economies of scale. In explaining the process of integration, federalists tend to rely heavily on the purely political elements of power and bargaining. Pluralist thought is altogether different; according to this school, the integrated community is no more than a system of independent states, although co-operative interaction between them is perceived as intense. It assumes that states can learn to govern their shared relations without losing part of their sovereignty to a higher entity (Pentland, 1975:12). These two bodies of literature tend to see the final goal of the integration process very distinctively. While federalists argue for a supra-national state, pluralists argue for a community of states. However, both share the emphasis on political forces rather than economic in the integration process.

A federalist vision of the EU has not materialised and, in the near future at least, is not a genuine possibility. Notwithstanding the Maastricht Treaty, resistance against further integration is not only deepening in the UK - it has allies within all member states. Indeed, at this stage, the EU is still a 'community of states'. It is the Council, not the Commission, which has actual power, and national politicians generally represent domestic interests. However, this is not to say that there has not been noticeable political and economic convergence. This convergence is far more noticeable in the telecommunications sector than in broadcasting.

Since the 1987 Telecommunications Green Paper, the EU managed to open up the terminal equipment market and has effectively moved into areas such as value-added services, satellite and mobile communications. In one decade, the telecommunications sector transformed itself in a crucial issue in the EU economic and inherently political integration. Still, as Michalis and Hills have demonstrated, despite the increased saliency of telecommunications to the EU project, there is little prospect of one regulatory regime for the sector: 'although the EU may be increasing its regulatory activity in the fields of standardisation and structural competition, the mechanisms of regulation over domestic tariffs, universal service obligations and quality of service are likely to remain weak and based at national level for the foreseeable future' (1995:3).

Progress in the EU intervention in the telecommunications sector was not followed by progress in broadcasting which remained an all together different case. The Commission linked broadcasting to the telecommunications sector on the basis that it was a 'tele-service' and, as such, relevant to economic integration. But this logic does not alter the fact that broadcasting is closely tied up with the way politicians project themselves on the national sphere. Hence, the recognition of the economic relevance of the broadcasting services, did not - in any way - convince them that any relevant power over the broadcasting field should be transferred to the European level. The EU intervention in this sector is therefore so minimalist that one can argue that - in practical terms - member states can decide on all relevant issues. The 1989 broadcasting directive (89/552/EEC) enshrines the objective of creating a common market in television broadcasts and programme supply (though establishing protective measures regarding violence, pornography and advertising content) but - because resistance was so strong, the most controversial issues in the Green Paper were dropped. Even programme quotas are perceived as being totally irrelevant because its provision is only politically (not legally) binding.
 
 

3.2. Functionalism, Neo-functionalism and the Spill-over Process

Both in federalist and in pluralist thought, the process of integration is mainly political, attitudes and behaviour of those holding power is a determining factor. And this is where these ideas clash with a functionalist perspective. Functionalist thinking could be summed up in a basic idea: function before structure. They were reluctant to, in an a priori manner, argue for a structural goal and believed that any integration process should be flexible and adaptive. Neo-functionalism is basically the adjustment of functionalist ideas to the development of Europe as a Community. This theory has achieved such prominence in the field that is often perceived as 'the' theory of European integration.

Indeed, neo-functionalism is the theoretical body specifically conceived to support the creation and development of the EEC. From the observation of functioning patterns of organisations like the European Coal and Steel Community, both politicians and academics noted the applicability of functionalist ideas. The most crucial initial formulations of neo-functionalism were Haas' (1958) study on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and Lindberg's (1963) study on the European Economic Community (EEC). But even before, on the 9th of March 1950, Schuman declared what turned out to be a particularly significant statement: 'Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single, general plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, which create a de facto solidarity'.

The logic of this theory is that the different European actors cannot achieve their aims without a progressive transference of power to the centre. 'After a while, these actors discover that they can only fulfil their original purpose if they confer more authority on the collective decision-making apparatus and also act together in other related functional fields' (Hodges, 1978:246). In this perspective, the EU integration is not the result of original commitment to supranationalism but a consequence of the perception that individual interests would be better served by the extension of competence to supranational institutions. Integration would therefore be achieved through a step by step process. One action would demand another one to make it effective and, from this 'spill over' process (or forward linkage), a de facto political union would be achieved.

Until the mid-1960's, the construction of Europe was indeed developing according to what neo-functionalists and EEC founders had predicted. But these expectations and early successes were shattered by the 1965 institutional crisis which was followed by the stagnation of the integration process during the 1970's and early 1980's. Substantial forward movement has developed since the mid-1980's, particularly due to the Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1991). But deep setbacks have not been far away: the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty (later revoked), the collapse of the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) and the Union's failure in the Balkans crisis brought back the concept of 'Europe à la carte'. Neo-functionalism has no explanatory frame to justify why, in certain moments of the EU's history, nation-states and other national actors do not recognise any interest in the transference of power from the peripheries to the centre. Furthermore, it does not explain how an inter-governmental institution (the Council) ends up controlling the EU decision-making process.

In parallel with the overall EU integration process, developments in communications give some credence to neo-functionalism but cannot be fully explained by it. As early as 1957, the Commission tried to co-ordinate postal services which were at the time closely related to telecommunications (usually operating under the same organisation). But the Treaty of Rome did not specifically provide the EEC with competencies to intervene in telecommunications and neither national governments nor the PTT's wanted to see the EU intervening in this area. In the 1970's, the Commission tried, though not very successfully, to gain a grip on telecommunications by linking it to information technology (IT) products. IT was politically a more relevant area and the gap between Europe and the US/Japan was far more evident. The Commission argued that intervention was needed in both IT and telecommunications if Europe was to remain competitive in the international arena. Still, the hostility of governments and PTT's was so strong that only in the 1980's was the EU able to develop a policy framework for telecommunications.

Essentially since the mid-1980's, and in spite of the reluctance of governments and PTT's, other actors (mainly big business and manufacturers) have actively lobbied the Commission to enter telecommunications policy. Manufacturers wanted a community-scale market to compete with the US and Japan (extensive re-regulation and liberalisation was already underway in both countries) and, of course, financing for R&D programmes. Big business was also arguing that without better and cheaper telecommunications, European companies would be at a disadvantage in the international market. The Commission seized this opportunity and started developing a policy framework which culminated in the crucial 1987 Telecommunications Green Paper (COM (87)290,30.06.87). Being a discussion document, the Green Paper required subsequent legislation if policy-orientations were to be implemented. Indeed, mainly after 1989, various directives were passed, for instance, on the creation of common services, equipment and network markets. The non-discriminatory access to the network was guaranteed by the Open Network Provision (ONP) directive.

The EU intervention in telecommunications was not an easy venture but the Commission has learnt from past experiences and in the late 1980's and 1990's took a more pragmatic approach. The Commission has been pushing for further integration and indeed there has been some spill over from one policy area to another. From initial attempts to intervene in postal services, the Commission shifted its efforts to information technology in the 1970's and into telecommunications in the 1980's. Notwithstanding the difficulties to gain some control over the telecommunications sector, it was even more difficult for the Commission to intervene in broadcasting. Broadcasting is a highly sensitive issue and therefore national politicians were not prepared to see the Commission extending its authority into what they perceive as a 'cultural' matter. In these circumstances, the Commission had no alternative but to argue that broadcasting was a tele-carried service and that it was crucial to the economic integration of the Community. The EU managed to enter yet another policy area considering it part of telecommunications services but only in limited terms. It can intervene in some economic matters and it can use the Commission's limited spending power to develop, for instance, national audio-visual production.

Neo-functionalists were right to point out that integration would be a step by step process and that no a priori goals should be settled once the process would be adaptive and flexible. Despite numerous setbacks, the Commission managed to move forward from intervention in postal services to intervention on IT and, from IT to telecommunications and, last but not least, from telecommunications to broadcasting. There has been a spill-over process from one policy area to another which gives credit to a neo-functionalist perspective. Where neo-functionalism fails is in its assumption that European and national actors would realise that their interests would be better served if more power was conferred to the centre. In fact, on too many occasions, actors did not recognise any interest in moving forward and the Commission (often divided about its own policies6) had to struggle to keep integration going.

Both in telecommunications and broadcasting, national governments, PTT's and public broadcasting companies have been very reluctant to transfer power to the centre. Other national actors, mainly big business and private telecommunications and broadcasting operators, see the EU as a way of attempting to circumvent domestic directions or policy options which are against their interests. Basically, whilst the Commission has been quite consistently pushing for further integration, national governments and actors have been selective in their approach. They pick and choose - according to their interests - as to which policy areas further integration is desirable. Given the inexperience of Portuguese authorities in the EU, governments have never publicly showed any serious dissatisfaction with the way integration was proceeding. National interest groups, however, have moved quite differently, depending on their perception of what suits best their own goals. The power of political and economic elites makes us consider the consociational theory as an alternative/complementary model to explain the integration process in the communications arena.
 
 

3.3. Consociationalism and the Anti-democratic Tendency of the Elites

Consociationalism in itself is not an integration theory but its application is useful to understand in which way governments and interest groups have used the EU integration process. The consociational perspective was first developed by Lijphart (1968, 1969) within the comparative government body of literature. Lijphart (1979) sees a consociation as having four main aspects. First, it relates to a number of groups which are in some sense insulated from each other, in that their interests and associations are more inwardly directed than overlapping with those of members of other groups in the same state so authority within that state is segmented in relation to such groups. Second, the state is dominated by what Dahrendorf called a cartel of élites. The political elites of the various segments are each involved in some way on a continuous basis in the process of decision making and decisions are the product of agreements and coalitions among the members of the cartel. The third principle is an extension of the previous one. It is that all the political elites should have the right to veto decisions which they disapproved. The majoritarian principle, characteristic of other forms of democracy, is suspended in favour of the requirement of consensus, though it might apply within the segments. Finally, is the law of proportionality which means that the various segments of the population have proportionate representation among the major institutions of the state (e.g. the bureaucracy, legal system, etc.) .

The central problem of this theory is therefore how to maintain stability in the permanent tension of elites' interests. The leaders are always trying to conciliate the preservation of the system with the interests of the groups they represent. 'The essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilize the system' (Lijphart, 1969:213). Consociationalism has been used simultaneously to describe deeply divided societies (e.g. Northern Ireland, South Africa, Israel) and as a way of solving problems of existing divided societies.

Differently from previous approaches, Paul Taylor (1990) argues that consociationalism can be fruitfully applied to the European integration process mainly because, unlike other theories of integration, consociationalism highlights the politics of the relationship between the leaders and the led, and the way in which the interests of the former may depart from those of the latter during the process. 'The theory suggests the possibility that élites will become more determined to strengthen controls over their own segments as integration proceeds: there may be cases, indeed, where regional integration helps to reinforce the anti-democratic tendencies of the élites' (1990:176-177). According to Taylor, a worse case suggested by the theory is a conspiracy of elites to promote their own interests even when these conflict with those of the segments which they nominally serve (1990:177). Hence, the integration process seems to provide an opportunity for the elites to favour their own.

Although the Commission has been trying to reinforce its power in terms of communications policy, integration has not been a linear process. In fact, both in telecommunications and broadcasting, national elites have been acting according to their own interests which are not necessarily the interests of the majority of the people. As Hills and Papathanassopoulos point out, the telecommunications RACE programme was delayed by West Germany most probably because it would support manufacturers in competition with Siemens (1991:140-141). In broadcasting too, it can be said that the final version of the television directive does represent the interests of private broadcasters in the sense that they were allowed to broadcast across borders without many of the original constraints laid down in earlier versions of the draft directive. Still, due to their relative light weight in the EU, neither the Portuguese government nor national elites/actors would be able to cause any dramatic slowing down in the integration process. However, telecommunications and broadcasting elites have been able to use selectively the 'integration factor' in their own favour.

In telecommunications, Portugal traded off EU policy directions for a poorly financed package deal. Portugal has lost some control over national affairs, but economic and scientific elites - mainly concentrated in Lisbon - have benefited from the move. According to Caraça et al.(1993), the Lisbon region accounted for more than 72% of the national participations in EU R&D programmes and, although the financial impact of European R&D programmes was globally small (around 5% of gross expenditure in R&D), it was locally very significant (around 40% of the research budget of participating teams). These figures suggest that - in the telecommunications sector - those who have benefited the most from the EU handouts were a limited number of operators, research centres and universities in the capital. For these economic and scientific elites, the EU financial support was very relevant indeed. So, it comes as no surprise that these actors tend to favour EU intervention in the telecommunications sector. The elites recognise interest in moving towards further integration where financial rewards are available.

In any case, such trade-offs are non-existent in the broadcasting sector. The Commission had far more difficulty in entering into the broadcasting domain and its position is still rather weak. Programmes such as MEDIA 92 and MEDIA 95 are not at all relevant for Portugal and therefore national broadcasting companies have not expressed much interest in participating in such programmes and in further policy convergence in the broadcasting sector. Yet, this does not mean that the EU has not been used by interest groups in the pursuit of their own interests. The Union has been used particularly as a testing ground when interest groups are not satisfied with domestic decisions. For example, the Portuguese private broadcasting company, TVI, has formally complained to the Competition directorate against the state subsidisation of RTP (the public service company). TVI has argued that state subsidies were against EU competition laws. Using EU internal contradictions in the broadcasting sector, domestic interest groups are attempting to get outside the country the political support they are not getting from national authorities.
 

In the future, the EU internal contradictions and political ambiguities are bound to create even more difficulties in the development of a comprehensive national communications policy. National actors which are not pleased with domestic decisions will continue to use the EU as a testing ground, in an attempt to benefit from the Union's inability to gain consensus in controversial areas. On the one hand, this will blur the already fragile national accountability mechanisms as governments can be excused by the views of a given Commission DG; on the other hand, democratic procedures themselves have been eroded particularly since the Commission has never been voted for and most European citizens perceive it as an impenetrable and remote institution. In the communications scene the EU is not providing any vision or leadership while diminishing the confidence of national governments such as Portugal (with lack of experience in the international fora) in developing a more coherent and comprehensive national communications policy.

Although the consociational model does not fully describe EU actions, it is relevant in the sense that it provides a framework to understand the trade-offs between national and regional interests. The EU positions are, according to this model, those on which some consensus can be reached: where the ensuing package can be sold to each nation by its leaders. The model also fits within the representation of interests in the Union's policy-making. Dominated by European business and state elites, it excludes from its political agenda concern for the individual person or the social impact of technology (Hills and Papathanassopoulos, 1991:141).
 
 

4. Theories of the State, the National Policy-making Process and Communications Policies
 

The IR inter-paradigmatic debate provided us with some analytic tools to examine Portuguese communications in the international context whilst integration theories helped us to understand the way EU communications policies have developed. As far as the Portuguese case is concerned, the previous considerations about dependency, interdependency and regional integration do not imply that the state has lost its grip over the definition of national communications policies. Though Mayall (1982) is right in emphasising that states are now forced to coexist in a more uncomfortable intimacy than ever before, national governments still play a crucial role in determining their own domestic policies. So, if we want to analyse the Portuguese communications policy, we must - first and foremost - concentrate on the national level of analysis, trying to understand the state in its complexity. For that purpose, we will cover different theories of the state and we will emphasise the most relevant aspects of those to Portuguese politics and communications. Searching for a single theory of the state appears to be less useful than adopting a more eclectic approach which draws on the strengths of each one.

Before analysing the theories of the state, we will very briefly refer to some of the complexities that the concept of state entails. The state is bound to be difficult to define and any sharp definition will necessarily unleash criticisms. None the less, it is generally accepted that a definition depends on distinguishing the state from society and that the line between the two is difficult, if not at all impossible, to draw. Schmitter says that the modern state seems to be an amorphous complex of agencies with ill-defined boundaries, performing a great variety of not very well distinctive functions (1985:33). System theorists did not recognise any value in the concept as an analytical toll because the state was a 'symbol of unity', a 'myth' (Easton, 1953). But, as Nettl pointed out, although the concept was out of fashion in the social sciences, it retains a skeletal, ghostly existence that no amount of conceptual restructuring can dissolve (1968:559).

New advocates of the statist approach, such as Nordlinger and Krasner, do not appear to shed light on the problematic relationship between the state and society. According to Mitchell (1991), the new advocates of the statist approach have not filled in the organisational contours. 'They have retreated to narrower definitions, which typically grasp the state as a system of decision-making. The narrower focus locates the essence of the state not in the monopolistic organization of coercion, nor, for example, in the structures of a legal and ideological order, nor in the mechanisms by which social interests find political representation, nor in the arrangements that maintain a given relationship between the producers of capital and its owners, but in the formation and expression of authoritative intentions. Constructed as a machinery of intentions - usually termed 'rule making', 'decision-making' or 'policy making' - the state becomes essentially a subjective realm of plans, programs, or ideas' (1991:82).

Nordlinger's view of the state is, in fact, quite narrow as he believes that it made up of and limited to those individuals who are endowed with society wide decision-making (1981, 1987). Nordlinger's emphasis on individuals rather than institutionalised structures in the study of the state is defended on the grounds that institutions themselves do not have preferences or act on them, but merely influence the way individual officials do so (1987:362). Like Nordlinger, Krasner believes that the state should be understood essentially as a subjective process of policy making (1978). Though both Nordlinger and Krasner reduced the state to state officials' policies, these perspectives prevent - at least - the deification of the state and advantageously bring the role of the individuals into the discussion.

Having critically analysed system and statist theorists, Mitchell (1991) argues that an alternative approach to the state would involve five propositions. First, the state should not be taken as a free-standing entity, whether an agent, instrument, organisation or structure, located apart from and opposed to another entity called society. Second, the distinction between state and society should nevertheless be taken seriously, as the defining characteristic of the modern political order. The state cannot be dismissed as an abstraction or ideological construct and passed over in favour of more real, material realities. Third, the prevailing subjectivist view of the state as essentially a phenomenon of decision making or policy is inadequate. Its focus on one disembodied aspect of the state phenomenon assimilates the state-society distinction to the same problematic opposition between conceptual and material. Fourth, the state should be adressed as an effect of detailed processes of spatial organisation, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which created the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society. The essence of modern politics is not policies formed on one side of this division being applied to or shaped by the other, but the producing and reproducing of this line of difference. Finally, these processes create the effect of the state not only as an entity set apart from society, but as a distinct dimension of structure, framework, codification, planning and intentionality. The distinctions between abstract and concrete, ideal and material, and subjective and objective, which most political theorising is built upon, are themselves partly constructed in those mundane social processes we recognise and name as the state.
 
 

4.1. The Authoritarian Tradition

Authoritarianism is not commonly used to analyse political systems in Western societies because it is understood as the opposite of democracy and - at this point in history - all Western states have a set of democratic institutions. Portugal is no exception but 50 years of authoritarian rule (brought to an abrupt end in 1974) left its mark and it must be taken into consideration when using analytic tools such as elitism, pluralism, corporatism and policy networks to examine the current political framework in the country.

Authoritarianism derives from 'authority' which has never been (at least until recently) a pejorative word. However, it is clear that nowadays authoritarianism indicates an excess or abuse of authority which crushes peoples' most fundamental liberties. Sartori (1987: 189) tries to explain how authority generates authoritarianism and the feed-back of the new term on the old one. Authoritarianism as a name for a political system was coined by fascism and was intended as a laudatory term; it was indeed meant to carry over to a dictatorial state the favourable attributes or associations of authority. As the label was received in the democratic camp, the value connotation was inverted, and the meaning was readjusted accordingly. For its propounders, authoritarianism was a regime in which 'true authority' was restored - as against the putrefaction of the decadent, authority-less 'pluto-democracies'. For the democrats, authoritarianism was instead a regime that counterfeits and abuses authority.

Linz (1964, 1975), one of the most eminent authors on authoritarianism, has worked out a typology of authoritarian regimes using two criteria: the character of their limited pluralism and the degree of apathy or demobilisation of their citizenry. The first takes into account which particular groups are allowed to participate and the second, the nature and the extent of political mobilisation. Linz calls authoritarian systems dominated by a bureaucratic-technocratic-military elite (in which there are few channels, if any, for participation), bureaucratic-military regimes. The authoritarian regimes in which there are a variety of groups and institutions established by the state to allow participation were called organic-statist. In the organic-statist regimes, the elite consciously attempt to go beyond bureaucratic-military government by mobilising and controlling participation through 'organic' structures such as family, parish, municipality, co-operatives, professional associations, among others. If these concepts are to be applied to the Salazar regime, the organistic-statist model seems more adequate.

Although there is no consensus among academics as to the nature of the Salazar regime (see, among others, Martins, 1969; Schmitter, 1974, 1975, 1979; Lucena, 1976, 1982, 1984, 1985; Cruz, 1980, 1988), it is widely acknowledged that it cannot be fully understood in the context of European fascisms. Recognising some similarities with Fascism and Nazism, Cruz argues that Salazarism distanced itself from these regimes at several levels. Ideologically, it had a Catholic basis and renounced totalitarianism; constitutionally it was an hybrid regime: full democracy was rejected but a representative electoral system was designed; despite its military origins, Salazarism was not a militarised regime (1988:37). To sum up, the regime can be seen as 'anti-liberal nationalism, anti-democratic authoritarianism and anti-socialist corporatism' (1988:37). Other authors - when comparing Salazarism to other authoritarian regimes - put an emphasis on its lack of subversive ideology and deep conservative nature (see e.g. Martins, 1969; Lucena, 1976, 1984; Pinto, 1990). Indeed, both Salazar himself and the regime's small political elite were keen to control the country, maintaining order and stability, without actually transforming it. Its core elements such as Catholicism, rural life and family values were to be preserved at all cost.

The authoritarian tradition cannot be ignored in the analysis of current national politics because, despite the apparent repudiation of the entire Salazarist legacy during the 1974-1976 revolutionary period, the rupture was far from fundamental. The regime's police and para-military forces were eradicated, special courts for political crimes were eliminated and political liberties were restored (e.g. freedom of expression, association, etc.). However, as Santos points out, the administrative system kept its structure intact, the police and the military - once they had adhered to the new regime - maintained their configuration, the judicial system and the social security system also remained largely untouched. The Catholic Church, one of the most important ideological pillars of the regime, was equally saved from criticism and did not undergo any relevant transformation (1992:27).

This idea of continuity rather than change is further reinforced by Maxwell (1986). He states that the political system which emerged in Portugal after 1976 was based on a truce, a truce that muted but did not resolve the hostilities. 'The contradictions beneath the compromise, however, are part of the explanation for the instability of the constitutional governments to act effectively or to resolve the structural problems that Portugal must solve' (1986:135). In fact, despite the dramatic events of 1974 and 1975, much in Portugal did not change. 'The social composition of the new political class differs little from that of the old regime. The bureaucracy remains in place, merely expanding to accommodate a new political clientele superimposed upon, rather than being modernised by the infusion of new people and ideas (1986:135-136). Particularly until the country's accession into the EEC, in 1986, political turmoil and social upheaval did not favour the development and implementation of a daring programme of reforms. Over the last ten years, during the three Cavaco Silva's terms in office (two of which with absolute majority), economic growth has been prioritised in detriment of social reforms. Hence, although the authoritarian inheritance cannot fully explain the current national policy-making process, it can be argued that any a-historical analysis of the state is bound to be deceptive.
 
 

4.2. Elitism and the Concentration of Power

The idea that political power is concentrated in the hands of a minority of the population goes back to the classical elite theorists, the Italian sociologists Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) and Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941) and the German Robert Michels (1876-1936). They were particularly concerned with examining the existence and nature of a single cohesive elite which dominates the affairs of a society. They were convinced that the existence of a political elite was not only necessary but also an inevitable feature of all societies. 'Among the constant facts and tendencies that are to be found in all political organisms, one is so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye. In all societies - from societies that are meagrely developed and have barely attained the dawning of civilisation, down to the most advanced and powerful societies - two classes of people appear - a class that rules and a class that is ruled' (Mosco, 1939: 50).

Pareto, Mosca and Michels believed that they had established a scientific theory asserting that government by a small elite over the rest of society could not be avoided. With this main argument in mind, their immediate targets were twofold. 'First, classical elitists claimed that Marxist theory, which pervaded most European socialist parties by 1890s, was a flawed and limited explanation of the persistence of domination in human societies. Second, against the prevailing liberal optimism of their time, they argued that the transition to an industrialised society with a system of representative democracy could not fundamentally alter the stratification of society into a ruling elite and a mass. Social mobility and elite circulation might increase, and the ruling group might become more heterogeneous, but government must remain oligarchic' (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 138). But the elitist thesis does not merely assert that in a society the minority takes decisions and the majority obeys. The argument goes further: it says that the dominant minority cannot be controlled by the majority, whatever democratic mechanisms are used. 'Historical evolution mocks all the prophylactic measures that have been adopted for the prevention of oligarchy. If laws are passed to control the domination of the leaders, it is the laws which gradually weaken, and not the leaders' (Michels, 1915: 423). Not surprisingly, attacks on Marxism and liberal democracy were taken up enthusiastically by European fascist ideologies during the 1920s and 1930s.

A quite different version of elite theory evolved in the work of Max Weber. He talked about 'democratic elitism' as a way of conciliating key elements of previous elite approaches with pluralism. In fact, two aspects of his arguments have had an enormous significance: the compatibility of bureaucracy and democracy, and the stress on elite competition. Max Weber was particularly concerned with the development of bureaucratic systems of administration to carry out the responsibilities taken on by the state from the nineteenth century onwards. As Weber (1947) notes, bureaucracies have both positive and negative aspects: positive in that they offer an efficient way of organising administration; and negative because they open up the possibility of power being vested in officials who were accountable neither to the public nor politicians (Ham and Hill, 1984: 30).

Modern elite theory is represented by Wright Mills (1956). In a study of the USA in the 1950s, Mills drew attention to institutional position as a source of power, and suggested that the American political system was dominated by a power elite occupying key positions in government, business corporations and the military. Mills was convinced that the status and composition of an elite cannot properly be explained in terms of the talents or psychology of its individual members but must be studied in the context of the economic and social structure of the particular society. Positions of power are not carved out by 'great men' but are attached to certain roles in society (Parry, 1980: 52). According to Mills, power in modern society is institutionalised. So, the elite is composed of those who hold the leading positions in the strategic hierarchies. This approach is considerably different from psychological approaches which emphasise human attributes in the development of elites.

Although Mills argues differently from classical elite theorists, he shares their belief that power is getting more and more concentrated in the hands of small but cohesive elite. At least in the American case, where his empirical studies were done, Mills is convinced that it is the concentration of the power elite, not its diffusion, which is the 'major clue to our condition' (Parry, 1980: 54). In any case, the core of the elitist doctrine is that there exists a minority of people which takes the vast majority of decisions affecting the entire society. This thesis is often considered very radical because it not merely asserts that a minority takes decisions and the majority obeys but it also argues that the dominant minority cannot be controlled by the majority, whatever democratic mechanisms are used.

Although elitism as a basic model is quite generalist, it can be applied to the Portuguese political context. The tradition of centralisation and control we have previously referred to has not disappeared overnight. During the authoritarian regime, the Council of Ministers - chaired by Salazar - was the core of the decision-making and the sole locus of actual power. The National Assembly and the complex corporatist apparatus were - in practice - of minimal weight. All major political decisions were taken by Salazar himself with the advice of a very few senior politicians, frequently close friends. Involvement of the citizenry in the decision-making process was virtually impossible both through corporations and through the União Nacional (kind of national party, but legally a civic association). The general public was controlled through media censorship and propaganda, and through repression of opposition movements. In addition to the government's deliberate measures to demobilise and depoliticise, Portuguese society was largely uneducated and unprepared to get involved in politics. Therefore, the political linkage between citizens and the government was cut off and, in this sense, Salazarism could hardly have been a more elitist regime.

When Portugal adopted a set of Western style democratic institutions, the repressive nature of the state eased off but the political power remained concentrated in the hands of a small minority. The president of the Republic has important reserve powers but he does not intervene in the daily business of the government. The Parliament has continued to neglect its legislative functions and is often perceived as a mere talking arena rather than an effective legislative forum. The core of the decision-making is therefore the prime minister and the governmental departments responsible for the different policy areas. The government team is selected by the prime minister himself mainly for reasons of personal confidence rather than for technical expertise or previous political performance. Secretaries of state and ministers do not have to be elected members of the Parliament and - if the prime minister wishes - they might have a senior position in the executive as their first political job. Democratic governments so far have been packed with ill-prepared members who are remarkably auto-sufficient. They tend to distrust the administrative bureaucracy, they tend to ignore expert advice and - crucially - they are largely unaccountable.

When a small minority of ill-equipped government officials have ample liberties to decide without public debate and consultation, and without being adequately scrutinised by the media or interest organisations (e.g. parties, trade unions, consumer groups, etc.), one can only expect poor quality executives. Indeed, the vast majority of the population ignores why and how decisions are taken. The tradition of secrecy inherited from the authoritarian regime has not faded away: most crucial policy options are still taken behind closed doors. Secrecy and incompetence are certainly related to elitism. If a wider range of people were involved in the policy-making process and if politicians had to publicly justify (in a satisfactory manner) their choices, the country would have an improved political system. The elitist method of decision-making is more open to manipulation than an approach involving public debate and alternative policy proposals.

This has inevitable consequences in the development and implementation of communications policies. Being part of overall public policy, the definition of the most important policies for broadcasting and telecommunications has been done according to the core elements of the elitist model. The selection of the candidacies for the two recent commercial channels was done by the prime minister himself with the advice of a few senior members of the government. The merger of the national telecommunications operators and the subsequent partial privatisation of Portugal Telecom (PT) were decided behind closed doors by the ministro for the tutelage and a very limited number of senior figures within Telecom Portugal (TP), later re-named PT.

At the same time, the elitist nature of Portuguese decision-making process and the inherent lack of accountability makes it possible for politicians to argue in one way whilst acting in a different one. The communications policy in the country has been fertile ground for contradictions and covert policies. In the broadcasting arena, for example, all governments since the 1974 revolution openly defended freedom of expression while developing efficient mechanisms to ensure editorial control over the most influential media. In yet another clear-cut case, according to the Television Law (58/90) the generic objectives of television - both public and private - are i) to contribute to inform the public and to promote cultural values which express the national identity, ii) to contribute to the formation of a critical conscience, stimulating creativity and free expression, iii) to contribute to the entertainment and education of the public and iv) to favour the exchange of ideas between national citizens and foreigners, particularly Portuguese language speakers (article 6). These policy objectives are obviously a dead letter because no specific legislation was developed to enforce them. Instead of what were presented as policy objectives, the Portuguese television audiences are getting reality shows, quiz shows, Brazilian soap operas and American movies.

In the telecommunications sector, the contradictions are less obvious. Being mainly related to the economic development of the country, general telecommunications policy objectives do not have to be hidden from the general public. None the less, recent policy decisions showed that the sector is not immune to confusion and contradictions. Cavaco Silva's governments tried to conciliate liberal ideology with very specific domestic interests. The ministro for Public Work, Transports and Communications, for example, publicly defended liberalisation and competition, stating that the future depended on small/flexible companies while his department was leading the concentration process of the three traditional telecommunications operator under a single one, Portugal Telecom. In yet another example, the government has overtly argued that its first and most crucial objective was to defend the national interest and the interest of Portuguese companies whilst signing the Bangemann report arguing for full competition at all levels.

To the concentration of power in the hands of a few senior politicians, corresponds a geographical concentration of power. In Portugal, the power is not only politically centralised but also geographically concentrated. As the country has no political/administrative regions, all political decisions are taken in the capital where central government departments are located. There is no regional television in continental Portugal and almost all TV production centres and companies are based in Lisbon. Terrestrial broadcasting companies have limited production facilities in Oporto, but these centres have no autonomy and produce mainly local news. The telecommunications operators and companies are also, almost without exception, based in Lisbon. Even if they have offices in other cities, these offices are under the control of Lisbon headquarters. This geographical centralisation is patently inter-related with political centralisation. Both public companies and private companies are as close as possible to the locus of political power.
 
 

4.3. 'Limited' Pluralism and Non-decisions
 

Though the elitist body of literature is particularly relevant to the Portuguese context, we do not mean to say that there is no interest intermediation between the state and interest groups. Most crucial decisions on communications issues are indeed taken by a highly restricted number of senior governmental figures but a limited number of actors manage to gain some control in the decision-making process. Pluralism and corporatism have been traditionally used in the assessment of different types of possible relationships between the state/government and interest groups. We will now examine the relevance of pluralism to our case study.

Political pluralism recognises the existence of diversity in social, institutional and ideological practices. Early exponents of pluralism, such as Schumpeter, associated the functions of the state with promoting democracy, which he regarded as 'that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote' (1947: 269). The idea of electoral representation as a centre piece of pluralism lost some ground, when a leading modern pluralist, Robert Dahl, argued that the activities of groups are central in the pluralist theory of democracy, and that state power was distributed among a wide range of competing groups.

According to Dahl in his classic study of urban politics in New Haven, Who Governs? (1961), no group is without power to influence decision-making, and equally no group is dominant. Any group can ensure that its political preferences and wishes are adopted if it is sufficiently determined. Essentially, in a pluralistic political system power is fragmented and diffused, and the basic picture presented by pluralists is of a political marketplace where what a group achieves depends on its resources. In the British context, Beer (1969) has noted the development of a collectivist theory of representation legitimising a much greater role for groups than earlier conceptions of representative government. Beer argues that as governments sought to manage the economy they were led to bargain with organised groups of producers, in particular worker and employer associations. Basically, governments are interested in consulting or bargaining with groups because they expect to win support and votes with these negotiations.

Pluralists recognise that elitists are correct in emphasising the strength and universality of tendencies towards domination. 'Where these views go wrong is in underestimating the strength of tendencies towards political autonomy and mutual control' (Dahl, 1982:33). Differently from elitism, the core of the pluralist perspective is that the state is relatively autonomous from various competing interest groups. They believe that political power is highly dispersed among interest groups which often fight for contradictory goals. The complex web of pressures operating in society guarantees the equilibrium and stability of the state itself.

The pluralist view is not only in contrast with the elitist body of literature. Dahl in particular was also attacked by Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963) for having merely analysed key decisions and actual behaviour. Bachrach and Baratz introduced the idea of nondecision-making, which is a way of suffocating demands for change in the existing system, before they are even voiced. For them, the main problem of the pluralists' one-dimensional view of power is that they pay too much attention to initiating, deciding and vetoing, and so they neglect the fact that often power is exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to uncontroversial or safe issues. Hence, according to this view, it is important to identify potential issues which nondecision-making prevents from being actual. This critique is quite appropriate as it is believed that decisions are prevented from being taken on potential issues on a regular basis. However, non-decisions on potential issues are difficult to identify and empirical evidence to support findings is bound to be fragile.

In addition to these two distinctive ways of understanding how power can be exercised, Lukes explores a more radical approach, which he calls 'three-dimensional view of power'. He is convinced that the supreme exercise of power is the control of people's thoughts and desires. What one has here is a latent conflict between the interests of those exercising power and the real - not the subjective - interests of those they exclude. Their real interests are what they would want if they were able to make the choice. Lukes argues that people's wants may themselves be a product of a system which works against their interests (1974: 34).

Although Lukes recognise that the two-dimensional view of power (the non-decision-making) represents a major advance over the one dimensional view (the analysis of decisions), he believes that it is nevertheless inadequate because it is still too committed to behaviourism. 'In trying to assimilate all cases of exclusion of potential issues from the political agenda to the paradigm of a decision, it gives a misleading picture of the ways in which individuals and, above all, groups and institutions succeed in excluding potential issues from the political process. Decisions are choices consciously and intentionally made by individuals between alternatives, whereas the bias of the system can be mobilised, recreated and reinforced in ways that are neither consciously chosen nor the intended result of particular individuals' choices (1974: 21). Shaping people's perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things may well be the most effective form of exercising power. Most people would accept the existing order of things if they take it as natural or unchangeable, or if their cannot see an alternative to it.

Although in practical terms, it is difficult to analyse non-decisions and probably impossible to determine the 'real interests of the people if they knew what is best for them', these dimensions alert us to the shortcomings of pluralism when analysing the dispersion of power in society based on concrete political decisions. In the Portuguese case, the Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963) perspective of limiting the scope of decision-making to safe issues is observable. Before the October 1995 legislative elections, for example, the government deliberately abstained from intervening in potentially controversial issues in the media arena such as addressing the financial crisis in the broadcasting sector or setting up mechanisms to implement policy objectives of quality broadcasting. Because controversy could be damaging to their electoral perspectives, the government concentrated its media initiatives on safe issues, namely violence on TV and co-operation with the Portuguese Speaking African countries (PSAC's). The ministro responsible for the media, Marques Mendes, was busy criticising violence on TV (there is a wide consensus amongst academics and the general public that excessive violence in the media is not desirable). Instead of addressing the root causes of poor quality programming (which would inevitably raise criticisms from one group or another), he preferred to criticise the existing broadcasting output, a 'safe' area. In addition to the anti-violence 'crusade', Marques Mendes set up various co-operation plans with the former Portuguese colonies. Although the setting up of public broadcasting companies in these countries, and the re-broadcasting of RTP's material to the PSAC's, impacts on their political sovereignty and culture, these plans were seen at the time as 'harmless' co-operation initiatives which could only improve the level of achievements of the Portuguese executive.

In this case, and according to the non-decision-making perspective, the Portuguese government exercised its power by not intervening in potentially controversial areas, i.e., by suppressing demand for change in the broadcasting sector. Lukes would probably argue that the reason why people accepted political inaction and therefore the current broadcasting scenario is because their preferences have already been shaped by the media, the education system and by the overall socialisation process. Concentrating their attention on what people actually do, pluralists would not lightly accept this thesis because they argue that people's interests correspond to expressed interests. Polsby, for instance, says that - when analysing power relations - research should not go beyond people's expressed preferences (1980:224). It is indeed dangerous to claim that one knows the real interests of the citizens as opposed to the expressed interests. Still, it should not be assumed that the expressed interests and concrete decisions reveal all the picture in terms of power relations and interest intermediation.

As far as the Portuguese case is concerned, the pluralist perspective has clear inadequacies. Naturally, there are interest groups competing for political influence in both telecommunications and broadcasting, but power is not highly dispersed among them. Quite on the contrary, and according to the elitist approach, power is concentrated in the hands of a small minority of senior politicians who have systematically disregarded the views of most interest groups. Even interest groups such as trade unions and consumer associations which were supposed to have a say in policy issues, which were directly related to the interests of the people they represent, have traditionally been ignored. For lack of resources and know how, some groups have no power what so ever. Indeed, because politicians do not feel they have to account for their actions, only a small number of actors (mainly personal friends of government members) can exercise effective power over political outcomes. A close personal relationship with the prime minister and/or with the head of a governmental department is the effective way of ensuring successful lobbying.

Although pluralism is not the most useful approach to analyse the definition of communications policy in Portugal, it is important not to neglect the increase in the number of actors in telecommunications and broadcasting particularly since the opening up of the markets respectively in the late 1980's and early 1990's. In the telecommunications sector, the actors most likely to have any weight in the designing of policies are the telecommunications operator Portugal Telecom (PT); the regulatory institute, Instituto das Comunicações de Portugal (ICP); the public communications holding company Comunicações Nacionais (set up in 1992/93 and dismantled in 1995), and the Associação Portuguesa para o Desenvolvimento das Comunicações, the APDC association which represents business interests. In the broadcasting sector, the most important actors are the public television company Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa (RTP); the Balsemão group which owns a private national TV channel and the Catholic church that controls the second private TV channel. Other institutional actors such as the High Authority for the Media or consumer associations (e.g. Associação Portuguesa dos Telespectadores) have no political significance. Private telecommunications companies and independent television producers per se also play no role, although their interests might eventually be served if properly channelled. So, if one wants to talk about pluralism in the Portuguese communications arena, one would have to say that pluralism is very limited indeed.
 
 

4.4. The Portuguese 'Corporatism' and the Corporatist Come Back

In the analysis of the relationship between the state and interests, pluralism is, in general terms, associated with numerous groups competing to gain access to the policy-making process whilst corporatism is associated with a smaller number of groups co-operating between them and with the state. However, behind this simplistic view, corporatism is a highly complex body of literature which is historically associated with European fascist regimes. The collapse of these infamous regimes coincided with the collapse of corporatism as an 'acceptable' piece of academia. Although corporatism was wiped out of Western Europe, Portugal continued to proclaim itself a corporative state and, in the 1970's, Schmitter (who has done extensive empirical research on Portuguese corporatism) believed that this country presented an excellent and virtually unparalleled opportunity for exploring the nature and consequences of modern corporatism. 'Portugal, one could argue, was for a long time a sort of actualised ideal type relatively uncontaminated by the germs of international strife (thanks to deliberate isolation), exposure to subversive ideologies (thanks to protracted censorship and linguistic marginality), massive upheavals in occupational structure or urban-rural balances (thanks to relative economic and social stagnation), or even crises of political succession (thanks to Salazar's extraordinary personal longevity)' (1975:5-6).

Schmitter considered particularly striking the architectonic effort of a narrow elite, or even of a single man, who explicitly set out to create, from above and in anticipation, institutions of limited representation, participation and influence and of comprehensive administrative control which would insulate that society and state from 'subversion' by either liberalism or socialism, at the same time laying the basis for a capitalist economic system in the absence of a vigorous and autonomous national capitalist class. 'Development without change; participation without freedom; capitalism without capitalists' (1975:7-8). Salazar, the designer of Portuguese corporatism, did not believe either in liberalism or in Marxism, and attempted to engineer an alternative way of organising the relationship between the state and society.

By ideological pedigree, Portuguese corporatism was manifestly and insistently derived from Social Christian, ethically reactionary tradition. By government practice, it more closely approximated to the type advocated by the authoritarian, bureaucratic, nationalist school. In the vocabulary of Manoilesco, it may have been intégral in its attempt to cover all spheres of interest articulation, but it was clearly impur in its consistent subordination of representational units to the imperative command of a highly centralised administrative apparatus and its persistent marginality with regard to the policy-making process (Schmitter, 1975:10). Indeed, despite the complex network of people's houses, syndicates, guilds, corporations supposedly represented in the Corporative Chamber, Salazar never implemented a corporatist regime as described by Schmitter in its widely quoted definition. 'Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically-ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports' (1974a:93-94).

In the Portuguese corporatism, the institutions were there, they just did not operate as a system of interest intermediation. For the largely uneducated and rural population, it was difficult to see how they could benefit from the intricate network of corporate institutions and little interest and support was shown for the corporatist apparatus. Opello argues that Salazar failed to institutionalise corporatism because of the existence of a powerful, highly centralised administrative system in Portugal: 'Behind the façade of corporatism, the actual process was dominated by a bureaucratic elite that made decisions without reference to inputs from the corporations, which were in theory designed to link the citizens to the decisional process (1985:58). Graham calls the Salazar official ideology the 'imaginary of corporatism' (1974:15).

Interestingly enough, the collapse of the Portuguese so-called corporatist regime in the mid-1970's coincided with the revival of corporatism as a theoretical model to analyse liberal/industrial societies (see, e.g. Schmitter, 1997; Panitch, 1980; Cawson, 1986; Grant, 1985; Williamson, 1989). 'It was almost as if Portugal, treading water and/or swimming against the tide for forty years or so, gradually found that the earlier developing, liberal democracies which swam or drifted with the predominant historical currents had been swept in a giant circle. Increasingly, they seemed to be bobbing up alongside this isolated, idiosyncratic and 'backward' country' (Schmitter, 1975:7). However, the corporatist arrangements of liberal democracies were quite different from those in Portugal where the authoritarian political elite bypassed or ignored the corporative complex.

In the 1970's and 1980's, corporatism became a quite successful approach because it represented a credible alternative to pluralism without demanding acceptance of Marxism. According to Jordan and Schubert, this perspective had as a useful sub-text an argument that suggested that societies were economically more efficient if organised on a corporatist basis: 'The more prosperous countries seemed to have corporatist structures' (1992:9) as, for example, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Austria, among others. Authors such as Wolfe (1977) understood the development of corporatism in Western societies as a response to the crisis of late capitalism. Having analysed the history of British corporatism, Middlemas (1979, 1986) argued that interest organisations like trade unions and employer associations changed from mere pressure groups to become part of the state. Unions and employers associations became effective governing institutions (1979:372). In his analysis of the Swedish case, Rothstein (1988) expressed concerns about the fact that the influence of interest organisations has superseded the parliamentary influence and that the demarcation line between the state and the civil society has been blurred by the state's ambition to incorporate every organised interest and to make it an instrument of state policy (1988: 6-8). Effectively, in order to participate in a corporatist system, an interest organisation must be prepared to become part of the political establishment.

Although corporatist links might obviously be identified in several policy areas, it cannot be said that the Portuguese state has a corporatist decision-making process. Both in the past and in the present, there has been little co-operation between organised interest groups and between these and the state, in terms of the design of policies. Corporatism is not particularly relevant to shed light upon the relationship between the Portuguese state and interest groups either in telecommunications or broadcasting. There is no relevant co-operation between telecommunications operators and between them and the state. Similarly, one cannot talk about co-operation between broadcasting companies and between them and the state. The only concrete examples of co-operation are between the state and public companies such as PT (now with 28% of the capital in private hands) and the RTP (totally owned by the state). Still, even if these companies are supposedly autonomous from the government, they can hardly be seen as distinctive from the state apparatus.
 
 

4.5. Policy Networks and the Fragmentation of the Policy Analysis
 

The theories of the state we have examined can be advantageously used in the analysis of the Portuguese policy-making process, in general, and in communications issues, in particular. Nevertheless, there are obvious difficulties with these basic models. They help us to understand some general characteristics of Portuguese communications policy but they are less relevant when trying to explain the distinctiveness and particularities of policy areas such as telecommunications and broadcasting. Taking pluralism and corporatism, for example, it is unlikely that any political process might adequately be associated with solely competition or co-operation. Indeed, as Jordan and Schubert (1992) pointed out, such a distinction is bound to be frustrated when models are applied to reality: 'Empirically these practices [co-operation and competition] are not clear alternatives. Groups involved in relations with the political authorities inevitably utilise both strategies. Competition, for example, between firms or between employers and employees, often co-exists with a consensus on a general political goal (such as economic growth). The consensus that underpins corporatism cannot remove all tensions between the constituent bodies - for example the antagonistic relations between employers and unions' (1992:10).

Just like pluralism and corporatism, the literature on policy networks has been used to analyse the interest group intermediation processes. However, differently from those theoretical constructions, policy network perspectives do not provide an a priori view as to the way groups behave. In fact, much of the current interest in policy network analysis appears to result from the fact that it does not offer a general model of these relationships. By contrast, say Rhodes and Marsh (1992), the policy network approach emphasises the need to desaggregate policy analysis and stresses that relationships between groups and government vary between policy areas. Rhodes and Marsh not only see policy networks as an alternative to both pluralist and corporatist models but also as a meso-level concept. By meso-level concept, they mean that it is a concept which provides a link between the micro-level of analysis, which deals with the role of interests and government in relation to particular policy decisions, and the macro-level of analysis, which is concerned with broader questions concerning the distribution of power within contemporary society (1992:1).

Hanf argues that the term network merely denotes, in a suggestive manner, the fact that policy making includes a large number of public and private actors from different levels and functional areas of government and society (1978:12). McFarland conceptualises an issue network as a communications network of those interested in policy in some area, including government authorities, legislators, businessmen, lobbyists, and even academics and journalists (1987:146). Rhodes uses the Benson's (1982:148) definition of a policy network as 'a cluster or complex of organisations connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the structure of resource dependencies'. However, Rhodes develops this definition and distinguishes various types of networks ranging along a continuum from highly integrated policy communities (see also Richardson and Jordon, 1979) to loosely integrated issue networks (Rhodes, 1986, Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). The policy network literature does not have a theoretical core in the same terms that elitism, pluralism and corporatism have. It reflects the view that a macro-analysis of the state distorts the reality and calls for the development of theoretical 'islands' based on the analysis of specific policy areas.

Although the theories of the state are relevant for our study, the policy networks critique is right to emphasise the need to desaggregate the analysis of domestic policy-making. Indeed, the policy-making process takes place within a variety of policy networks characterised by close relationships, and the study of the overall process must be complemented with the study of the different policy areas. To use the concept of policy networks in the Portuguese context, it is only relevant to talk about the relationship between the prime minister and/or governmental departments and the different actors/groups with an interest in a given policy area. Given what we have previously said about the Portuguese authoritarian tradition and the current elitism, it is the government which has actual power. The Presidency plays no role on day to day affairs and the Parliament is a talking arena, rather than a true legislator. Its powers have been largely marginal.

Broadcasting and telecommunications are, in fact, very distinct policy areas. The prime minister has a direct interest in the broadcasting field and the sector is under his direct control. The network of interests around broadcasting is far from stable, it varies according to specific political developments. Before the discussion which preceded the opening up of the broadcasting market to private interests, the network was quite small and lacked public visibility. However, when it became evident that the RTP monopoly would be broken up, interest in the broadcasting sector has increased and numerous actors came to the fore. The Catholic Church, the Balsemão group, the Sonae group and Proença de Carvalho were particularly active in assessing their chances of winning a TV channel and in lobbying the political establishment. Following the victories of the Church and of Balsemão, the other 'candidates' concentrated on their previous areas of interest. The broadcasting policy network is bound to expand and shrink, depending on what is at stake. Economic and political opportunities appear to induce change in policy networks.

The broadcasting policy network in Portugal has a centre and a periphery in the sense that some elements of the network are far more influential than others. Indeed, many actors have an interest in the sector but few have tangible access to the decision-making process. The centre is obviously the government and the broadcasting companies (RTP, SIC and TVI). They have close links with the political establishment and - most crucially - they have the means to broadcast their dissatisfaction with the political outcome, if they feel that their interests have not been satisfied. Institutional actors such as the High Authority for the Media and non-institutional actors such as trade unions and consumer associations might occasionally have a say but they play no role in the definition of policies.

The prime minister is clearly less involved in the telecommunications sector than in the broadcasting one. Telecommunications has far more economic relevance but has little to do with the way politicians put their message across in the domestic arena. Telecommunications are under the tutelage of the ministério of Public Works, Transports and Communications. The ministério is supposed to set up policies and the regulatory institute, ICP, is supposed to advise the government on policy issues and to regulate. The most relevant actors in this network are the government and the main national operator, Portugal Telecom. ICP can be said to be in the periphery of the centre. Just like in the broadcasting sector, consumer associations and trade unions are in the periphery with little or no actual power. The Portuguese Association for the Development of Communications (APDC) which represents business interests has recently gained considerable influence and it can be perceived as being at the centre of the periphery. Naturally, it has been the groups most directly affected by political decisions which exert most pressure over the political power.

Although broadcasting and telecommunications have always been - and still are - distinctive policy areas, with distinctive political approaches and actors, technological convergence has made some actors move across the networks. The private broadcasting company, TVI, for example, has decided to set up its own basic infrastructure because it had plans to provide telecommunications services such as data transmission and it has been busy arguing for the full liberalisation of telecommunications services in the country. The cable television companies, and TV Cabo in particular, have also been arguing that they would be interested in getting involved in local/regional TV production and are clearly unhappy with the legislation which prevents them from other activities rather than the distribution of third party broadcasts. Technological conversion will inevitably lead to an increased blurring of telecommunications and broadcasting policy networks, but currently these networks are still quite distinctive.
 
 

5. Conclusion

This chapter has set out a theoretical overview of this thesis. Instead of trying to use a single body of literature, we have decided for an eclectic approach which takes on board the strengths from each theoretical perspective. We started by putting the Portuguese communications in the international context with the assistance of IR perspectives. Interdependency and dependency, though not particularly well equipped to analyse the very distinctive situation of Portuguese communications in the international arena, provided useful insights. It can be argued that there is an 'unequal' interdependent relationship between Portugal and the EU in the telecommunications sector. Despite the fact that Portugal could have had negotiated the opening up of its national market far more efficiently, the country managed to get some financial resources to improve its basic infrastructure and to introduce advanced services. On the other side of the equation, the EU got yet another open market and fostered economic and political integration.

Dependency theory describes quite well the current situation of the national broadcasting sector. Indeed, television channels are dependent on foreign imports as national fiction production is practically non-existent. However, this theory does not provide any clear explanation for the fact that Brazil (a former Portuguese colony and - as such - supposed to be trapped in the periphery) ends up playing a crucial role in Portuguese communications. The 'cultural industries' approach, with its emphasis on the economic characteristics of the broadcasting product and production, is therefore more useful to explain the main reasons behind the Portuguese broadcasting scenario.

Telecommunications and broadcasting have developed quite differently in their relation with the EU. None of the previous IR theories have a rationale to clarify why it has happened. We used integration theories and, in particular, neo-functionalism, to demonstrate that there has been a spill over process from one policy area to another, namely from postal services to IT, from IT to telecommunications and from telecommunications to broadcasting. Although consociationalism is not an integration theory per se, it can be used to explain why integration in the broadcasting sector was far more difficult to nurture.

The national political elites were not interested in handing out power in the broadcasting sector which is much more relevant in terms of electoral politics than telecommunications. Furthermore, because there has not been much political support for EU intervention in the broadcasting sector, neither the Council nor the Commission granted substantial financial resources for it. If no relevant financial rewards were available, national companies were not particularly favourable to further integration. The opposite has happened in the telecommunications sector, where financial support and subsidies were available and the national business elites argued for closer links with the EU. These developments demonstrate that the elites use the integration process in their own interest.

Although the links between Portuguese communications and international organisations (mainly the EU) and markets are clearly increasing, this study takes the view that the Portuguese government still has ample room for manoeuvre and that the most crucial communications policies are still taken at national level. In order to analyse the national level of political decision-making and communications, we used various state theories. First we have emphasised the need to consider the Portuguese authoritarian tradition because any a-historical study of the state is bound to be deceptive. Then we have used elitism to demonstrate that the policy-making process in general (including decision-making for communications issues) does not fully take into account the interests of the different interest groups and the interests of the public in general. Power is clearly concentrated in the hands of a small minority of government officials and other democratic institutions such as the Parliament play a minimal role in the process.

This does not mean however that there is no interest intermediation between telecommunications/broadcasting actors and the state. Pluralism and Corporatism emphasise different forms of exercising pressure over the political establishment, but we considered that for the Portuguese context, the 'policy network' body of literature is more relevant. This approach emphasises the need to desaggregate policy analysis and stresses that relationships between groups and government vary between policy areas. Indeed, although there is some movement from the broadcasting policy networks to the telecommunications policy network and vice-versa, the two networks have distinctive actors and perform differentiated tasks.
 
 

Footnotes:

1. These figures are based in the examination of one week of Portuguese television programming (5-12 April 1993).

2. Generally, political economy is a body of literature which examines the production, distribution and consumption of resources, including communications and information products.

3. The broadcasting commodity might be understood as the total set of audience needs which broadcasting attempts to satisfy and the historically given set of productive resources which the broadcasting industry has at its disposal for the fulfilment of that task (Collins et al., 1987:6).

4. W. J. Baumol was the first economist to study the impact of the production costs in the cultural industries. He argued that performing arts were predestined to be victims of a cost disease because the costs of these labour intensive industries would continue to increase while, due to technological advances, production in manufacturing industries would continue to decrease (Baumol and Bowen, 1976).

5. Dumping is usually taken to mean a product exported at below domestic prices.

6. In the broadcasting arena, for example, the most obvious tensions are between the most liberal DGIII and DGIV and the most dirigistes DGX and DGXIII.